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(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or [an international or inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act; or] commits a terrorist act.

[Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-section,--

(a) "public functionary" means the constitutional authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary;
(b) "high quality counterfeit Indian currency" means the counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination by an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency imitates or compromises with the key security features as specified in the Third Schedule.] [(2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.]

25. We may also notice that phrase 'cause or likely to cause' occurring in sub-clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 15 would clearly explain the "width" in which said provision operates. It gets triggered not only on the actual happening of a resultant effect of such terrorist act but also possibility or probability of having the result as enumerated under sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 15 of UAP Act.

26. The prosecution has made an endeavour to bring itself case against the appellants in all or anyone of Section 15(1)(c)(a) or Section 15(1)(c)(b) of UAP Act to establish that "acts" of appellants constitutes terrorist act within the meaning of Section 15 of UAP Act. Alternatively, prosecution has tried to contend that even if mens rea element of "intention to strike terror" is not proved, the case can be brought under or any one of Section 15(1)(a)(i) or (ii) or (iv) or Section 15(1)(c) of the UAP Act. In other words, prosecution has made an attempt to contend that acts of appellants qualified as "terrorist act", since there was an intention to strike terror attracting Section 15(1)(c), using inflammable substances attracting Section 15(1)(a), which cause or likely to cause loss or damage to property attracting Section 15(1)(a)(ii), damage or destruction of property in connection with State Government and Section 15(1)(a)(iv) or overawed by means of criminal force or attempts to do so or attempts to cause death of any public functionary - Section 15(1)(b) and alternatively, such actions would be likely to strike terror attracting Section 15(1) in the people or section of people on the same grounds as mentioned herein before. Thus, it will have to be the endeavour of the court to discern the term "intent to strike terror" in the people from an ordinary crime affecting "public order" from an act of terror having more serious ramifications and to understand the same separately. Hence, it is necessary to discern the meaning of the words "terrorism" and "acts of terror". Thus, it would be worthwhile to notice the authoritative principles of the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in the context of anti-terror legislation such as, TADA and POTA.