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1. This common order shall govern the disposal of 4 civil writ petitions, namely CWP 2796/97, Ms. Deeksha Suri vs. ITAT, CWP 2797/97, Ms. Divya Suri vs. ITAT, CWP 2798/97, Sh. Lalit Suri vs. ITAT and CWP 2299/97, Smt. Jyotsna Suri vs. ITAT. The facts of the four cases and the questions arising for decision therein are common, rather the same, except for a minor deviation on facts in the case of Smt. Jyotsna Suri which would be taken note of at its appropriate place.

2. The facts in brief, which for the sake of convenience are being stated in the succeeding paragraphs from the record of CWP 2796/97 Ms. Deeksha Suri vs. ITAT.

17. In between the filing of the above said two applications yet another important event had taken place. On 18th March, 1997, Mrs. Jyotsna Suri, the petitioner in CWP No. 2299/97 had filed a writ petition of her own challenging the order dt. 3rd January, 1997 passed by Tribunal seeking its quashing followed by a direction to rehear the appeal on merits after recalling the order dt. 3rd January, 1997. We have called for the record of that CWP 1255/97 (Mrs. Jyotsna Suri vs. ITAT & Ors.) and perused the same. The contents of the petition show the following questions of law having been specifically raised before the High Court inviting its adjudication (vide para 7 of the said writ petition) :

28. At the very outset, let us make it clear that the legality or propriety or otherwise of the order dt. 3rd January, 1997 could not have been considered by the Tribunal by way of review. The Tribunal is a creature of the statute. It has not been vested with the review jurisdiction by the statute creating it. The Tribunal does not have any power to review its own judgment or orders. [See Dr. Kaslinath G. Jalmi & Anr. vs. The Speaker & Ors. , Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya , Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradumansinghji Arjunsinghji , Manohar Lal Verma vs. State of MP and CIT vs. ITAT . In the purported exercise of inherent power the Tribunal cannot rehear a case on its merits [CIT vs. K. L. Bhatia (1990) 182 ITR 361 (Del) : TC 8R.1360].

41. We have carefully considered all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. There appears to be a divergence of opinion amongst other High Courts but so far as Delhi High Court is concerned, the law is settled by at least three decisions, namely, Punjab National Bank vs. ITAT, TC 8R.1324, CIT vs. K. L. Bhatia (supra), ITO vs. President ITAT (CW 1010/97, decided on 10th March, 1997). We may quote only from Punjab National Bank's case (supra) :

"In the present case what has happened is that the petitioner had filed an application under s. 256 against the original order of the Tribunal but has not filed any application against the order dismissing the application under s. 254. Merely because the petitioner has chosen not to file an application under s. 256 against the order passed under s. 254 can be no ground for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 226. The petitioner had adequate remedy against the orders passed under s. 254 by moving an application under s. 256(1) and, if the said application was dismissed, by filing a further application under s. 256(2) to this Court. If the petitioner has not been diligent enough and has allowed the period of limitation to expire that by itself can be no ground to persuade this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226. When an adequate alternate remedy is provided to a citizen under the statute it is an exercise of sound discretion that the Court should refrain from exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution".