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Showing contexts for: mandatory injunctions in Misrilal Misra vs Ikram Husein And Co. on 9 December, 1977Matching Fragments
...It has always been, in my opinion, a very open question whether in strictness a mandatory injunction can properly be made on interlocutory applications. In England whatever doubts may have existed on this point may be said to have been removed by Section 25 of the Judicature Act, and it has long been a common place in the text-books that the Courts indubitably have the power to make mandatory injunctions on interlocutory motions.
2. The learned Judge further observes (p. 293):
An examination of this and many other cases which I have gone through, however, leaves me unshaken in the opinion that in strictness no mandatory injunction upon an interlocutory proceeding can ever be temporary.
3. Further the learned Judge at p. 295 expressed his doubts as under:
If we turn to Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, which govern all the Courts of the Mofussil in India, it will be observed that the issue of injunctions upon interlocutory applications is designedly confined to temporary injunctions, and, speaking for myself, I do entertain some doubt whether the Courts in India have any right to assume that in this respect they are on the same footing as the Courts in England, and have the power and a discretion to issue mandatory injunctions upon interlocutory applications.
15. Reading these provisions it would appear that temporary injunctions could be granted in appropriate cases to maintain the status quo as when the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff to use the language of Order XXXIX, Rule 1(c), or appears from the opening provisions of Section 94, which open with the words, "In order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated...." That mandatory injunctions in appropriate cases could be granted to maintain the status quo as on the date of the suit appears to be consensus opinion of all the Courts in India and that is also the established practice. The existence of such power is recognised by Davar, Acting Chief Justice in Champsey Bhimji's case.
33. These two authorities of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Keshavdas could have no application to the exercise of the inherent powers of the Court to grant temporary injunctions under its inherent jurisdiction! when the Court considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so inasmuch as observed by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal's case, it is well-settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. Mr. Keshavdas therefore is not right when he says that the Court has no inherent power to grant temporary mandatory injunctions or that there is no such provision in Order XXXIX or Section 94 of the Civil Procedure Code. Apart from the provisions just pointed out, the Court has inherent jurisdiction to grant injunctions when it is absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to maintain the status quo as at the date of the suit. It would therefore appear that in appropriate cases the Court could grant temporary injunctions when it is absolutely essential for special and adequate reasons for maintaining the status quo as at the date of the suit.