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16. The next contention of the learned counsel for the assessee is that when a debt is secured on a property which is only partially exempt as in the case of s. 5(1)(iv) property and s. 5(1A) properties, since the value of the property over the exemption limit is included in the net wealth of the assessee, s. 2(m)(ii) is not applicable to such cases and the debts secured on those properties should be deducted in arriving at the net wealth of the assessee by the application of s. 2(m) of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the assessee, the working out of s. 2(m)(ii), as suggested by the learned standing counsel, cannot be done in the case of taxing statutes, as taxing statutes are to be construed strictly and in favour of the assessee. Further, the principles of casus omissus applies to s. 2(m)(ii) and the court is not obliged to supply what is not there in the statute and to do so will amount to legislation and not construction.

51. Having observed as above, the Bench proceeded to make the following observations with reference to the facts of that case (p. 80) :

"As we have earlier indicated, the present case is not neatly drawn on simple, uncomplicated, facts. It is not the case of a debt about which we can say that it is secured on an exempted asset. At the same time, we cannot say that it is secured on a taxed asset. The truth is that the debt in question is secured on house property whose value is chargeable to tax as to one-half, and exempted from tax as to the other half. What, then, is its position in terms of the dichotomy in s. 2(m)(ii) ? The position is that it falls between two stools, as it were. It assumes an intermediate, or a third, position. This position s. 2(m)(ii) does not clearly provide for at all, and apparently does not even envisage. It must be a case of casus omissus."

56. In CIT v. National Taj Traders [1980] 121 ITR 535, the Supreme Court stated the rule of casus omissus thus (headnote) :

"A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature."

57. The above being the true principle of casus omissus, a case of casus omissus cannot be readily confined. It is the duty of the court to address itself to the question what exactly was the true intention of the Legislature. Would the Legislature have omitted to provide for the case if the omission had been called to its mind. If the answer is in the negative, then it is the duty of the court to supplement what the Legislature omitted to expressly say and should not decline to do so by taking refuge on the doctrine of casus omissus. We have already seen that s. 2(m)(ii) specifically provides for exclusion of debts secured or incurred in relation to a property on which wealth-tax is not payable. The principle of this rule is, as already stated, to prevent the assessee having a double advantage. That being the case, it is not unreasonable to assume that if the Legislature had applied its mind to an instance where a debt is secured on a property which was partially exempt from chargeability to wealth-tax and partially not, the Legislature would have provided that that portion of the debt which was secured on that portion of the property exempt from chargeability to tax would be outside the purview of the definition of net wealth under s. 2(m). We are, therefore, of the opinion that the doctrine of casus omissus cannot be attracted to an interpretation of s. 2(m)(ii) to hold that when a debt is charged on a property which is only partially exempt from wealth-tax, then the entirety of the debt should be deducted in the computation of net wealth.