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6. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. was filed and was very much on record. The learned Judge, while being fully cognizant of the pendency of such application, proceeded to adjudicate and dispose of the suit without adverting to or passing any order on the said application. Such inaction, in the teeth of a specific statutory procedure, cannot be countenanced. Once a complaint of perjury is formally brought before the Court, it is incumbent upon the Court to either initiate proceedings under Section 340 or to decline the same by recording reasons. A complete omission to consider the application defeats the very object of the provision. In the event of refusal or failure to NC: 2026:KHC:19954 HC-KAR entertain such application, the statute provides a specific remedy by way of appeal under Section 341(1) Cr.P.C.

7. Section 341(1) of Cr.P.C. expressly provides that an appeal shall lie from any order made under Section 340(1) or Section 340(2), or from an order refusing to make a complaint, to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of Section 195(4) Cr.P.C. In the present case, the order impugned emanates from the Court of the Senior Civil Judge. Admittedly, the said Court is subordinate to the Principal District Court in the civil hierarchy. Therefore, having regard to the statutory scheme and the concept of subordination contemplated under Section 195(3) and (4) Cr.P.C., the appeal under Section 341(1) would squarely lie before the Principal District Court and not before this Court. Entertaining the appeal directly before this Court would be contrary to the legislative intent embodied in Sections 340 and 341 Cr.P.C.

9. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court that appeals under Section 341

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 HC-KAR Cr.P.C. would "ordinarily" lie either to the District Court or to the High Court, and that the District Court being the subordinate court amongst the two must be regarded as the appropriate appellate authority, the said principle squarely governs the case on hand. The test, as laid down, is objective in nature and hinges upon the ordinary appellate hierarchy of the court from which the order emanates. Since the order impugned arises from the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, whose decrees and orders ordinarily lie in appeal before the District Court, the Principal District Court alone would have the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under Section 341(1) Cr.P.C. Any deviation from this settled position would run contrary to the statutory scheme as well as the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra). Consequently, the impugned order, having overlooked the binding ratio and having assumed jurisdiction contrary to law, suffers from patent illegality and perversity.

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 HC-KAR clear that notice to such person is not mandatory before forming an opinion and making a written complaint. It is only after the complaint is forwarded to the jurisdictional Magistrate and the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process that the alleged offender would be brought within the fold of criminal proceedings.

11. In the present case, the application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner has not even been entertained on merits by the Court of first instance. The refusal or inaction on the part of the said Court compelled the petitioner to invoke the appellate remedy under Section 341 Cr.P.C. At this stage, what is under consideration is merely the correctness of the order declining to act under Section 340. The proceedings have not progressed to the stage of formation of opinion leading to a written complaint, much less to the stage of cognizance by the Magistrate. Therefore, issuance of notice to respondent No.1 at this appellate stage would be wholly premature and inconsistent with the statutory