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14. Further in the case of Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. (2007) 10 SCC 797, this Court gave a clear exposition of Section 107 IPC when it observed as follows in para 6:

"6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in IPC. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. "Abetted" in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence."

17. The expression `abetment' has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause firstly or to do anything as stated in clauses secondly or thirdly of Section 107 IPC. Section 109 IPC provides that if the act abetted is committed pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence.

18. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, however, clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause `thirdly' of Section 107 IPC only would be attracted. According to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided for under Section 107 IPC.

19. In view of the aforesaid situation and position, we have examined the provision of clause thirdly which provides that a person would be held to have abetted the doing of a thing when he intentionally does or omits to do anything in order to aid the commission of that thing. The Act further gives an idea as to who would be intentionally aiding by any act of doing of that thing when in Explanation 2 it is provided as follows:

22. The prosecution, however, heavily relies on the clause thirdly of Section 107 IPC because, according to the prosecution, the appellant by way of harassment and torturing the deceased at various point of time and by marrying said Anita for the second time without the permission and against the will of the deceased, intentionally aided the commission of suicide by the deceased.

23. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the prosecution relied upon Explanation 2 to Section 107. He submitted that prior to the commission of suicide by the deceased, the appellant had, by bringing said Anita as his second wife to his house facilitated the commission of suicide by the deceased and thus, the appellant intentionally aided the commission of suicide by the deceased. The evidence on record, however, does not support such a case. It is pertinent to note that the appellant had brought Anita to stay with him at his house three months prior to the date of the death of the deceased. If the deceased had been so perturbed by the act of the appellant in marrying the said Anita and in bringing her to his house that she felt impelled to commit suicide then she could have done so on the very day when Anita had come to stay with the appellant in his house as naturally at that point of time her annoyance or dismay with life would have been at its pinnacle. From the period of three months which elapsed in between the incidents of the appellant bringing Anita to his house and the deceased committing suicide, it can be clearly inferred that it was not the act of the appellant which instigated or provoked the deceased to commit suicide.