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(4) In his replication the respondent says that the appellant's parent arranged separate accomodation for their residence in house No. 1462, Gali MurliBan Wali,Chitli Qabar, Delhi at a distance of 10/15 feet from his father's house) that they both had been living and sleeping in the said house but always taking their meals in the house of his father. The respondent denies that the appellant used to give her salary to him or his father. On the contrary he says that she had been retaining her salary with her and she also used to ask him to give his salary to her and not to give to his parents for boarding and lodging, that the delivery expenses in a private medical ward at St. Stephens Hospital, Tis Hazari. Delhi were born by him and his family always kept a maid servant for day to day house hold jobs except cooking and that the appellant never did any house hold work. He further says that the cooking was done by his mother and after her death cooking was also done by the maid servant. The respondent admits the meeting between the parties and their relations for reconciliation but the appellant laid down conditions for return to the matrimonial home such as to own a house and to pay Rs. 15.000.00 . All other allegations and the agreement as alleged by the appellant in her written statement are denied by the respondent.

Sub-section 2 of this section was deleted by the Amendment Act 68 of 1976 and following explanation was added to section 9. "EXPLANATION--WHERE a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society."

This section means that reasonable excuse need not the based on a matrimonial offence. However the excuse must be grave and weighty distinct from a matrimonial offence within the meaning of other provisions of the Act. What constitute a 'reasonable excuse' depends upon the circumstances of each case. The ordinary wear and tear of daily life is however not an excuse for the withdrawal of one from the society of the other. The Division Bench in Smt.Shanti Devi v. BalbirSingh and others, Air 1979 Delhi 294, held that the scope of the word 'reasonable excuse' in Sub-section (1) is not restricted to the grounds which under Subsection (2) can be taken in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Thus, it seems that if there is an excuse which is grave and weighty justifying one to withdraw from the society of the other, a decree for a restitution of conjugal rights may not be passed by the court. The granting of a decree fur restitution of conjugal right is discretionary as the court should be satisfied of the various facts as detailed in Section 23 of the Act. Explanation to Section 9 of the Act places the onus upon the parly who has withdrawn from the society of the other to prove the reasonable excuse. Even before the insertion of the explanation to Section 9 of the Act the onus to prove 'reasonable excuse' was upon the person who had withdrawn from the society of the other. The person who approaches the court under Section 9 of the Act has only to state the facts how and when the opposite party withdraw from. his or her society. The respondent in his application for restitution of conjugal rights narrated various facts and it seems that he has proved those facts. The appellant wife on the other hand in her written statement made only vague and general allegations against the respondent. She did not comply with the rules of pleadings. Under Section 21 of the Act power to frame rule is conferred upon the High Court. The Hindu Marriage (Punjab) Rules 1956 were' framed by the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh in 1956 and those rules, it is not disputed) are applicable to the instant petition. Rule 4(vii) provides that petitions under Sections 9 to 13 of the Act shall state the matrimonial offence charged set in separate paragraphs with times and places of their alleged commission. After reading the written statement it would be clear that the alleged acts of cruelty are vague and general in nature. She did not mention any date or time of commission of any alleged act of cruelty. The place of commission has also not been mentioned but it may presumably be the house of the respondent where the parties used to reside after marriage. On account of failure to plead properly the alleged acts of cruelty with their date and place of commission, the trial court ought to have held that in the absence of pleadings no evidence can be looked into on vague allegations. It appears that after the recording of the evidence, the appellant was willing to join the respondent provided his father would not live with them. The trial court after going through the evidence on record came to the conclusion that there was no such justification for the appellant to put such a condition. During the course of argument before me the appellant appeared once. On enquiry if she was willing to join the respondent and live with him away from her father-in-law she replied that she apprehended danger to her life at the instance of the respondent and was unwilling to live with him. This appears to be an entirely new allegation. It only means that she is not inclined to join the respondent. The question however remains whether the respondent is entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant submit that the facts pleaded by her are sufficient to disentitle the respondent from claiming the society of the appellant. He says that the appellant was made to do all house hold jobs, that there was no maid servant in the house of the respondent even during the period of her pregnancy. His main stress is that the deposition of Ram Kali Public Witness PW2 is false and should not be relied upon. Ram Kali Public Witness PW2 in her statement recorded on January 30, 1976 says that she has been working at the house of the respondent for the last eight years, that she used to clean utensils and sweep the house, that she also used to wash clothes and cook food, that the respondent lived in a house nearby while his parents resided in the main house, that the respondent after marriage lived in the said house which consists of one room, laterine, bath and kitchen but they used .to take meals with the parents in the main house. She says that she used to clean the main house as well as the other nearby house in occupation of the appellant and the respondent, that she used to visit the two houses daily for washing clothes of the entire family and to do other house hold jobs. According to this witness the appellant being a teacher in a school was not doing any house hold work and that she was being treated well by the members of respondent's family. In cross-examination she says that her salary initially was Rs. 50.00 per month and after four years it had been raised to Rs. 100.00 besides food and clothing. She says that she resides at Chitli Qabar is a house near the house of the respondent. The maid servant has a son and two daughters. When she joined the job with the respondent's parents in 1953 her son was aged Ii years and the daughter was aged 9 years. She says that in her absence her daughter used to do all house hold jobs of the respondent. She farther says that she also used to prepare the food for the child of the appellant. She denies that she was never in the employment of the respondent's family. She also denies that she did not cook meals. After reading portions of the statement of this witness, learned counsel for the appellant submits that this witness could not give the names of the two sisters of the respondent and therefore she should not be believed. It is correct that this witness gave the name of one of the sisters only and did not tell the name of the other. I do not attach any importance to the failure of the witness-maid servant to give the name of one of the sisters. The maid servant is supposed to do the house hold jobs. She gives the names of various persons. She has stood the test of cross-examination. Her deposition has not been shaken at all. It is argued that the maid servant was never in the service of the respondent. It is urged that she was in whole time employment of a school. On a reference to the documentary evidence however it would be clear that this allegation is. not correct. The maid servant joined the respondent as a part time worker in 1968. Her salary initially was Rs. 50.00 per month and subsequently (say 1972) it was raised to Rs. 100.00 per month. It is in evidence that she was temporarily employed in May 1972 in Government Girls Middle School, Charkhe Walan, Delhi. Ex. RW2/1 is a certificate from the authorities showing that Ram Kali of 1019, Chitli Qabar, Delhi had been working as a water woman in the said school in the morning shift since May 1972 up to the date of issuance of this certificate. This certificate was issued on March 28, 1979. Ex. RW3/2 is another letter dated May 20, 1972 from the Directorate of Education, Delhi to the Head Mistress of the said school sanctioning the appointment of a part time water woman out of the pupils fund at Rs. 3.00 per day for the period from May 1, 1972 to May 15, 1972 only. Further Ex. RW3/3 is another sanction letter showing that Ram Kali was appointed as a water woman in the school with effect from July 15, 1972 on a monthly salary of Rs. 35.00 . This sanction is dated July 15, 1972. From this documentary evidence it would be clear that Ram Kali joined the school service as a part time water woman in May 1972 on a paltry sum of Rs. 35- per month. It does not mean that she has always been in the school incapable of doing any other part time job meant for maid servants in the nearby locality. It is not disputed that the school where she had been working and the house of the respondent are situated in the same locality. Moreover the maid servant is assisted by her daughter also in her day to day part time jobs with the respondent. Admittedly parties were married in May 1968. There is nothing on record to show that Ram Kali maid servant was employed elsewhere as full time worker from 1968 to May 1972 when she joined the school as a part time worker. The appellant has failed to place on record any material to show that Ram Kali was not doing house hold jobs in the house of the respondent. She joined service of the respondent in January 1968 and no question was put to her that she was in full time employment of the school while she was under cross-examination. The appellant in her written statement says that during her pregnancy no domestic servant was engaged and that she was doing all house hold jobs. There is no plea that there was no domestic servant before or after the period of pregnancy. It is in evidence that respondent's father is a sales executive in a limited concern at New Delhi getting Rs. 2000.00 per month, respondent is a junior engineer in C. P. W.D. and the appellant is a teacher employed in a girls school. There were thus three earning members in the family and it is unbelievable that even a maid servant for house hold jobs would not be employed by them. As a matter of fact the maid servant joined the respondent for doing the house hold jobs before the marriage between the parties. It is, therefore, clear that the defense put up by the appellant is not correct. The documentary evidence produced by the witness on her behalf proved that the maid servant was only a part time water woman getting only Rs. 35.00 per month and that she was not in the full time employment. There is no suggestion how the house hold jobs were got done when the respondent, his father and the appellant were all in service. On the contrary it is in evidence that the appellant never used to do any house hold work as she was busy in her teaching job. After giving my careful consideration to the statement of R am Kali Public Witness Public Witness 2 I am of the view that she has been in the part time service of the respondent. The evidence of other witnesses on behalf of the respondent also leads me to the conclusion that the appellant was treated well in the house of the respondent and that there was no excuse for her to leave the society of the respondent. The evidence led by the appellant consists of herself, her father and others but their statements do not lead to the conclusion that there was any excuse for her to withdraw from the society of the respondent. The statement of the appellant and her witnesses are also general in nature. Any particular act of cruelty has neither been pleaded nor proved. The learned counsel for the appellant read certain portions of the evidence on record but on account of vague allegations the appellant has not made out any ground for her withdrawal from the society of the respondent.