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21. It is relevant at this juncture to scrutinise the reason which impelled the NDMC to pass the resolution in 1973 for giving the SS Committee pay scales to the staff of the electricity wing alone. The only reason which prompted the NDMC to pass the resolution was that since DESU had implemented the SS Committee pay scales for its technical and non-technical staff, the NDMC should also follow suit insofar as its electricity wing is concerned. In doing so, the NDMC had failed to bear in mind several distinguishing features between its set up and the set up of the DESU and its staff pattern and the staff pattern of DESU. The NDMC, as already stated, is governed by the Punjab Municipal Act while DESU is governed by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The set up of the NDMC is that of an integrated unit comprising all the three wings while the set up under the Municipal Corporation Act of the MCD is that its three wings have to function as distinct and independent units. Such being the case, the DESU is a separate and independent unit of MCD and constitutes an independent body. The DESU has its own budget and consequently it has freedom of action without reference to the other units. In contrast, the NDMCs revenues is the income derived from all the three wings of it and the expenses are governed by a common budget. Having regard to all these factors, there is no room whatever for treating the electricity wing of the NDMC on par with the DESU and adopting the pattern of pay scales implemented by DESU. Apart from the difference in the set up, it has also to be borne in mind that the ministerial staff in the NDMC are comprised in a unified cadre and the posts in the three wings are transferable and interchangeable which is not so in the case of the staff of the DESU. If regard is had to all these factors, the decision taken by the NDMC originally to place the non-technical staff in the electricity wing on a higher footing and give them alone the SS Committee pay scales cannot be legally sustained. The action of the NDMC clearly suffered from the vice of arbitrariness and discrimination.

(iii) Accordingly, it is proposed that a post of Dy. Commissioner (Slum and JJ)/Addl. Commissioner (Slum and JJ) may be revived/created at the strength of Slum and JJ Deptt. under its own budgetary provisions for supervision and control over the Slum and JJ Deptt. of MCD with usual pay-scale and allowances.

(iv) Accordingly, it is proposed that a post of Dy. Chief Acctt. in the pay-scale of Rs. 3000-4500 with usual allowances, may be created specifically for the Slum and JJ Department.

11. Counsel for the petitioner has also contended that the respondent/MCD has undertaken rigorous exercise in appointing the petitioner on the said post of Director-in-Chief (Sanitation), then, what compelled the respondent/MCD to relieve the petitioner from the said post. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that when the post exists, work exists and a selected candidate exists, then at least there should have been some justifiable reasons before the respondent/MCD for taking such a decision of relieving the petitioner from the said post. Counsel for the petitioner has also contended that there were valid reasons for appointment of the petitioner on the said post but no reasons whatsoever are visible for relieving the petitioner from the said post. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that it cannot be ipsi dixit of the MCD but the decision of the respondent/MCD which is instrumentality of the State must be backed by some justifiable reasons. Counsel for the petitioner also invited my attention to the Minutes of the Selection Committee dated 27.10.2005 which clearly shows that the petitioner was seniormost to all the four incumbents and his ACRs as compared to the other officers were best and the Selection Committee found the petitioner as the most suitable person for manning the post of Director-in-Chief (Sanitation). In the said Minutes of the Meeting the fact regarding petitioner's facing Regular Departmental Enquiry for a minor penalty was also revealed. Counsel for the petitioner also contended that his reversion being equivalent to the reduction in rank amounts to major penalty and, therefore, the decision of the respondent being punitive in nature is liable to be set aside being in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that stipulations contained in appointment letter dated 8.11.2005 are unconscionable in nature and in violation of Section 23 of the Contract Act.

16. While countering the petitioner's contentions on his being transferred from one cadre to the other cadre, counsel for the respondent submitted that the Slum and JJ Department is a division of the MCD, and therefore, his transfer cannot be considered out of his cadre and he will continue to be governed by the same cadre of Chief Engineer with same seniority list, scale of pay and allowances. The contention of the counsel for the respondent is that there is no restriction on the power of the MCD to place an employee of the General Wing of the MCD to the Slum and JJ Department, which is another Wing of the MCD. Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Section 59 of the DMC Act which confers the entire executive power on the Municipal Commissioner and contended that the relieving order was passed in exercise of the said executive powers.

27. I also do not find any force in the submissions of counsel for the respondent that transfer of petitioner to slum and J.J Wing is well within the power and domain of Commissioner, MCD, who being the Executive head of MCD enjoys such executive power U/S 59 of DMC Act. The contention of the counsel for the respondent is that under Section 59 of the DMC Act, it is within the power of Commissioner, MCD to transfer any Municipal Officer or any employee or to take any decision under his executive powers to deal with all matters relating to the service of any of the municipal employees or officers. It cannot be in dispute that under Section 59 of the DMC Act, the Commissioner being the executive head of the MCD has to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties as conferred upon him by various provisions of the Act or by any other law for the time being in force. However, in the case of petitioner Section 59 of the DMC Act has to be read with Resolution No. 2585 dated 23.11.1992 whereby administrative control the Slum and J.J. Department was transferred to the MCD. The terms of the said resolution clearly indicate that the Slum and J.J. Department was transferred to the MCD but still the same will be maintaining its separate and independent existence. Sub Clause (vii) of Clause A of the said decision dated 23.11.1992 clearly states that the employees of Slum and J.J. Wing of the DDA will become the employees of Slum and J.J. Department of the MCD and they will continue to be governed by their existing terms and conditions of service. It has also been made clear that they will not be merged with any cadres of the MCD till any orders to the contrary are issued. It is not the case of the respondent that with the said transfer of Slum and J.J. Department to the MCD, the erstwhile employees of the Slum and J.J. Wing shall become employees of the MCD itself and rightly so because even with the said transfer of the Slum and J.J. Department, it has not lost its independent entity. Under Clause B of the said resolution dealing with the integration of Slum and J.J. Department with the administrative hierarchy of MCD, the executive powers under Section 59 of the DMC Act came to be vested in the Commissioner as post of Commissioner, MCD was found to be of higher level of Joint Secretary/Additional Secretary to the Government of India in comparison to the Commissioner (SandJJ)-I and Commissioner (SandJJ)-II who were in the lower hierarchy. The Commissioner of the MCD, therefore, enjoys all the administrative powers as envisaged under Section 59 of the DMC Act but for exercising such powers, he will have to remain conscious of the fact that separate cadres exist in the MCD as well as in the Slum and J.J. Department. In this regard, the judgment cited by counsel for the petitioner in the case of R.D. Gupta's case (supra) is applicable to the facts of the present case with all force. The Supreme Court while dealing with the pay scales of employees of Electricity Wing of the NDMC with that of employees of DESU has highlighted the distinction by holding that three wings set up under the Municipal Corporation Act of the MCD have to function as distinct and independent units and, therefore, DESU was held as separate and independent unit of the MCD constituting an independent body with its own budget and freedom of action without there being any reference to the other units. Similar is the position of setting up of Slum and J.J. Wing and its administrative correlation with the MCD. The contention of counsel for the respondent, therefore, has no merit. On the issue of `stop gap arrangement' of employment, counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the minutes of the meeting of the Special Selection Committee dated 27.10.2005 in which the decision was taken to appoint the petitioner on the said post of Director-in-Chief (Sanitation) as a stop gap. Counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to Clause IV of the said minutes in which the Committee made it clear that a Special Selection Committee was neither a DPC for recommending officiating promotion nor they were recommending promotion on ad hoc basis. The Selection Committee clearly held that they were recommending only the most suitable person manning the post of Director-in-Chief (Sanitation) as a `stop-gap arrangement'. The contention of counsel for the respondent is that the petitioner was only entrusted with the said job of Director-in-Chief as the `stop-gap arrangement' and, therefore, there was nothing wrong on the part of the respondent in withdrawing the said arrangement and placing the petitioner to his earlier position of Chief Engineer. Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma and Ors. (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has held that no one has a right to ask for or stick to a current duty charge and once the impugned order did not cause any financial loss or prejudice of any kind, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court could not have been invoked under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In reply to this argument of counsel for the respondent, Mr.Raman Duggal, counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Secy-cum-Chief Engineer, Chandigarh, v. Hari Om Sharma and Ors. JT 1998 (3) SC 654, in which the said judgment of State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma and Ors. was also referred and the Supreme Court in its operative paras has held as under: