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(ii) Mosaic tiles, that is to say, tiles known commercially as 'mosaic tiles';

(iii) Goods manufactured at the site of construction of buildings for use at such site.

(iv) Lightweight (solid or hollow) concrete building blocks.

                            (b) Blocks, slabs, lintels, con-    10% ad
                            crete beams and stairs constituting valorem 
                            intermediates and components of pre- 
                            fabricated buildings falling under 
                            heading No. 94.06 
                           (c) Floor Coverings in rolls or in    30% ad
                            the form tiles
              2. 68.01 to   All Goods excluding the following    20% ad
                 68.07      namely:                              volrem
                            (i)Goods specified against S. No. 1 above 
                            and 
                            (ii) All goods falling under heading No. 
                            68.04 

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5. It is noteworthy that the expression "constituting intermediates and components of" used in the pre-Budget Notification was substituted by "of a kind used in" for the post-Budget period. In this context, it is also noteworthy that the description of goods covered by Clause (2) of Sl. No. 117 under Notification No. 5/97-C.E. was adopted, for sub-heading 6807.20 inserted in the Central Excise Tariff with effect from 1-3-1997 under the Finance Act, 1997. Ld. Counsel has argued that, insofar as "blocks" and like items mentioned before "concrete beams and stairs" are concerned, the expression "constituting intermediates arid components of prefabricated buildings" in Sl. No. 1(b) of Notification No. 36/94-C.E. 1 and the expression "of a kind used in prefabricated buildings" in Sl. No. 117(2) of Notification No. 5/97-C.E. have to be read disjunctively by virtue of the comma occuring just before "Concrete beams and stairs" in each entry. According to ld. Counsel, the said expressions are meant only to qualify "concrete beams and stairs" and are not intended to qualify the "blocks" etc. The purport of this argument is that the blocks mentioned at in Sl. No. 1(b) of Notification No. 36/94-C.E. for the period prior to 1-3-97 and in sub-heading 6807.20 (equivalent to Sl. No. 117 (2) of Notification No. 5/97-C.E.) for the subsequent period need not be intermediates/components of prefabricated buildings for the former period and need not be of a kind used in such buildings for the latter period. In other words, the blocks manufactured and cleared by the appellants are per se eligible for concessional rate of duty in terms of Sl. No. 1(b) of Notification No. 36/94-C.E. as well as Sl. No. 117(2) of Notification No. 5/97-CE for the respective periods. Ld. Counsel has pointed out that the appellants had taken such a view as early as in 1996 in a letter sent to the department. Ld. Counsel has also sought to draw support from HSN explanatory notes on Heading 68.10 to his argument that the concrete blocks in question per se would be entitled to the benefit of concession under the Notifications, without there being any need for the appellants to fulfil any condition of constituting intermediates and components of prefabricated buildings or any condition of being of a kind used in such buildings. Ld. Counsel has also attempted to invoke the rule of noscitur a sociis to fortify his plea of disjunction ("comma"- based argument). Finally, ld. Counsel has relied on the Tribunal's decision in Vinayaka Impex v. Commissioner of Customs, Madras [1998 (101) E.L.T. 660 (T)]. We are unable to accept the Counsel's argument that the comma preceding "concrete beams" in the description of goods covered by Sl. No. 1(b) of Notification 36/94-C.E. and Sl. No. 117(2) of Notification No. 5/97-CE. is disjunctive. That comma is only a conjunctive punctuation. Moreover, the conjunction "and" used between "concrete beams" and "stairs" in each entry connects all the items, from blocks to stairs, all of which are qualified by the expression which follows. We find that, in relation to a similar Notification, this Tribunal has recognised this position in the case of CCE v. Excon Bldg. Material Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1999 (112) E.L.T. 516 (T)] wherein the issue was whether hollow concrete blocks manufactured by the said company were eligible for exemption under Notification No. 64/88-C.E., dated 1-3-1988. The assessee in that case had claimed the benefit of concessional rate of duty in terms of Sl. No. 3 of the said Notification. [The description of goods covered by Sl. No. 3 is identical to that covered by Sl. No. 1(b) of Notification No. 36/94-C.E.]. The Tribunal held that as the "hollow concrete block's" manufactured by the assessee did not qualify to be intermediates or components of prefabricated building, they were not eligible for the benefit of exemption under Notification No. 64/88-C.E. In holding so, the Tribunal considered that the item "blocks" occurring in the description of goods was qualified by the expression "constituting intermediates and components of pre-fabricated buildings". In view of the Tribunal's decision in Excon case (supra), ld. Counsel's argument that the Concrete Blocks in question were per se eligible for the benefit of exemption under Notifications No. 36/94-C.E. and 5/97-C.E., without there being any obligation for the appellants to show that the blocks constituted intermediates and components of pre-fabricated buildings or that they were of a kind used in pre-fabricated buildings cannot be accepted. Ld. Counsel has relied on the Tribunal's decision in Vinayaka Impex (supra), wherein the description of goods covered by Sl. No. 1 of Notification No. 30/95-Cus. had arisen for interpretation. This description reads as under :-

"Woven pile fabrics, chenille fabrics, terry towelling and similar woven terry fabrics, including narrow woven fabrics of width not exceeding 30 cm. and not containing elastomeric yarn or rubber thread."

The Tribunal held that the expression "narrow woven fabrics" could not be read in conjunction with the preceding expressions such as woven pile fabrics as there was a comma after each expression. We notice that the expression "narrow woven fabrics" which accompanies the word "including" belongs to an inclusive clause and nothing contained in the inclusive clause is applicable to the outlying expressions such as "woven pile fabrics". Obviously, there is nothing in common between the Notification provisions considered in Vinayaka Impex (supra) and the Notification provisions being considered in the instant case. The reliance placed by ld. Counsel on Vinayaka Impex (supra) is, therefore, misconceived. We also do not think that the instant case is a good case for application of the rule of "noscihir a sociis" nor for invoking HSN explanatory notes. The rule of "noscitur a sociis" means that, when two or more words which are susceptible to analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. Such words should take colour from each other i.e. the more general gets restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. The meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of the words associated with it. This rule is not to be applied where the provision of law to be construed is clear and unambiguous, as held by the Tribunal's Larger Bench in the case of Commissioner v. Surya Roshini Ltd. [2001 (128) E.L.T. 293 (Tri-LB)] cited by ld. SDR. We find no ambiguity in the meaning of the description of goods at Sl. No. 1(b) of Notification No. 36/94-CE, or at Sl. No. 117(2) of Notification No. 5/97-C.E. The legislative intent is clear from the language used for describing the goods. The intention behind the above provisions of the Notifications was to provide concessional rate of duty for intermediates and components of prefabricated buildings falling under heading 9406 for the period prior to 1-3-1997 and for structural items of a kind used in pre-fabricated buildings for the subsequent period. In the instant case, the Commissioner found that AEON'S did not adduce any evidence to show that their concrete blocks constituted intermediates and components of prefabricated buildings for the period prior to 1-3-1997 and were of a kind used in such buildings for the subsequent period. This finding of the Commissioner has not been rebutted by the assessee. The car factory building of M/s. Hindustan Motors Limited, in which such blocks were shown to have been used, was, however, not shown to be a "prefabricated building" within the meaning of Note 4 to Chapter 94 of the Central Excise Tariff.

"We may further like to add that it is our Understanding that the said notification prescribed effective rate of 10% on slabs, lintels, blocks other than goods covered by item 'a' of the said notification without any requirement that they should constitute an intermediate and components of prefabricated building and only beams and stairs should constitute as intermediate components of pre-fabricated building to be entitled to the exempted rate."

There is nothing on record to show as to how the Revenue reacted to the above argument of the assessee. Obviously, on the part of the Revenue, there was complete silence in the matter for over a period of three years between the above letter of the assessee and the show-cause notice in question. We have no doubt in our mind that the allegations of misdeclaration and suppression raised against the assessee in show-cause notice dated 11-10-1999 are unfounded inasmuch as the party had not only disclosed material facts to the department from time to time during the period 1994-1995 to 1998-1999 but they had also raised a reasoned claim for the benefit of Notification No. 36/94-C.E. As a matter of fact, the Superintendent's letter dated 12-7-1996 to the assessee is indicative of the department's knowledge of how AEON'S understood the scope of applicability of this Notification. In the facts and circumstances, it was not open to the department to invoke the larger period of limitation against the assessee to demand duty for the period 1994-95 to 1998-99. In similar circumstances, this Tribunal has held in the case of Subros Ltd. v. CCE, Noida [2003 (162) E.L.T. 626] that the larger period of limitation is not invocable. The assessee can also claim firm support from the Apex Court's judgment in Padmini Products v. CCE [1989 (43) E.L.T. 195 (S.C.)] in this context. Therefore, the demand of duly affirmed against the assessee for the above period cannot be sustained. The demand raised in each of the show-cause notices issued by the Superintendent is admittedly within the normal period of limitation prescribed in the main part of Section 11A(1) and the same is liable to be honoured by the assessee.