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4. A sub-tenant who has been upgraded to the status of a tenant under the provisions of the Act (Sections 16 (3) and 13 (5) ).

26. It would be opportune here to consider how such tenancies arc terminated. So far as contractual tenancies are concerned, the duration thereof and the termination of such tenancies are governed by the provisions of Section 106 read with Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 106 does not use the expression "notice to quit", but the notice given under Section 106 has been described in Section 111(h) as "a notice to determine a lease or to quit, or an intention to quit the property leased''. Thus, both the landlord and the tenant can terminate the tenancy by means of an appropriate notice mentioned therein. In the case of a monthly tenancy, unless there is a contract to the contrary, it is deemed to be a tenancy from month to month and in the case of a tenancy for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, it is deemed to be a lease from year to year, In the former case, the tenancy could be terminated by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy, and in the latter case, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of tenancy. In AIR 1962 SC 23 Mukherjea J. points out that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down a rule of construction of the agreement between the parties. In the case of a statutory tenant however, no notice to quit is necessary for terminating the tenancy. A statutory tenancy commences when the contractual tenancy has been terminated, and brought to an end, but the tenant continues to be in possession. The tenancy of a statutory tenant could only be terminated by a decree for possession. All this has now been substantially affected by the provisions contained in 1956 Act. Under Section 13(6), a notice must precede the filing of a suit by the landlord against the tenant, for recovery of possession, except in one case provided for in the Act itself, i.e. under Section 34 (4). Under that provision, where under the terms of the tenancy a tenant is bound to make any repair but fails to do so even after he is called upon to perform his obligation by the Rent Controller, the Landlord can sue the tenant at once. No notice is necessary to be served upon the tenant in such a case. Coming back to Section 13 (6), a difficulty in interpretation arises from the vague way in which it is worded. The first question that arises is as to whether it contemplates a notice to quit or merely a notice of suit, or a combination of both. Next, the question arises as to whether, it is necessary to set out in the body of the notice itself, the grounds upon which the notice has been served. So far as a notice to quit is concerned, I have already pointed out that in a contractual tenancy, such a notice is governed by the terms of Section 106. That section does not talk about "a notice to quit"

27. The importance of this section is that it actually uses the expression "notice to quit"

and denotes that a notice under Section 13(6) partakes of the nature of a notice to quit. It will be remembered that in Section 13(6) an exception has been made with regard to a notice issued on any of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (j) and (k) of Section 13(1). Clause (j) deals with the cases where the tenant has himself given a notice to quit but has failed to deliver possession. Clause (k) deals with the case where the tenant has agreed in writing with the landlord to deliver possession but has failed to do so. In both the cases, it was considered that a notice to quit need not be served on the tenant, because he had himself expressed an intention of giving up possession or has agreed to do so. This indicates that a notice under Section 13(6) might in certain cases partake of the nature of a notice to quit. In my opinion a notice under Section 13 (6) when combined with a notice to quit under Section 106 partakes of the nature of a notice to quit although in essence it is a notice of suit. So far as notice of suit is concerned, all that Section 13 (6) says is that such a notice is to be given preparatory to the filing of a suit. It does not lay down the form and content of the notice. In that respect it is different from a notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code where the notice must set out the cause of action and the relief to be claimed in the proposed suit. What has happened is that Section 13(6) has been introduced in the 1956 Act, as an additional protection to tenants, and it has been superimposed on the existing law. Where the existing law can function without doing violence to the provisions of Section 13 (6), it is not abrogated, but the specific terms of Section 13 (6) must prevail where there is a conflict. So far as a contractual tenancy is concerned, there is not much difficulty in combining a notice to quit under Section 106 and a notice under Section 13(6) in such a case, the only difference is that the combined notice must be for a period of not less than a month, expiring with a month of the tenancy. The real difficulty arises in the case of a statutory tenancy. Previous to the 1956 Act, such a tenancy did not call for any termination by the landlord. As the parties did not create the tenancy, the landlord could not terminate it by a notice to quit. It could only be terminated by a decree for possession. What then is the position under the present Act ? As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwat Prasad Prabhuprasad, , the right to possession is to be distinguished from the right to recover possession. The right to possession arises when the tenancy is determined. The right to recover possession follows the right to possession and arises when the person in possession does not make over possession as he is bound to do under the law and there arises the necessity to recover possession through the Court. In the case of a contractual tenancy, the right to possession can only arise upon a determination of the tenancy. The notice to quit served under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act determines the tenancy and calls upon the tenant to give up possession by a specified date. If he fails to do so, the right to recover possession arises and the landlord may then file a suit for recovery of possession, but no further notice had to be given. In the case of a statutory tenant, it is neither necessary nor possible for the landlord to determine the tenancy, because he has not created it. Such a tenancy is a creature of statute and can be determined only by the passing of a decree for possession. In the case of a statutory tenant, no notice was required to be served prior to the filing of a suit. until Section 13 (6) incorporated in the 1956 Act, made it necessary. Therefore, the notice under Section 13(6), upon a statutory tenant, cannot strictly be called a notice to quit, as is understood under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Yet, under that section, a month's notice has to be given 'expiring with the month of tenancy" even upon a statutory tenant. The position therefore is as follows : So far as contractual tenancies are concerned a notice to quit was necessary to be served upon the tenant to determine the tenancy but no notice of suit was necessary. So far as statutory tenants were concerned, neither a notice to quit was necessary, nor a notice of suit. Now under Section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, a notice of suit is essential in all cases. This special requirement has however been superimposed on the existing law. Where a notice to quit was necessary, it is still necessary, but it can be combined with a notice of suit, and the period of the notice, instead of being a fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy is to be for a period of not less than thirty days expiring with a month of the tenancy. In the case of a statutory tenant, it operates as a notice of suit, and the period mentioned would be the extent of time which must expire before a suit for recovery of possession can be filed. The next point to be considered is as to whether it is necessary to set out the grounds in such a notice. I do not say that an argument cannot be advanced advocating that such grounds must be given. It may be argued that Section 13 (6) makes an exception in the case of a notice, on grounds mentioned in Clauses (j) and (k) of Section 13 (1), The question may well be asked as to how a tenant was to know whether the matter falls within the exception, unless grounds are mentioned in the notice itself. So far as Clauses (j) and (k) of Section 13 (1) are concerned, there is not much difficulty, because in such a case a tenant would know the facts as much as the landlord. Under the law as it stood previously, apart from the Rent Control Acts, it was held that a notice to quit need not set out the grounds. The reasons have been set out in a decision of Mukharji, J. Amarendra Nath v. Bibhuti Bhusan, . That was a case under the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946. It was pointed out that the inclusion of a ground in a notice to quit does not make it compulsory to file a suit on that ground only. A suit for recovery of possession could be filed if the requisite ground existed at the time of the filing of the suit or even at the time when a decree was going to be passed. Thus, a landlord may give a number of grounds in his notice to quit, but he need not avail of all of them at the trial, or he may rely on a ground which was not disclosed at all in a notice to quit. This being the law before the Act was promulgated, clear words to the contrary, are necessary if we are to hold that it was intended to alter the law. Up to now, it has been firmly established that grounds are not necessary to be stated in a notice to quit. Thousands of suits are pending, and are daily being instituted, without stating such grounds. It would be nothing short of a calamity if, as a result of our decision, all such suits become Incompetent. Where it was the intention of the legislature that specific grounds should be given, that has always been stated specifically. For example, under Section 114A of the Transfer of Property Act, it is provided that no suit for ejectment shall lie in the case of a forfeiture for breach of an express condition , in the lease unless the lessor has served on the lessee a notice in writing specifying the particular breach complained of and if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach. Similar is the position under Section 155 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is a specific provision for setting out in the notice, the particulars of the cause of action upon which the suit is to be based. Under Section 13 (6), however, there is no provision requiring any grounds to be set out in a notice which has to be given under it. It is sometimes rather difficult to determine in advance the exact ground or grounds on which a suit was going to be filed. The only result of holding that the grounds must be sot out in a notice under Section 13 (6) will be that a prudent landlord would have to set out in his notice all possible grounds. In fact, to be perfectly safe he would have to set out all the grounds as stated in Section 13 (1) of the Act, reducing the tenant to a state of bewilderment. In my opinion, therefore, nothing is gained by giving this interpretation to Section 13 (6). I think that in a notice under Section 13(6) no grounds need be given, although there is nothing to prevent the landlord setting out the grounds if he wishes to do so. Such a notice will however not be a notice on such grounds:
We are therefore of opinion that so long as the contractual tenancy continues a landlord cannot sue for the recovery of possession even if Section 12 of the Act does not bar the institution of such a suit, and that in order to take advantage of this provision of the Act he must first determine the tenancy in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act."

32. Let us apply these principles to the facts of the instant case. Section 13 (6) speaks about a suit for the recovery of possession. No such suit can be filed until a notice under Section 13 (6) is given. It is pointed out by Dayal, J., that in cases where Section 106 applies, it is necessary first of all to determine the tenancy so that the right to possession arises. This is followed by legal proceedings for recovery of possession, for which a Section 13 (6) notice is now essential under the West Bengal Act. In the case of a statutory tenancy, the law was that no notice at all was necessary to be served before filing a suit for recovery of possession. Now such a notice is necessary under Section 13 (6) itself. So far as a contractual tenancy is concerned, two ends have to be achieved, namely, the termination of the tenancy whereby the landlord gets a right of possession and a notice preparatory to the filing of a suit for recovery of possession. In the case of a statutory tenancy only one end is to be achieved namely, the right to recover possession for which a notice under Section 13 (6) is a pre-condition. A question arises as to whether in the case of a contractual tenancy two separate notices are to be given namely, one under Section 106 and another under Section 13 (6). In my opinion, it would be a superfluity to give two notices. What was intended was that one notice should be given which would satisfy the conditions of Section 106, as well as the provisions of Section 13 (6). The only distinction between the two lies in the period for which notice should be given. Previously, the period was controlled, either by the terms of the contract or Section 106, which provided a 15 days' notice. In all cases now, the notice must be a month's notice ending with the expiry of a month of tenancy. I have interpreted it to mean that it should not be for less than a month. J have already explained how this could be done in the case of a tenancy for manufacturing purposes. In cases where Section 106 does not apply, for example, in the case of Statutory tenants or tenants under a statute, no question arises of serving a notice to quit. In other words, no determination of tenancy is necessary to obtain a right to possession. In certain circumstances however, it is possible to recover possession even from a Statutory tenant. Previously, no notice was necessary in such case, in order to file a suit'- to recover possession. Such a notice is now necessary under Section 13 (6). In such a case it is nothing bat a notice of suit and the period of notice must be for not less than a month expiring with a month of the tenancy. For such a notice however, no particular form has been prescribed and we cannot lay down any particular form. The form must be one that carries out the intent and purpose of the Statute. I agree with the answer to Question No. 2 as given by my Lord the Chief Justice.

-- would all terminate on the month's notice under Section 13 (6). A consequence so violent, so drastic and so revolutionary cannot be accepted, unless the statute compels it or gives or contains some sure indication in that behalf. I find none here, no such compulsion or indication, and, accordingly, I feel bound to rejet this argument.

58. It is urged next that, this notice to quit under Section 13 (6) will be necessary for determination of the statutory tenancy under the Act, which will operate after the termination of the contractual tenancy by notice to quit or otherwise, and this argument is sought to be supported by reference to Section 19 (1), which preserves the terms of the contractual tenancy, not inconsistent with the Act, for the statutory tenancy. It is argued, accordingly, that a notice to quit may be necessary in respect of the statutory tenancy, and the statute provides for it in Section 13 (6). It is to be remembered, however, that, unless the particular statute prescribes the contrary, a statutory tenancy need not be determined by the landlord to enable him to file a suit or proceeding for ejectment and, under the Act, now before us (Vide Section 2 (h)), a statutory tenancy determines only on the passing of a decree for ejectment. A notice to quit, therefore, in respect of statutory tenancy for determining the same is unmeaning in the instant case.