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4. Mr. K.L. Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner (in CWP No. 4704 of 1989) on the strength of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Lipton Ltd. v. Their Employees, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 676; of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Paritosh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1984 Labour Industrial Cases 1254, of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Little Sons & Co. v. Amar Nath, 1978 Labour Industrial Cases (Pb. & Haryana) 430, of the Kerala High Court in JJ. Bechana Distributors Hyderabad v. State of Kerala, 1974 Labour Industrial Cases 379; of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in National Tabocoo Employees Union, Jullundur v. Manohar Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1968 (Punjab & Haryana) 514, contended that the State where head office of the Corporation wherefrom the letter of termination of the services of the workman was issued, as well as the State where the situs of employment is located are appropriate-State Government to refer the disputes to Labour Court or Tribunal Under Section 10 of the Act. Thus, the reference regarding industrial dispute made by the Chandigarh Administration at the instance of the worker is perfectly valid. This argument was further elaborated by Sarvshri Ashok Aggarwal and Surjit Singh counsel appearing for the respondent U.T. Chandigarh in all the writ petitions preferred by Puntex and Markfed. Shri Aggarwal also relied upon the latest judgment of this court in Punjab Financial Corporation v. U.T. Chandigarh, (1990-2) 100 P.L.R. 327 in support of the proposition that the Chief Commissioner/Administrator of U.T. Chandigarh has the delegated powers of the President of India in the matter of making such reference.

9. The III proviso appended to Section 10 of the Act, however, empowers the Central Government to refer those disputes where it is appropriate Government to any Tribunal or Labour Court, as the case maybe constituted by the State Government. This proviso by necessary implication indicates that the State Government has the jurisdiction to refer such dispute to the Labour Court, or Industrial Tribunal constituted by such State Government and not constituted by other State Government.

10. The concept of concurrent jurisdiction on different State as appropriate State Government for referring the dispute between the workers and he Management Under Section 10 of the Act was elaborately delved upon by Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, the then Chief Justice of the Patna High Court in Prithosh Kumar's case (supra). The Seamed Chief Justice after referring to the observations of the Bombay High Court in Lal Bhai Trikon Lal A.I.R. 1955 Bombay 463, which were affirmed by the final court in Indian Cable Company Ltd.'s case 1962-1 Labour Law Journal 409 and later in Sri Rangavilas Motor's case A.I.R 1967 S.C. 1040 besides referring to the observations of the Apex Court in Hindustan Aeronautics case A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1737 and in Lipton Limited and Anr. v. Their Employees AIR 1959 S.C. 676 observed in para 21 of the judgment as under:-

11. The learned Chief Justice also referred to the observations of the Kerala High Court in Emerald Valley Estates v. Secretary for Kerala Estates & Staffs' Union South India' 1979 Labour Industrial Case 86 to the effect that there may be cases where part of the cause of action arose in two or more states. In such cases two or more states may have concurrent jurisdiction. When the question regarding the territorial jurisdiction crops up, what is to be asked and answered is whether cause of action substantially arose in the State, the Government of which referred the dispute for adjudication. The passing observations of the Kerala High Court in J & J Dechane Distributors v. State of Kerala (1974(2) Labour Law Journal 9) to the effect that startling results would follow if there was concurrent jurisdiction in different Governments to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal, was held to be merely obiter dicta. In the ultimate analysis after relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Rangavilas Motors's case A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1040 observed that the nexus should be between the industrial dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the industry and the State concerned. The learned Chief Justice concluded in para 24 of the judgment that in the face of the discordant precedents on the point that herein perhaps two view are possible and in such like contingency the beneficient welfare legislation like the Industrial Disputes Act should be interpreted in the light of the illuminating observations in Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1978 S.C. 1594) " Where doubts arise the Gandhian tailsman becomes a tool of interpretation. Whenever you are in doubt .... apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him, Law, at the service of life must respond interpretatively to raw realities and make for liberties."

13. In Little Sons & Company v. Amar Nath and Ors., 1978 Labour Industrial Cases 430 the Division Bench of this court observed that for determining the appropriate Government competent to make a reference of the dispute due regard has to be paid to the place where a dispute arises and it cannot be said that the reference of the dispute must necessarily be made by the State within the territory of which the head office of the employer company is situate especialy when the object of the Act is to ensure fair terms to the workmen and to prevent disputes between employers and employees so that production might not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the public might not suffer. It was further observed that the provisions of the Act have to be interpretted in a manner which advances the object of the legislature. The Legislature has cast a duty on the appropriate Government to procure industrial peace by creating machinery for easy and early settlement of industrial disputes Labour unrest may create serious law and order problems for a State and such problems can be effectively solved by the State within the geographical limits of which they arise and any construction to the contrary will frustrate the object of the Act. Reference was also made to the term "appropriate Government" as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act which attaches no importance to the place where the controlling office of the industry is situated but on the other hand the 'words in relation to' denote the place wherever a dispute between the industry and its workment arises and the Government having jurisdiction over that area would be competent to make a reference. The Division Bench while, distinquishing judgment of the Apex Court in Lipton India Limited case (AIR 1959 S.C. 676) in para 10 of the judgment observed as under:-