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28.11 The issue raised by the OPs have already been succinctly put to rest by the Division Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the present matter itself. The Division Bench vide its judgement dated 25.08.2022 in LPA Nos. 163/2021 and 164/2021 has observed as follows:
"26. At the outset, it becomes pertinent to delineate the objective of the Competition Act, 2002, and the role of the CCI. The objective of the Act is set out in the Preamble itself, i.e. to establish a Commission to prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets, to protect the interests of consumers, and to ensure the freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets, in India, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Chapter II of the Competition Act prohibits certain agreements, abuse of dominant position, and regulation of combinations, with Section 4 specifically prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. Chapter IV of the Act deals with provisions which set out the duties, powers and functions of the CCI, with Section 18 stating that it shall be the duty of the Commission to eliminate practices relating to the principles set down in the Preamble itself.
87. In relation to reliance placed by the OPs on the Commission's previous decisions as mentioned above, it is noted that it is crucial to distinguish between the contexts of combination assessments and abuse of dominance proceedings. The decision under the Combination regulations is a forward-looking exercise where the Commission predicts potential market outcomes, anticipating future market dynamics to gauge the potential SM Case No. 01 of 2021 and Case Nos. 05 of 2021 & 30 of 2021 45 Public Version appreciable adverse effect on competition resulting from the combination. On the other hand, in abuse of dominance cases, the Commission must assess the prevailing market conditions to determine if any anticompetitive conduct is occurring. Thus, the Commission's conclusions from a dated assessment in an another context are not sufficient to disregard the market realities which have been unravelled in an in-depth investigation. Furthermore, in rapidly changing markets in particular, market assessment cannot have a static approach. In the present case, the Commission has the benefit of a detailed investigation which has revealed that network effects are a critical factor in determining the success of new entrants in the OTT messaging market. These network effects, which strengthen as more users join a platform, significantly hinder the ability of new players to enter and compete effectively. This is evidenced by the market exit of platforms like Hike, which struggled to gain traction against larger competitors with entrenched user bases. Therefore, it is imperative to assess market conditions on a case- by-case basis, particularly in the fast-evolving digital markets where the landscape can shift rapidly.