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“50. What are those cases where a preliminary hearing is a worthwhile exercise? Without being exhaustive, we may instance some. Where the only ground urged is a point of law which has been squarely covered by a ruling of this Court to keep the appeal lingering longer is survival after death. Where the accused has pleaded guilty of murder and the High Court, on the evidence, is satisfied with the pleas and has awarded the lesser penalty, a mere appeal ex misericordia is an exercise in futility. Where a minor procedural irregularity, clearly curable under the Code, is all that the appellant has to urge, the full panoply of an appellate bearing is an act of supererogation. Where the grounds, taken at their face value, are frivolous, vexatious, malicious, wholly dilatory or blatantly mendacious, the prolongation of an appeal is a premium on abuse of the process of court. Maybe other cases can be conceived of, but we merely illustrate the functional relevance of Order 21 Rule 15(1)(c).”

“53. The common embankments applicable to Order 21, Rule 15(1)(c) and Section 384 of the Code to prevent unconstitutional overflow may now be concretised, not as rigid manacles but as guidelines for safe exercise. We are hopeful that the Supreme Court will if found necessary, make- clarificatory rules in this behalf.

54. To conclude, we uphold the vires of Order 21, Rule 15(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Rules and also Section 384 of the Criminal Procedure Code but hold that in their application both the provisions shall be restricted-by certain criteria as a permissible exercise in constitutionalisation.

55. Order 21 Rule 15(1)(c) in action does not mean that all appeals falling within its fold shall be routinely disposed of, as far as possible, on a preliminary hearing. Such a course, as earlier mentioned, obliterates the difference between Articles 134 and 136, between right and leave.

The rule, in cases of appeals under Article 134(1)(a) and

(b) and Section 2(a) is notice, records and reasons, but the exception is preliminary hearing on all such materials as may be placed by the appellant and brief grounds for dismissal. This exceptional category is where, in all conscience, there is no point at all. In cases of real doubt the benefit of doubt goes to the appellant and notice goes to the adversary — even if the chances of allowance of the appeal be not bright. We think it proper to suggest that with a view to invest clarity and avoid ambiguity.

Order 21, Rule 15(1)(c) may be suitably modified in conformity with this ruling.” 24 The Constitution Bench has considered the challenge to Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the 1966 Rules from the perspective of Article 21. Procedure established by law, it is well-settled, must be fair, just and reasonable. The Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act was enacted by Parliament in pursuance of the power conferred by clause (2) of Article 134 of the Constitution. The object of Parliament in enacting the law was, inter alia, that where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed an acquittal and sentenced the accused to a sentence of imprisonment of life or to imprisonment for not less than ten years, a right of appeal should be made available to the Supreme Court. A parity of principle applies where the High Court has withdrawn for trial before itself any case pending before a court subordinate to its authority and sentenced the accused to either imprisonment for life or to a term of not less than ten years. There is a doctrinal parity between the conferment of a right to appeal by Article 134(1)(a) and (b) and Sections 2(a) and (b) of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, save and except for the fact that the former deals with a case where the High Court has imposed a sentence of death, while, the latter deals with a situation where the High Court has, while reversing an order of acquittal, imposed a sentence of either imprisonment for life or for a term of not less than ten years.