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1. The question which is being answered by this Court in the present matter is associated with the issue of easy / ready access to music / sound recording vis-a- vis the restrictions which can be put on the same by the bonafide owners of copyright in the said music and / or sound recording. The advent of the internet has irreversibly made a global impact upon the functioning of society and the music industry is no exception. In the past, a musicophile's desire to access the latest song album or favourite classic would inevitably lead him to the doorstep of a record store or have him sifting through the radio channels on a traditional radio / transistor. Whereas today, any song is just a couple of clicks away. The rapid technological advancement in the music industry, has phased out the traditional purchase of records, cassettes, compact discs, etc. The innovation of online streaming services such as the services provided by the present Defendants, have rendered the same obsolete and antiquated. Most users have switched to modern platforms for their music demands. The Legislature, being conscious of the shift in the industry, responded with an amendment to the Copyright Act, 1957 (The Copyright Amendment Act, 2012). However, a few provisions of the copyright law, which are the subject matter of this proceeding / decision and pertain to these services require delineation.

59. Ld. Senior Advocate for the Plaintif further submitted that the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 is a modern statute and it was passed on the basis of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2010. He submitted that the digital downloading / surfing of music was very much in the public domain in 2010 / 2012. The Legislature was therefore fully aware and cognizant of digital technologies and of music downloading / streaming at the time the said Copyright Amendment Bill 2010 was passed. He submitted that the Legislature's awareness is demonstrated from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, which is reproduced hereinbelow:

66. I have considered the above submissions advanced by the Ld. Senior Advocates appearing for the parties. Indeed, the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 is a modern statute and cannot be termed as old or archaic. The Legislature was well aware of existence of prevalent digital technologies and trends, including the sharing, streaming and downloading of music when the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010 was before it. The same is evident from a reading of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Copyright Amendment Act, 2012. The expropriatory nature of Section 31-D cannot be denied. The rights of such owner of a sound recording are given under Section 14(1)(e) and Section 30 of the Act. Section 31- D acts as a statutory exception to the rule that a copyrighted work is the exclusive property of its owner and he may deal with it as he may deem fit. It was only in 2012, vide the amendment to the Act, that the Legislature made additions to the Act, including, inter alia, the subject Section 31-D. It would not be going far to say that the Legislature had intended specific circumstances where the Statutory License under the said section would constitute an exception to a copyright owner's exclusive rights. In view thereof, along with the caution advised by the Apex Court in Super Cassettes Industries v. Music Broadcast (supra); Union of India v. Board of Control for Cricket in India and Ors. (supra); and the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma and Ors. (supra) in respect of expropriatory legislations, Section 31-D must be construed strictly in conformity with the specific intention for which it was enacted.

It is evident from the above paragraphs that the Rajya Sabha Parliamentary Standing Committee itself understood that 'broadcast' under Section 31-D was limited to either 'radio' or 'television' broadcasting only.

71. Further, the contention of the Defendants that they are broadcasting sound recordings over internet and that internet broadcasting is a type of audio broadcasting and hence internet broadcasting falls within the term 'radio broadcasting' is misplaced. Firstly, there is nothing in the definition of the term ''broadcast' or other provisions of the Act concerning 'broadcast' which supports this submission. Digital downloading or surfing of music was in the public domain when the Copyright Amendment Bill 2010 was introduced and when the Copyright Amendment Act 2012 was passed. The Legislature was thus fully aware and cognizant of the digital technologies and of music downloading / streaming in 2010 and 2012. The same is also evident from the excerpts (reproduced in the preceding paragraph) of the Rajya Sabha Parliamentary Standing Committee Report. It is pertinent to note that despite the said position, the Legislature consciously decided not to specifically introduce the term 'internet broadcasting' in Section 31-D of the Act. There is one more factor which throws light on this aspect. Section 52 of the Act provides for 'Certain acts not to be infringement of copyright'. Section 52 (1) (b) and (c) of the Act which were introduced by the Copyright Amendment Act, 2012 are meant for providing protection to the Internet Service Providers which makes it evident that the technology pertaining to downloading/streaming over internet was very well within the knowledge of the Legislature and that the Legislature even made provisions for the protection of internet service providers. Despite the said position, the Legislature in its wisdom decided not to introduce the words 'internet broadcasting' in Section 31-D of the Act. This shows the conscious choice of the Legislature in not including 'internet broadcasting' within the scope of Section 31-D of the Act.