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“The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it.” Although the Madras High Court in Gayatri Balaswamy (supra) appropriately noted that these observations in McDermott International Inc. were not in the context of the specific issue being dealt herewith, this Court is of the opinion that it is determinative of the Court's approach in an enquiry under Section 34 of the Act. Indeed, a Court, while modifying or varying the award would be doing nothing else but “correct[ing] the errors of the arbitrators”. This is expressly against the dictat of McDermott International Inc. Further, if the power to remit the matter to the arbitrator is read into Section 34, it would render inexplicable the deliberate omission by Parliament of a provision analogous to Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in the present Act. Section 16 of the 1940 Act specifically armed courts with the power to remit the matter to arbitration. Noticeably, the scope of remission under the present Act is confined to that prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 34. Besides the Division Bench rulings of this Court in Delhi Development Authority, State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., this was also noted by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in R.S. Jiwani v. Ircon International Ltd., 2010 (1) Bom CR 529, where the Court held:
“An award can only be set aside under the provisions of Section 34 as there is no other provision except Section 33 which permits the arbitral tribunal to correct or interpret the award or pass additional award, that too, on limited grounds stated in Section 33… It is also true that there are no parimateria provisions like Sections 15 and 16 of the Act of 1940 in the 1996 Act but still the provisions of Section 34 read together, sufficiently indicate vesting of vast powers in the court to set aside an award and even to adjourn a matter and such acts and deeds by the Arbitral Tribunal at the instance of the party which would help in removing the grounds of attack for setting aside the arbitral award.” On the other hand, the Calcutta High Court in Snehasis Bhowmick did not analyse this distinction, or the specific observations of the Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc. quoted above. Further, the decisions in Numaligarh Refinery and Harishchandra Reddy (supra) did not discuss the Court's power to modify, vary or remit the award under Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, in light of the dictum in McDermott International Inc. and the difference in provisions of the 1940 Act and the present Act, this Court holds that the power to modify, vary or remit the award does not exist under Section 34 of the Act.
34. At this juncture, it is important to point out that an earlier Division Bench of the Madras High Court reported in Central Warehousing Corpn. v. A.S.A. Transport, 2007 SCC OnLine Mad 972 had specifically considered the judgment of this Court in McDermott (supra) and held: -
18. Though we are not in a position to concur with the reasoning of the learned single Judge, we are in complete agreement with the ultimate order of the learned single Judge in setting aside the award. However, the further direction given by the learned single Judge directing the appellant to appoint an arbitrator at Chennai and for conducting the arbitration are to be set aside as it cannot be given as an order of the Court. Useful reference can be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mcdermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard co.

39. As has been pointed out by us hereinabove, McDermott (supra) has been followed by this Court in Kinnari Mullick (supra). Also, in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 157, a recent judgment of this Court also followed McDermott (supra) stating that there is no power to modify an arbitral award under Section 34 as follows: -

(f) In law, where the Court sets aside the award passed by the majority members of the tribunal, the underlying disputes would require to be decided afresh in an appropriate proceeding.