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Documents citing Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015

Google India Private Limited vs M/S Visaka Industries Limited And 2 ... on 18 November, 2016

Thus, the principle laid down in all the judgments is only based on actual knowledge about posting of defamatory or any content by the 3rd parties on the web-blog. The same is the language used in Section 79 (3) (b) of the Information Technology Act. Added to that another safeguard is provided under Rule 3 of the Rules framed thereunder i.e. exercise of due diligence. If the intermediary exercised due diligence and when such posting of defamatory content in the web-blog came to their actual knowledge or brought to their actual knowledge, the intermediary has to take steps to block access to such content or remove such content from the blog after due verification.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 32 - Cited by 12 - M S Murthy - Full Document

Dr. Chegudi Ashok Babu Alias Joshua ... vs Karunakar Sugguna, on 2 August, 2019

(2014) 2 SCC 1 11 HACJ & MSM,J WP(PIL)_80_ 2019 The petitioners appear to have lodged another report on 06.03.2019 with Central Complaint Cell, Office of Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam City and obtained receipt bearing No.111/19 and the gist of the complaint is that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 abusing Jesus Christ and insulting the public by uploading the trailer by name "Nene Devvuni" in YouTube. Therefore, lodging a report with the Central Complaint Cell and Cyber Crimes are of no use when the alleged release of teaser or trailer "Nene Devunni" do not fall within the provisions of Information Technology Act in view of declaring Section 66A as unconstitutional by the Apex Court in "Shreya Singhal v. Union of India" (referred supra) and the petitioners ought to have lodged a report with the Law and Order Police Station to take necessary action for the offence punishable under Section 295A of I.P.C. but no report was lodged by the petitioners for one reason or the other with the Law and Order Police Station to take necessary action against the respondent Nos.1 and 2. Thereby, the question of their taking action by registering crime and issuing F.I.R., and conducting investigation, based on such report does not arise.
Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati Cites 33 - Cited by 2 - M S Murthy - Full Document

Ani Media Pvt. Ltd. vs Wikimedia Foundation Inc & Ors. on 2 April, 2025

We may notice that what is considered in Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] was Section 79 after substitution. There was a challenge mounted to the constitutionality of Section 79. This Court held as follows, inter alia : (SCC pp. 180-81, paras 120-24) "120. One of the petitioners' counsel also assailed Section 79(3)(b) to the extent that it makes the intermediary exercise its own judgment upon receiving Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:SHAZAAD ZAKIR CS(OS) 524/2024 Page 36 of 61 Signing Date:03.04.2025 21:20:01 actual knowledge that any information is being used to commit unlawful acts. Further, the expression "unlawful acts" also goes way beyond the specified subjects delineated in Article 19(2).
Delhi High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 0 - S Prasad - Full Document

Suki Sivam vs You Tube on 9 August, 2023

14. In view of the discussions made earlier, this Court holds the defendants are only intermediaries as defined under Section 2(1) (w) of Information Technology Act and they are not responsible for infringing contents posted by third parties in their platform. However, the liability is limited as held in Shreya Singhal case cited above. Therefore, the defendants cannot be termed as infringers in the absence of any Court order or order from appropriate Government under Section 69 of Information Technology Act. Issue No.3 is answered accordingly.
Madras High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Suki Sivam vs You Tube on 9 August, 2023

14. In view of the discussions made earlier, this Court holds the defendants are only intermediaries as defined under Section 2(1) (w) of Information Technology Act and they are not responsible for infringing contents posted by third parties in their platform. However, the liability is limited as held in Shreya Singhal case cited above. Therefore, the defendants cannot be termed as infringers in the absence of any Court order or order from appropriate Government under Section 69 of Information Technology Act. Issue No.3 is answered accordingly.
Madras High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Suhail Rashid Bhat vs State Of Jammu & Kashmir And Others on 25 October, 2019

138. Reference stands made in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Grayned v. City of Rockford PIL 24/2018 Page 79 of 196 33 L Ed 2d 222 : 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972), wherein it was observed that the void for vagueness doctrine requires to address at least the following three connected but discrete due process concerns:
Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench Cites 164 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mrs X vs Union Of India And Ors on 26 April, 2023

In addition to "actual knowledge" as defined in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (supra) as a Court order or upon being notified by the appropriate Government, Rule 3(2)(b) and (c) of the IT Rules now allows the victim/user to approach the intermediary on their own with their grievance. Further, it already mandates a timeline that must be adhered to when it comes to disabling access/de-linking the offending content. If read holistically, if the user/victim is required to approach with each specific URL again and again, this will only frustrate the purpose of the timelines and the grievance mechanism redressal as expounded under the IT Rules. It has been submitted that the sustained practice with regard to content removal under the IT Act has been to provide specific URLs, however, this practice fails to account for a grievance redressal mechanism available to the user/victim and it is not justifiable, morally or otherwise, to suggest that an NCII abuse victim will have to constantly subject themselves to trauma by having to scour the internet for NCII content relating to them and having to approach the authorities again and again. Once it has been reported by the user/victim or a Court order or an order of the appropriate Government has been rendered, then the search engine cannot contend that any filtering of the content that is done subsequent to the reporting or the Order is proactive in nature; it can only be termed as being in pursuance to the reporting of existence of such content specific to an individual or a judicial Order.
Delhi High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 0 - S Prasad - Full Document
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