22. The submission of Shri Amist that multiplier of 400 months cannot be given has to be accepted, but at the same time, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent-claimants that the Tribunal did not grant any amount under the head of future loss of income though the deceased was a salaried person. The judgment of Gobald Motor Services Ltd. And another vs. R.M.K. Velusamy, 1962 SCR (1) 929 and General Manager, Kerala S.R.T.C. vs. Susamma Thomas, 1994 SCC (2) 176 will permit this Court at enough figure of 50%, hence, the amount would be Rs.1500/- per month as the deceased was a bachelor, but his younger brother, younger sister and mother were there and it is come on evidence that elder brother after his marriage had started living separately and it was the deceased the sole bread-earner for the family, hence, 1/3 would be deducted. The data figure would be Rs.1,000/- per month, which means Rs.12,000/- per year.
24. The Appellate Court must grant just compensation even in absence of written cross objection by claimants. The Tribunal was under an obligation to grant what is known as future loss of income which has not been granted in view of the judgment of Gobald Motor Services Ltd. and another v. R.M.K. Velusamy, 1962 SCR (1) 929. Thus, it can be said that the Tribunal has erred in granting compensation nor the compensation is on the higher side.
Reference was made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Gobald Motor Service v. Velusami (AIR 1962 SC1) and C. K. S. Iyer v. T. K. Nair, AIR 1970 SC 376, both the decisions were under Fatal Accidents Act but certain observations therein would also apply to the principles for determining just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act also. One observation was : "As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority."
In support of this contention, reliance was placed on a Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. Velusami, AIR 1953 Mad 981 which has been relied upon also by the court of appeal below. I will now proceed to consider the points raised seriatim in the order in which they are stated above.
(26) The above case was approvingly referred to by a Division Bench of Madras High Court (Rajamannar C.J. and Venka- tarama Ayyer J.) in Gobald Motor Service Ltd., a company registered under the India Companies Act, by its Managing Directors N. Veeraswami Chettiar and another V. R.M.K.Velusami and others (12) where the learned judges also referred to the following "THErights of action in the two case are quite distinct and independent. Under the Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, the right of action is for the benefit of the deceased's estate; under the Fatal Accidents Act the right of action is for the benefit of the deceased's deperddents."
(27) It was said that since compensation for the loss of pecuniary benefit is claimable only under S. 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act and since compensation for loss of expectation of life is claimable under S. 2 on behalf of the estate of the deceased and since no such compensation was claimable under S. 2 on behalf of the estate of the deceased and since no such claim to compensation for loss of expectation of life had been made in the plaint, no such compensation was claimable or awardable. It is now clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. Velusami that although compensation is claimable by defendants of deceased under S. 1-A for loss of pecuniary advantage and compensation for loss of expectation of life is claimable under S. 2 in a case in which compensation is claimed by the dependents under both sections the claim could be set off where the estate is left to the defendant. It was also further explained that there was no legal impediment to a person who is entitled to compensation under both the section making a claim to such compensation although the claim would be controlled by the rule that the compensation under S. 1-A should be reduced by the amount awarded under S. 2 and vice versa.
3. The next argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded by the tribunal. Mr. Subramaniam invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service v. Velusami, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bubagwanti, .
9. As regards the measure of liability in the case of motor accidents, the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Gobald Motor Service v. Velusami, and C. K. S. Iyer v. T. K. Nair, have (after a discussion of all the leading decisions in England) laid down the main principles. Both the decisions did not have to consider the measure of liability under Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. We may now take it as settled law that under the Fatal Accidents Act the liability under Section 1 and Section 2 are distinct, different and independent. Under Section 1, damages are recoverable for the benefit of persons mentioned therein as loss sustained by them, while under Section 2, damages are awarded for the recoupment of the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased as a result of the accident. The two claims are based upon different causes of action and the claim ants would be entitled to recover compensation separately under both the heads. If, however, the person who takes benefit under Section 1 happens to be the same person as entitled to compensation under Section 2, there cannot be duplication of the dame claim and the compensation awarded under Section 2 for the loss of the estate of the deceased will be taken into account in the calculation of the compensation payable to the claimants under Section 1.