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Documents citing Sate Of Punjab And Ors vs Chaman Lal Goyal on 31 January, 1995

Sudarshan Singh Aged About 58 Years Son ... vs Union Of India Through Secretary on 2 August, 2011

Nevertheless, in view of our findings as mentioned hereinabove, we are inclined to follow the preposition of law laid down in the case of State of Punjab and others Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal (supra) in which the preposition laid down by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulays case have been broadly made applicable in such cases of delay. In the aforesaid case of Chaman Lal Goyal, the Honble Apex Court had directed for consideration of promotion of the respondents forthwith without taking into consideration the pendency of the enquiry and if the respondents of that case are found fit and so promoted, it was to be subject to review after conclusion of the enquiry. The Honble Apex Court also directed to conclude the enquiry within a stipulated period. Accordingly, this O.A. is partly allowed with the direction to the respondents No. 1,3 and 4 to consider the applicant for promotion to the Junior Administrative Grade from the date applicants juniors were promoted and also consider the applicant for selection grade and higher promotion on the post of Conservator of Forests at par with the similarly situated / junior person from the due dates , if he is otherwise found suitable, without taking into consideration the pendency of enquiry in question. But it would be subject to review ,if any, after conclusion of the enquiry in question. Simultaneously, the respondents are directed to conclude the enquiry in question within 4 months from the date of this order.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Lucknow Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Dr. Anil Kumar Mukhi vs The Chief Soil Survey Officer And Ors. on 18 November, 2005

In State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal (supra), in (1996) SCC (L & S) 80 (B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India), We have considered the judgments referred by the applicants and also the respondents. Here is a case where according to the charges the incident took place between May, 1990 and March, 1991, the Fact Finding Authority was appointed and subsequently a charge memo dated 28.08.1995 was issued, during the said period the respondents have issued a notice to attend the inquiry, after obtaining the report from the Fact Finding Committee the impugned charge memo was issued. The inquiry report dated 24.12.1999 as per Annexure-A30 was forwarded to the applicant as late as on 4.10.2002, whereas the inquiry authority who conducted the de novo inquiry notwithstanding the fact that the very constitution of de novo inquiry is illegal and thus there was a gap of 34 months to forward a copy of the inquiry report to the applicant to submit his representation. Though the applicant had submitted his representation to the inquiry report on 30.10.2002, the Disciplinary Authority has not considered the gap of 34 months and also the representations of the applicant. In reply to the said contention, the respondents have stated that there was no delay in conclusion of the inquiry. The stand taken in the reply statement at para 40 is that the initial report of inquiry was submitted by Sri S.K. Swami on 27th December, 1999 and an appendix to the inquiry report was submitted by him in January 2001 and the report was accepted in consultation with the CVC by the Disciplinary Authority in August 2002. The Chief Vigilance Officer has issued the order not in the capacity as CVO but for and on behalf of the President of India, which is the Disciplinary Authority. The delay of 5 months was due to the fact that Disciplinary Authority desired a clarification from the UPSC. The applicant totally misrepresented the facts. The CVC had recommended imposition of minor penalty. The Disciplinary Authority had only taken a tentative view on the advice of the UPSC and they have further contended that there is no requirement of forwarding a copy of Disciplinary Authority's letter to the UPSC seeking its advice. We have carefully examined the contention taken from either side. We are of the considered view that the delay has not been explained by the Inquiry Officer as held by the Apex Court as stated above and it is held that there was delay in concluding the inquiry.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Bangalore Cites 23 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Sh. Chaman Lal vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi on 13 January, 2010

S.B. Bhattacharjee Vs. S.D. Majumdar & others, 2008 (1) SCC (L&S) 21  (2007) 10 SCC 513 In State of Punjab & others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 SCC (L&S) 541, a delay of more than 5 years had taken place in disciplinary proceedings and government servant was responsible of escape of prisoner involving of death of number of persons. This disciplinary proceeding and its delay was not found in the interest of administration but the delay would depend upon individuals case.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 211 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Mohinder Singh Kanwar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 21 April, 2023

14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary 13 proceedings, as such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question must be carefully examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of the charges involved therein. The court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514 : AIR 1990 SC 1308] , State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal [(1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 :
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 1 - S Dwivedi - Full Document

Rakesh Bahadur vs M/O Personnel,Public Grievances And ... on 10 March, 2026

17. The legal principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anand K. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society, Managing Director, Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. R. Rajan, State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, and S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India (supra) consistently emphasize that courts or tribunals should ordinarily refrain from interfering with disciplinary proceedings at the initial or intermediate stages, including quashing charge-sheets or inquiries merely on the ground of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that delay in initiation or conclusion of disciplinary proceedings does not automatically vitiate the proceedings; rather, the facts and circumstances of each case, including the gravity and seriousness of the charges, must be carefully examined. Interference is warranted only where the delay is inordinate, unexplained, and Digitally signed by NEETU NEETU SHARMA results in demonstrable prejudice to the delinquent employee. If Date: 2026.03.12 SHARMA 11:47:02 +05'30' Item No.37 32 OA No.31/2015 the delay is reasonably explained and no prejudice is shown to have been caused, the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to continue in the interest of maintaining clean and honest administration. In this case, the respondents have demonstrated that on analysis of the case by the respondent No.1, it found it appropriate to call for the comments of Ministry of I&B on the relevant points raised by the applicant in his defence. The comments of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting were called on 09.11.2012 which were received only on 29.05.2015 despite many reminders, the details of which is given in para 5 above. Thereafter, within 12 days, the applicant instituted the present OA before this Tribunal on 10.06.2015. This Tribunal vide interim order dated 17.06.2015 stayed the operation and effect of the departmental proceedings and the said interim protection is still continuing in favour of the applicant. We agree with the argument of the applicant that too long time has been taken by the respondent to decide his representation, however, it is also a fact that reply of concerned Ministry at last was received and thereafter the applicant has filed this Original Application merely after 12 days and is seeking of quashing of Inquiry Report. We hold that in the above sequence of event, the Disciplinary Authority did not have adequate time to consider the said comments of Ministry of I&B and was in a position to take an appropriate decision in the matter. In the background of these events, we are of the considered view that at this juncture, there are no grounds to set aside the Inquiry Report and the question in para 9 above is answered against the applicant.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

A V Premnath vs Home Affairs on 20 September, 2024

"14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, must be carefully examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The Court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the Court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion, which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of a delay in their conclusion. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 943; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3475; Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906; The Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha, AIR 2012 SC 2250; and Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. v. A. Masilamani, JT (2012) 11 SC 533).
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 28 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Udaragondi Rama Rao, vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 15 February, 2021

Learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that, in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in State of Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goyal (referred supra), delay if unexplained, is a ground to quash the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the government servants. The Apex Court is of the candid view that there is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the fact-, of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing MSM,J WP.No.16658 of 2020 19 for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing.
Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - M S Murthy - Full Document

Prakash Mishra vs M/O Home Affairs on 29 February, 2016

In the judgment reported at 1995 (1) ILJ 679 (SC) State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal it has also been observed that when a plea of unexplained delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings as well as prejudice to the delinquent officer is raised, the court has to weigh the facts appearing for and against the petitioners pleas and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. The court has to indulge in a process of balancing.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 58 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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