Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 68 (0.92 seconds)
Documents citing Atmaram Rachhodbhai vs Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin And Anr. on 2 March, 1972

Nagar Wachan Mandir, Pandharpur, ... vs Akbaralli Abdulhusen And Sons And Ors. on 4 March, 1993

A.I.R. (36)1949 Calcutta 519 Ramesh Chandra Roy v. Hemendra Kumar Roy, has also taken identical view as expressed by the Full Bench in , Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulam Mohyeddin, (supra). He also points out that the view expressed by Full Bench is also followed by Justice Shri S.K. Desai in Special Civil Application 3107 of 1975 though in a different context and hence he points out that the reasoning assigned by the two courts below in holding that the suit is not maintainable is correct and no interference is called for of this Court in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. He also supports the finding of the two courts below and the interpretation of section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and he rightly points out that in view of the definition of section 2(13) the society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is also included in the definition of the said Public Trust. In view of this he contends that both the judgments should be confirmed.
Bombay High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Shri Gokulrao Sheshrao Deshmukh vs Vasant Mahadeorao Akarte (Dead on 16 January, 2009

"After hearing both the learned counsel I am not inclined to accept the submission of Shri Abhyankar whereas I am inclined to accept the contentions of Shri Apte as I find that the Full Bench decision of Gujarat reported in AIR 1973 Gujarat 113, Atmaram Ranchhodbhai vs. Gulamhjusein Gulam Mohiyaddin (supra) is directly on the point and arises under the Rent Act. It has been held by the Full Bench of Gujarat that unless instrument of trust otherwise provides all co-trustees must join for filing a suit to recover the possession of the property from the tenant. It is nobody's case in this matter that the instrument of the Trust provides otherwise. In fact, instrument of the trust is not even produced on the record, and on the proper construction of Sections 47 and 48 of the Indian Trust Act which are reproduced above, the contention raised by Shri Apte is correct. Section 47 clearly deprives the trust from delegating his office in any of his duties to co-trustee or to a stranger unless conditions mentioned in the said section are complied with. It is not in dispute in this matter that the conditions referred to in section 47 are not complied with by the plaintiffs. When one reads ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:15:24 ::: 8 both section 47 and section 48, it would not be difficult to record a finding that the present suit filed by the two trustees is not maintainable. The second submission with reference to Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1980 cannot be accepted in view of the definition of Public Trust given in section 2 (13) of the Bombay Public Trust Act. Section 2(13) of Public Trusts Act reads as follows:-
Bombay High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - S R Dongaonkar - Full Document

M/S Jugal Kishore Chowdhury Charitable ... vs Shyam Divan on 3 July, 2025

2025.07.05 KAUR 13:21:00 +0530 cited with approval Atmaram Ranchodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam MANU/GJ/ 0112/1973 holding, whether a trust is a private trust governed by the Indian Trusts Act or is a public charitable or religious trust, a trustee cannot delegate any of his duties, functions and powers to a co-trustee or to any person unless the instrument of trust so provides or the delegation is necessary or the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation or the delegation is in the regular course of business. It was further held that the trustees even by a unanimous resolution authorise one of themselves to act as managing trustee for executing the duties, functions and powers relating to the trust and everyone of them must jo in the execution of such duties, functions and powers"
Delhi District Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Unknown vs Zoroastrian Co-Operative Credit Bank ...

"11. After hearing both the learned Counsels I am not inclined to accept the submission of Shri Abhyankar whereas I am inclined to accept the contentions of Shri Apte as I find that the Full Bench Decision of Gujrat reported in MANU/GJ/0112/1973: AIR 1973 Guj 113 Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulam Moyeddin (supra) is directly on the point and arises under the Rent Act. It has been held by the Full Bench of Gujrat that unless instrument of trust otherwise provides all co-trustees must join for filing a suit to recover the possession of the property from the tenant. It is nobody's case in this matter that the instrument of the Trust provides otherwise. IN fact, instrument of the Trust is not even produced on the record, and on the proper construction of section 47 and 48 of the Indian Trust Act, which are reproduced above, the contention raised by Shri Apte is correct. Section 47 clearly deprives the trustee from delegating his office in any of his duties to co-trustee or to a stranger unless conditions mentioned in the said section are complied with. It is not in dispute in this matter that the conditions referred to in section 47 are not complied with by the plaintiffs. When one reads both section 47 and section 48, it would not be difficult to record a finding that the present suit filed by the two trustees is not maintainable. The second submission with reference to section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 cannot be accepted in view of the definition of Public Trust given in section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trust Act. Section 2(13) of Public Trust Act reads as follows:-
Madras High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Jain Swetambara Murthi Pujaka Samastha ... vs Waman Dattatreya Pukale And Ors. on 29 June, 1978

Following this pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the High Court of Gujarat in Atmaram's case (FB) held that unless the instrument of trust otherwise provided, all co-trustees must join in filing a suit to recover possession of the property from a tenant and that no one trustee, even if he be a managing trustee unanimously chosen by the co-trustees, can maintain such a suit without joining the other co-trustees. It was further laid down that all co-trustees must join in the suit and that if any one or more of them is or are unwilling to be joined in the suit as plaintiff or plaintiffs or for some reason or the other it is not possible to join him or them as co-plaintiff or co-pliantiffs, he or they must be impleaded as defendant or defendants, as the case may be, so that all co-trustees are before the Court. Sri S. K. Kulkarni sought to draw upon these observations to support his contention that if one only amongst the body of trustees institutes proceedings for recovery of possession of trust property from a tenant the proceedings would, unless that is enabled by a specific provision in the Charter of Trust, be wholly illegal and void and not amenable to rectification by subsequent impleading of the other trustees.
Karnataka High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Sree Mukhya Pranaswami By His Trustee ... vs T.U. Raghavendra Rao And Ors. on 3 September, 1996

7. Point No. 1: The plaintiff, as already stated above, is Sri Mukhya Pranaswami in the Uttaradi Mutt Building at Vijayawada by his trustee Sri Satya Pramoda Theerdha Swamuluvaru, represented by his power of attorney agent M.V. Ramanacharya. The contention of the first defendant is that the trustee of the plaintiff-Mutt has chosen to file the suit through his power of attorney holder; that a trustee is, however, not entitled to delegate his duty or power in that manner to file the suit on behalf of the plaintiff and that, therefore, the suit is not maintainable. The contention of the learned Counsel for the first defendant, who is the first respondent herein, is that a trustee is a person in whom confidence is imposed by the persons who created the trust and he is in a fiduciary capacity; that he cannot, therefore, delegate his duties and obligations to any other person, either a power of attorney holder or otherwise, even for the purpose of filing a suit and that, therefore, the suit is not maintainable in view of the relevant provisions of the Indian Trusts Act. It is seen from a perusal of the Judgment of the lower Court in this regard where this aspect is discussed under issue No. 1, that the learned Subordinate Judge has chosen to rely upon the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court reported in Atmaram v. Gulamhusein, wherein, the earlier decision of the Privy Council reported in Man Mohan Das v. Janaki Prasad, AIR 1945 P.C. 23 and the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Abdul Knyum v. Alibhal, were also referred to and considered, in support of his conclusion that the trustee of the plaintiff-Mutt cannot delegate his power to file a suit to any power of attorney holder, and that the suit filed in that manner through the power of attorney holder is not maintainable. The learned Subordinate Judge, after referring to the above died decisions and observations made therein, has chosen to observe that the trustee of the plaintiff-Mutt cannot delegate his power to file the suit to a third person by executing a power of attorney in his favour and such delegation by a trustee is not permissible regarding a trust property and that the suit filed by such a power of attorney holder is not maintainable. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, tries to contend that the facts in the above said three decisions are quite different and the observations made by the learned Judges in those decisions cannot be made applicable to the present case where the power of attorney was executed only for the purpose of fulfilling the formality of filing a suit regarding the trust property and not for meddling with or administering the property as such in any manner either for leasing out or selling away the same or for determining the lease-hold rights etc., and that the suit filed by a power of attorney holder to whom the powers are delegated by the trustee is quite maintainable and cannot be dismissed on the ground that the trustee is not entitled to appoint such a power of attorney holder to file the suit. A perusal of the above cited decisions and the relevant provisions of the Indian Trusts Act clearly shows that there is any amount of force in the above said contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant and the observations made by the Courts in the above cited decisions cannot be said to be applicable to the present case in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the powers delegated and the reasons for which such delegation of powers to the power of attorney holder was made.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - R B Reddy - Full Document

Kantaben Wd/O Mohanbhai Rathod vs Harijan Ashram Sabarmati Trust on 31 January, 2025

26. The arguments canvassed by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that defendant No.10 could not join in the suit as defendant No.10 as the said exchange was in breach of the order of status quo passed in the present proceedings, it is required to be noted that the order of Page 20 of 26 Uploaded by MANOJ KR. RAI(HC01072) on Fri Jan 31 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Feb 01 05:33:35 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CRA/137/2024 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 31/01/2025 undefined status quo that has been passed is in respect to the premises and the said relief will have to be read subject to the claim of the plaintiff in the suit and the claim of the plaintiff in the suit is with respect to tenancy rights, and therefore, it cannot be said that by virtue of status quo order, the defendant No.10 could not be joined as party defendant. The judgments on which the plaintiffs are relying also will be of no assistance to the plaintiff as in the facts of the said case Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin and another (supra) and the present are different, here the defendant No.10 who has by way of Exchange Deed dated 10.06.2024 has entered the shoes of defendant No.1, has given an application and the persons added alongwith that defendant No.10 are the trustees of defendant No.10. It cannot be said that defendant No.10 has delegated power to a third party. Moreover, it is not a third party who is not a trustee wants to be joined as party defendant but the trustees of defendant No.10 and the trust have been joined as party defendant.
Gujarat High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mr. Anil Rathi vs Sanjog Steels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. on 15 September, 2020

" 8.0 Within the ceiling of the number of licenses earmarked for a group/sub-group as defined in clause 7 above, the seniormost Trustee of the group/sub-group will issue the license to use the Trade Mark 'RATHI' on behalf of the "Foundation" to the company(ies)/firm(s) of his CS(COMM) 603/2019 Page 47/47 group/sub-group provided the company(ies)/firm(s) fulfil the conditions laid down in cluases 9,9.1,9.2,9.3 and 9.4 hereinafter."
Delhi High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - V K Rao - Full Document

Mr. Anil Rathi vs Shri Sharma Steeltech (India) Pvt. Ltd. ... on 15 September, 2020

17. On the other hand, there is a Full Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court which seems in our view to take the right view. This is Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mphiyaddin and another, A.I.R. 1973, Gujarat 113. The judgment of Bhagwati C.J., sets out the facts in that case which was a reference on this very question, i.e., as to whether some out of several co-trustees could file a suit for eviction. And also, on the question whether some out of several co-trustees could determine the tenancy. It was held on both points that all the trustees must join together. On the second question, namely, as to whether a single trustee could maintain the suit, it was found that there was a unanimity amongst all the High Courts on this question and the conclusion of the Full Bench was as follows:--
Delhi High Court Cites 36 - Cited by 0 - V K Rao - Full Document
1   2 3 4 5 6 7 Next