11. He also cited (The Sakharikherda Education Society, Sakharkherda through the Secretary and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra through Secretary, Education Department and Ors.) from its paragraph 10 wherefrom it appears that a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a society registered under the Act is not a Corporation but is merely an association of persons, though for certain purpose it is recognised as an entity. Therefore, such a society can sue through the President.
compliance of the procedure laid down in the three
Environmental Impact Assessment Notifications. We are
also satisfied that the project is being implemented in
public interest, and serves the cause of environment,
without any serious damage to ecology. Where there are
two competing public interests, a balance has to be struck
between the two. We are, therefore, satisfied that no
interference is called for by this Court in exercise of writ
jurisdiction."
On the point that a project implemented in public interest and which serves the cause of environment is not liable to be quashed merely for technical non-compliance, much reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Rambhau Patil & others vs. Maharashtra State Road Development Corp. Ltd. & others (2002-1-ALLMR-385), wherein, it was ruled thus,
"29. ..... in a case of this nature, if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the notifications, the project and the environment clearance granted by the Government of India should not be quashed on the mere ground of technical procedural non-compliance. We cannot lose sight of the fact that this is a public interest litigation. Therefore, the primary concern of the Court in such writ petitions is to safeguard public interest. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the project has also been conceived to serve public interest, and provide free flow of traffic between Bandra and Worli, which is considerably an over-burdened sector. The report of the Consultants does include a chapter on Environmental Impact Assessment. The report takes into account earlier reports and views expressed by experts. This was followed by public discussions and seminars held for the purpose. It is not as if the project violates any statutory provision. Reclamation of land is permissible for sea-link projects. The project is included in the revised Development Plan prepared under the MRTP Act. The Coastal Zone Management Plan, which includes the project, has also been approved by the Government of India. We are also satisfied that the project would not cause any ecological or environmental damage. We cannot lose sight of the fact that while maintaining and observing environment and ecology, the Government is also required to solve other problems, which are of varied nature and also involving public interest, and, therefore, a balance has to be struck between the two. If the project violated any statutory provision, and resulted in ecological and environmental damage, we would have no hesitation in quashing the project itself. However, we find that the project will not have any such result, and all that can be said is that the procedure under the three EIA notifications was not followed, though we find that Environmental Impact Assessment Report was submitted along with the application for grant of environment clearance by the Government of India, and that was followed by seminars in which social activists and environmentalists had adequate opportunity of expressing their views. We are, therefore, of the view that the requirements of the notifications have been substantially complied with, even if technically the procedure was not punctiliously observed."
Reference in this context can be made the judgments in
Sanjay Rambhau Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 CrLJ 1407(Bom);
Zamir Khan v. State, 2010 CrLJ 4044 (Bom)
In the judgment Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2000
CrLJ 2283 : AIR 2000 SC 1677, "The Supreme Court has held that the benefit of this Act
is not to be extended to persons convicting of the offence of causing death by rash and negligent
driving".
Reference in this context can be made the judgments in
Sanjay Rambhau Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 CrLJ 1407(Bom);
Zamir Khan v. State, 2010 CrLJ 4044 (Bom)
In the judgment Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2000
CrLJ 2283 : AIR 2000 SC 1677, "The Supreme Court has held that the benefit of this Act
is not to be extended to persons convicting of the offence of causing death by rash and negligent
driving".
In Sanjay Rambhau Patil v. State of Maharashtra 2010 CrLJ 1407 (Bom),
the accused drove the vehicle ignoring the signal given to stop the bus by a
police officer in uniform. There was absolutely no turn or bend on the road
which could have prevented the accused from noticing the victim in uniform
on road. Accident occurred on account of rash and negligent act of
applicant/accused and led to death of victim. Conviction of accused is held
proper by Bombay High Court.
In case titled as Sanjay Rambhau Patel vs State of
Maharashtra 2010 Cr. LJ 1407 (Bombay) it was observed that the "accused
drove the vehicle ignoring the signal given to stop the bus by a police officer
in uniform. There was absolutely no turn or bend on the road which could
have prevented the accused from noticing the victim in uniform on road.
Accident occurred on account of rash and negligent act of appellant and led
to death of victim. Conviction of accused is held proper".
According to them, in
another decision, which is unreported, in Criminal Appeal No.13 of
2008 [Raju s/o Rambhau Patile and another v. State of
Maharashtra] decided on 18-9-2012, the Division Bench of this
Court [M/s. P.V. Hardas & A.B. Chaudhari, JJ.] has followed the
view taken in Shivaji Patdukhe and Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir's cases.
The Apex Court has observed in the case of Rambhau and
Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2001 SC 2120)
"Incidentally, Section 391 forms an exception to
the general rule that an Appeal must be decided on
the evidence which was before the Trial Court and
the powers being an exception shall always have to
be exercised with caution and circumspection so as
to meet the ends of justice. Be it noted further that
the doctrine of finality of judicial proceedings does
not stand annulled or affected in any way by
reason of exercise of power under Section 391
since the same avoids a de novo trial. It is not to
fill up to lacuna but to subserve the ends of justice.
Needless to record that on an analysis of the Civil
Procedure Code, Section 391 is thus akin to Order
41 Rule 27 of the C.P. Code."