In Prashant Ramachandra Deshpande Vs. Maruti Balaram
Haibatti, reported in 1995 Supp (2) 539, the principle of "approbate
and reprobate" has been explained. At Paragraph 2, it is held,
"2. .........Similarly, on the principle that a person
may not approbate and reprobate, “a species of estoppel
http://www.judis.nic.in
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O.S.A.SR.Nos.74162, 74164
and 74166 of 2019
has arisen which seems to be intermediate between
estoppel by record and estoppel in pais. The principle that
a person may not approbate and reprobate expresses two
propositions: (1) that the person in question, having a
choice between two courses of conduct, is to be treated
as having made an election from which he cannot resile,
and (2) that he will not be regarded, in general at any
rate, as having so elected unless he has taken a benefit
under or arising out of the course of conduct which he has
first pursued and with which his subsequent conduct is
inconsistent”. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn.,
Vol. 16, para 1507."
26. It is a fact that respondent/defendant No.2 remained unrepresented
in the Title Suit No. 323/2014, and he also did not contest the petition
No. 805/15, in the said Suit, which was impugned in the CRP(I/O0
393/2019. But, on account of the same, it cannot be said that the case
proceeded ex-parte, since the main dispute is in between the review
petitioner and the respondent No. 1-Bank, and both were duly
represented. Further, such contention was never raised during hearing of
the CRP (I/O), and having consented and argued the case, even in
absence of the respondent/defendant No.2, the petitioner, now, cannot
be allowed to raise the same at this stage. Mr. Parvez, the learned
counsel for the respondent No.1, has rightly pointed this out at the time
of hearing. In terms of 'rule of estoppel', a person may be precluded by
his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from
asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. Reference in this
context can be made to following decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Prashant Ramachandra Deshpande vs. Maruti Balaram Haibatti,
reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 539] and in P. R. Deshpande vs.
Maruti Balaram Haibatti reported in [(1998) 6 SCC 507].
10. The question to be considered is as to whether a party, who flies an undertaking before the Court is precluded to challenge the judgment by way of appeal. This question arose in an appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution before the Apex Court from judgment of High Court in which tenant gave undertaking to vacate within specified time. Two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Prashant Ramachandra Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, 1996 Supp (2) SCC 539, vide order dated 7th April, 1995, made a reference to a larger Bench in view of earlier two decisions that such appeal cannot be filed by tenant, who has given undertaking to vacate.
Reliance is paced to the judgments in the case
State Bank of Pattala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma, , R.N. Gosain v. yashpal Dhlr, , Prashant Ramchandra Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatt, . Another fact to be considered that after the Criminal Proceedings were Initiated totaling 124 in number, the writ petitioner has filed this writ application for quashing those Criminal Proceedings. It is a settled legal position now that the writ Court will not interfere with the Criminal Proceeding unless the parameters of such interferences are fulfilled. The factors as would allow the writ Court to Interfere with has been broadly discussed and expressed in the Judgment in the case Dudhishyam Benupani, Astt.
13. It is further contended by Mr. Rohtagi that constitutional remedies cannot be affected or restricted or annihilated by application of the principles of estoppel. Reliance has been placed by him on the enunciation of law in Prashant Ramachandra Deshpandey v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti 1995 Supp (2) SCC 539, which was affirmed in the same matter by a larger Bench reported as P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti . The main question raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether, owing to the non- compliance by the tenant of an undertaking to vacate the demised premises, the Appeal by Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, could be dismissed. The Court answered in the negative, observing that constitutional rights cannot be taken away by legislation and much less by invoking principles of election or estoppel.