86. On behalf of the respondent, it was sought to distinguish the pronouncements of the Judicial Committee in Midnapur Zamindary Co. v. Naresh Narayan Roy 9 A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 241 and Bhagchand Dagdusa v. Secretary of State from the Dhanbad suit, relying upon Krishna Chandra v. Challa Rammanna . Issues were framed and decided upon matters not properly raised in the plaint. At p. 367 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed that both parties had, without contest, chosen to join issue upon those points and they saw no reason why those matters in dispute should not be res judicata between them. That suit was properly constituted and to which no objection lay against it. In such case the Court's findings upon issues which either were agreed between the parties or to which no objection was raised could properly be given. Whereas the Dhanbad suit was one which could not be instituted and in effect the Court had no authority to try any issue save that upon the competency of the suit and it should, have rejected the plaint in limine. The above-authority does not affect the present suit and appeal.
4. If the previous suit had been dismissed principally on the ground that it was premature, it could have been said that the decision on the other points including the point as to whether the plaintiffs' sale-deed was hollow or fraudulent was not necessary in the previous suit and the finding on that point would not operate as res judicata. Several cases were cited in argument and they might be grouped in different classes. The first class of cases would relate to cases in which the finding on the issue was against the defendant who succeeded in the previous suit on another point. The finding against the defendant who eventually succeeded in the previous suit would not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit on the ground that he could not have appealed against the finding on the issue in the previous suit as the decree was in his favour, and the adverse finding on the issue would not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit on the ground that the issue had not been finally decided in the previous suit, and that the decree in the previous suit was in his favour in spite of the finding on that particular issue against him. The cases of Midnapur Zamindari Co. v. Naresh Narayan Roy (1920) L.R. 48 I.A. 49, s.c. 26 Bom. L.R. 651.
In
Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan
Roy and Ors. 1924 PC 144, Si r John Edge summed up
the Indian law by stating that in India persons are not
permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain
such possession as they are entitled to through a Court.
468. One such aspect came to be considered by the Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and others, AIR 1924 P.C. 144 which is also a decision cited by Sri Siddiqui. The plaintiff excluded certain question by the statement of his pleader and, therefore, the trial Court did not decide the issue. In the first appeal the defendant urged that the Trial Judge was wrong in not deciding this question even though his action was based on the plaintiff's advisor's statement and the defendant asked the first appellate Court expressly to decide the question. The Court did so. The question was whether it can be argued that the point decided was not raised and, therefore, the Court did not consider it to be a necessary issue. On the contrary when the first appellate Court decided the issue and the same became final, it would operate as res judicata to the subsequent suit involving the same issue.
In Midnapur
Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan
Roy AIR 1924 PC, 144 Sir John Edge
summed up the Indian law by stating that in
India persons are not permitted to take
forcible possession; they must obtain such
possession as they are entitled to through a
court." (emphasis supplied)
In Midnapur
Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and Ors. 1924
PC 144, Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in
India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they
must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a
Court.
20. Salmond has taken pains to emphasize that in the absence of provisions akin to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, violence, chaos and disorder would become inevitable. These comments are generally made from the viewpoint of the person in possession of the subject immovable property. Section 6 also protects the rightful owner against trespass onto his property, inasmuch as the trespasser in order to be entitled to relief must be able to disclose that he is in settled possession. The duration is incapable of definition and will invariably have to be determined in the facts of each case. For example, if an owner is residing on the land and a trespasser occupies a portion thereof, even after one week the prohibition of Section 6 may come into play against the owner. When the title holder resides at a distance from the land, and he has no reason to visit it for a year or so, such period or duration of trespass would not be indicative of `settled' possession. Assuming, however, that such person has been informed of the trespass and he declines to take immediate action, the rigour of Section 6 would take effect. Close to a century ago the Privy Council had clarified in Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Roy AIR 1924 PC 144 that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court . The preeminent factor is the maintenance of public peace and tranquility. The Respondents' assailed action ignores the law and has the potential of exploding public order.