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State Of Gujarat vs Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala on 30 January, 1964

Bombay subsequently repudiated the Jagirdars' rights that repudiation was of no avail; (3) that the letter sent to the Ruler of Sant State by the Secretary to the States Depart- ment, Mr. V. P. Menon, in October, 1948 amounted to a waiver by the Dominion of India of the right of repudiation of the rights of Jagirdars; (4) that after the Jagirdars became the citizens of the Dominion of India there could be no act of State against them; (5) that the doctrine evolved by the Privy Council in its decisions starting from Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba(1) and going upto Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer(2) was opposed to the present view on the effect of conquest and cession upon private rights as exemplified in the decisions in United States v. Percheman(3) and that this Court should, therefore, discard the Privy Council's view and adopt the modem view inasmuch as the latter is considered by common consent to be just and fair and finally (6) that the Jagirdars could not be deprived of the forest rights deprived by them from the Ruler of Sant State before the Constitution, without ,complying with the provisions of s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and after the coming into force of the Constitution without complying with the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution. I agree with my brother Ayyangar J., that the fact that some officers of the forest department had permitted the respondents to carry on operations in the forests leased out to them by the Jagirdars does not amount to recognition of the right conferred upon the latter by the Tharao of March 12, 1948. In the first place, it was not open to the officers of the forest department to grant recognition to the Jagirdars' rights for the simple reason that the right of granting recognition could be exercised only by the Government acting through its appropriate agency. Moreover the permission which was accorded to the respondents was only tentative and expressly subject to the final decision of the Government on the question of their right under the leases granted by the Jagirdars.
Supreme Court of India Cites 47 - Cited by 60 - N R Ayyangar - Full Document

Swami Vasudevanand Saraswati Disciple ... vs Jagat Guru Shankarcharya Jyotishpeeth ... on 22 September, 2017

Allahabad High Court Cites 273 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Dayal And Anr. vs Mst. Rodi on 1 August, 1951

9. Mr. Mahajan has relied on the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 'Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee Ajmer', AIR 1947 PC 1. No doubt there the question of the hereditary nature of the right could not be decided on the pleadings of the parties and this issue would be incidental even though the defendants had invited a decision, on it, but in the present case the defendants had to invite an adjudication on this point in order to succeed, as I have said above. It was then submitted by Mr. Mahajan that the previous litigation was on a different cause of action, and, therefore, the issue was not 'res judicata'. He has relied on a judgment of Din Mohammad.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Special Land Acquisition Officer vs Vijayaben Gordhanbhai on 27 September, 2021

The Division Bench also considered Asrar Ahmed vs. Durgah Committee, Ajmer, AIR 1947 PC 1 and Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji vs. Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai, AIR 1952 SC 143, before concluding that Issue No.2 framed in O.S. 5/78 was wholly unnecessary and faulty. The Division Bench held that the findings on that Issue were unnecessary, did not constitute the minimum foundation for the ultimate decision and, therefore, would not constitute res judicata. We have already indicated above that, in our opinion, if O.S.5/78 was merely a suit for injunction simpliciter, since the Defendants therein (both the Trustees as well as the Transferees) had posited in their respective Written Statements that they had no intention to dispossess the Plaintiff/Tenant, that suit ought not to have been Page 14 of 20 Downloaded on : Sun Jan 16 18:54:50 IST 2022 C/FA/4841/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 27/09/2021 dismissed but should have been decreed. We have also laid emphasis on the fact that the Tenant had made a specific and pointed assertion in the plaint that the transfer of the demised land by the Trust to the Transferees was not in consonance with Section 26 of the Puducherry Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972. We have also noticed the fact that this was an important objection raised by the Tenant in their Written Statement in O.S.6/78 and O.S.7/78. It seems to be incongruous to us to consider ownership of the demised premises to be irrelevant in O.S.5/78 but nevertheless constitute the kernel or essence or fulcrum of the disputes in O.S.6/78 and O.S.7/78. The dialectic adopted by the Court must remain steadfastly constant - if title was irrelevant so far as a claim for injunction simpliciter, it was similarly so in relation to the party having the advantage of Section 116 of the Evidence Act in respect of its claim for arrears of rent from its tenant. It would not be logical to overlook that the pleadings on behalf of the Tenant were common in all three suits, and that Issues on this aspect of the dispute had been claimed by the Tenants in all the three suits. On a holistic and comprehensive reading of the pleadings of the Tenant in all the three suits, it is inescapable that the Tenant had intendedly, directly and unequivocally raised in its pleadings the question of the title to the demised premises and the legal capacity of the Trustees to convey the lands to the Transferees. This is the common thread that runs through the pleadings of Tenant in all three suits. It is true that if O.S.5/78 was a suit for injunction simpliciter, and in the wake of the stance of the Trustees and Transferees that no threat had been extended to the Tenants regarding their ouster, any reference or challenge to the ownership was Page 15 of 20 Downloaded on : Sun Jan 16 18:54:50 IST 2022 C/FA/4841/2018 JUDGMENT DATED: 27/09/2021 wholly irrelevant. But the ownership issue had been specifically raised by the Tenant, who had thus caused it to be directly and substantially in issue in all three suits. So far as the Suit Nos.6/78 and 7/78 are concerned, they were also suits simpliciter for the recovery of rents in which the defence pertaining to ownership was also not relevant; no substantial reason for the Tenant to file an appeal in O.S. 6/78 had arisen because the monetary part of the decree was relatively insignificant. Obviously, the Tenant's resolve was to make the ownership the central dispute in the litigation and in these circumstances cannot be allowed to equivocate on the aspect of ownership. Logically, if the question of ownership was relevant and worthy of consideration in O.S. 6/78, it was also relevant in O.S. 5/78. Viewed in this manner, we think it is an inescapable conclusion that an appeal ought to have been filed by the Tenant even in respect of O.S. 5/78, for fear of inviting the rigours of res judicata as also for correcting the "dismissal" order. In our opinion, the Tenant had been completely non-suited once it was held that no cause of action had arisen in its favour and the suit was 'dismissed'. Ignoring that finding and allowing it to become final makes that conclusion impervious to change.
Gujarat High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 0 - V Nanavati - Full Document

K.Arumuga Velaiah vs Pr.Ramasamy And Another on 27 January, 2022

“From his evidence it is clear that there is a partition in the year 1964 and the list of the apportionment and they have also written a Muchallikka before the panchayat. It is undoubtfully known that since there was a joint possession, the partition was effected to the plaintiff’s 3 sons in 1964 by plaintiff by accepting that the suit properties were joint properties, it is not right on the part of the plaintiff to claim that the properties are his individual, self­acquired properties and it is also unbelievable.” This finding is sought to be questioned before us by placing reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer, AIR 1947 PC 1 to contend that the plea of res judicata does not arise in the instant case. We have perused the same. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed heavy reliance on this judgment contend that when a finding has been 40 given by a lower court based on sufficient evidence, if erroneous, is not binding between the parties to the said proceeding on the principle of res judicata. The said judgment is not applicable to the present case.
Supreme Court of India Cites 27 - Cited by 16 - B V Nagarathna - Full Document

University Of Delhi vs Ministry Of Environment Forest And ... on 31 May, 2022

222. It also referred to two judgments of the Privy Council in Run Bahadur Singh vs. Lucho Koer ILR (1885) 11 Cal 301 and Asrar Ahmed vs. Durgah Committee AIR 1947 PC 1 as well as its earlier decision in Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji vs. Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai 1952 SCR 513 and found that inspite of a specific issue and adverse finding in the earlier suit, the finding was not treated as res judicata as it was purely incidental or auxiliary or collateral to the main issue in each of the three cases and was not necessary for the earlier case nor formed foundation.
National Green Tribunal Cites 139 - Cited by 0 - A K Goel - Full Document

Kanhaiya Lal Gadri vs Moef on 29 July, 2022

222. It also referred to two judgments of the Privy Council in Run Bahadur Singh vs. Lucho Koer ILR (1885) 11 Cal 301 and Asrar Ahmed vs. Durgah Committee AIR 1947 PC 1 as well as its earlier decision in Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji vs. Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai 1952 SCR 513 and found that inspite of a specific issue and adverse finding in the earlier suit, the finding was not treated as res judicata as it was purely incidental or auxiliary or collateral to the main issue in each of the three cases and was not necessary for the earlier case nor formed foundation.
National Green Tribunal Cites 99 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State Of Rajasthan vs Madanswarup And Anr. on 28 August, 1959

109: (AIR, 1941 PC (34) and Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer AIR 1947 PC 1. In law, therefore, the proress of acquisition of new territories is one continuous act of Shite terminating on the assumption of sovereign powers do jure over them by the new sovereign and it is only thereafter that rights accrue to the residents of those territories as subjects of that sovereign, In other words, as regards the residents of territories which come under the dominion of a new sovereign, the right of citizenship commences when the act of State terminates and the two therefore cannot co-exist.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 19 - Cited by 3 - Full Document
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