119. The petitioner has drawn impetus from the decision of the Apex Court in Renusagar case and New Horizon case (supra). Whether those decisions would carry the case of the petitioner to any length requires to be determined in the light of the facts as is woven around those judgments.
18. The parameters of the High Court's power of judicial review fell for
examination in State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co., (1988) 4 SCC 59,
and reliance was placed by the Supreme Court on its earlier decision in
CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Limited [(1983) 4 SCC 392 wherein the
parameters of the court's power of judicial review of administrative or
executive action or decision was dealt with, and it was held that it was
settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no
reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to or has been
arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach
or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters, the court would
be justified in interfering with the same.
15) Coming to the law laid down by Supreme Court in State of UP
Vs. Renusagar Power Company, the Commission contends that
ruling is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The
Commission contends that TSL may be the end user but it cannot
be termed as a captive user. The Commission denies the allegation
that no person other than a generating company established with
the business objective of generation and sale of electricity were
No. of Corrections: Page 17 of 36 Appeal No. 160 of 2007
SH
permitted except for captive use. It contends that the permission
under section 43(A)(1)(c) was given in cases where there was nexus
between the generating company and the purchaser other than the
Electricity Board or distribution licensee. However, this sanction,
the Commission contends, cannot make the two units as captive
generating station. JAPCOL sought permission to install the two
units in question. The Commission however, contends that the
power generated by TPCL being supplied to TSL, a distribution
licensee, will not attract any cross subsidy under section 42(2) of
the Electricity Act 2003. The Commission contends that the
impugned order does not call for any interference.
15. Coming to the law laid down by Supreme Court in State of UP v. Renusagar Power Company, the Commission contends that ruling is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Commission contends that TSL may be the end user but it cannot be termed as a captive user. The Commission denies the allegation that no person other than a generating company established with the business objective of generation and sale of electricity were permitted except for captive use. It contends that the permission under Section 43(A)(1)(c) was given in cases where there was nexus between the generating company and the purchaser other than the Electricity Board or distribution licensee. However, this sanction, the Commission contends, cannot make the two units as captive generating station. JAPCOL sought permission to install the two units in question. The Commission however, contends that the power generated by TPCL being supplied to TSL, a distribution licensee, will not attract any cross subsidy under Section 42(2) of the Electricity Act 2003. The Commission contends that the impugned order does not call for any interference.
11.1 It was submitted that the Supreme Court had no legislative powers and, therefore, a delegate of the Supreme Court, i.e. the Committee, cannot be discharging a legislative or quasi-legislative function. As held by the Supreme Court in STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. RENUSAGAR POWER COMPANY [AIR 1988 SC 1737], when an authority had power to fix different rates and the function was quasi-legislative in character, the decision in such a case must be arrived at objectively and in consonance with the principles of natural justice. When the power was exercised with reference to a class, it would be in the nature of subordinate legislation, but when the power was exercised with reference to individual, it would be administrative.
After taking into consideration the
decided cases on the point whether there was fraudulent
movement of goods under which letter of credit was
obtained which in turn entitled the bank to file the
suit, the Supreme Court held that that point was already
decided by decision of the Supreme Court in U.P.
Co-operative Federation's case and therefore the
allegation of non-supply of goods by the sellers to the
buyers did not by itself amount, in law, to a plea of
"fraud" as understood in this branch of the law and hence
by merely characterising alleged non-movement of goods as
"fraud", the bank was not entitled to claim that there
was a cause of action based on fraud or
misrepresentation. While allowing the appeal, what is
emphasised by the Supreme Court is that the question
whether a real cause of action has been set out in the
plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with
a view to get out of Order 7, R.11 of the CPC has to be
decided with reference to averments made in the plaint
and clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action
are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should
be shown in the plaint. In view of this decision of the
Supreme Court, it is evident that if something purely
illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order
7, R.11 of the CPC by resorting to clever drafting, it
cannot be said that the plaint discloses a cause of
action and if a clear right to sue is not shown in the
plaint, it is liable to be rejected.