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Kulbir Singh vs State Of Punjab on 11 September, 1990

In State v. Maksudan Singh's case (1985 Cri LJ 1782) (supra), the majority judgment of the Full Bench as per para 10 had answered the questions before the Full Bench in affirmative by holding that the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy and public trial in all criminal prosecutions now flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution, by virtue of precedential mandate is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution. Towards fag-end of para 9 of the judgment it was remarked that the right of speedy and public trial in India should be put at a lower pedestal than the Sixth Amendment of the American Constitution as it is not written in so many words in our Constitution. It was further remarked that such right must be in a way read down in Article 21 of our Constitution.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Smt. Archana Guha vs Ranjit Alias Runu Guha Neogi And Ors. on 5 March, 1990

While on the point and on the question of dehumanising factor of a prolonged delayed proceedings, Mr. Dutt referred to the case of T.V. Valheaswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (1983 Cri LJ 48I) (SC) (supra) and Srinivas Gopal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradcsh (1988 Cri LJ 1803) (SC) (supra), apart from relying on the case of The State v. Maksudan Singh (1985 Cri LJ 1782) (Patna) (FB) (supra) and Rakesh Saxena v. State through C.B.I. (supra). We have indicated the characteristic feature of those cases earlier and we further feel that the observations as made in those cases, would not apply with full vigour as claimed by Mr. Dutt, in a case of the present nature and more particularly when, the writ petitioner Respondent Mr. Guha Neogi is a Police officer.
Calcutta High Court Cites 70 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Selvi.J.Jayalalithaa vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 30 September, 2011

80. The learned Chief Justice then examined the facts of the case before him in the light of the principles evolved and held that it is a clear case where the petitioner's right to speedy trial has been violated. He found that the petitioner was not guilty of obstructive tactics and that the delay was entirely of the prosecution's doing. Accordingly, the investigation and the trial against the petitioner was quashed. Another Full Bench presided over by the same learned Chief Justice held in State v. Maksudan Singh that in case of serious offences like murder, delay of 10 years or more occasioned entirely by the default of prosecution must be deemed to be per se prejudicial to the accused."
Madras High Court Cites 50 - Cited by 8 - K N Basha - Full Document

Sewa Singh vs K.C. Kanungo on 20 December, 1991

In the case of Rakesh Saksena v. State, (supra) the accused was not an officer but a mere trader in Foreign Exchange Division of the Bank and the chance of conviction in that case was extremely doubtful so the Supreme Court has held that the continuance of the prosecution would serve no useful purpose and quashed the charges against the accused though the offence was six years old and gave a liberty to the Bank to pursue civil remedies that may be available to it. In the case of State v. Maksudan Singh, 1985 Cri LJ 1782 (supra) the Full Bench of Patna High Court held that the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy and public trial in all criminal prosecution now flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court also held that inordinately prolonged and callous delay of ten years or more occasioned entirely by the prosecutions default, in the context of reversal of clean acquittal on a capital charge, would be per se pre-judicial to the accused.
Calcutta High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Darshan Singh Sodhi vs State Of Punjab And Anr. on 11 February, 1997

10. The second premise made out by the petitioner is that the offence, if any, according to the prosecution, was committed either in the year 1953 or in the year 1969 or in the year 1959 or when it came to the notice of the State in the year 1989 and still the petitioner is being prosecuted in the year 1996 and in these circumstances the F.I.R. and the challan should be quashed. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701 : 1992 Cri LJ 2717; and The State v. Maksudan Singh, 1985 Cri LJ 1782 : AIR 19,86 Patina 38 a Full Bench authority of the Patna High Court. I have also the occasion to go througt these authorities. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Patna High Court which have put emphasis for a speedy and fair trial. The Legislature has not laid down any limitation for the offences of which the petitioner is being charged. The case of the State is that earlier investigation was not honest by the Investigating Officers, who perhaps wanted to oblige the petitioner. The Director General of Police was not even satisfied with the findings of the D.I.G. in the departmental matters and he ordered to his subordinate S.S.P. (respondent No. 2) to register a case against the petitioner in order to bring the truth on the surface. Why a public servant, who has committed an offence should go unpunished. These authorities do not lay down the law that in no circumstance a person on the ground of delay cannot be prosecuted even in those cases where the Code has not laid down any limitation.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 37 - Cited by 0 - R L Anand - Full Document

Shyam Narayan Singh vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 25 June, 1993

In a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of the State v. Maksudan Singh, , the Court after a careful consideration of the entire law on the subject quashed a criminal proceeding that had been pending for over ten years due to the fault of the prosecution in that case. An argument was advanced in that case that the right to a speedy trial which is now deemed to be implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution by virtue of various precedents, though an enforceable right in India must be treated to be lesser in content and effect from what it would be in America where it was a part of the Constitution in express terms. Relying on the language of the Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution, which was conspicuous by its absence in Article 21, it was argued that such a right in India rests on a pedestal much lower than that under the American Constitution. This argument did not find favour with the learned Judges, but I need to record that it is unnecessary to draw any such distinctions because the wording of the 6th Amendment to the American Constitution, in fact, forms the basis of the principles laid down by the Apex Court of this country while enforcing Article of the Constitution. There can be no question of lesser or greater application of a right or a principle which is either enforceable or not and where it has been held time and again that such a right is implicit, that it flows from Article 21 and that it can be insisted upon, there is no longer any scope for debate.
Bombay High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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