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Surendra Kumar Verma Etc vs The Central Government Industrial ... on 23 September, 1980

The cases of Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala were treated by the Labour Court as distinct from the cases of all the other appellants 796 on the ground that, though they had worked for more than two hundred and forty days in the preceding twelve months, they had not been in employment for one year. It appears that Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala were in the employment of the Bank from May 4, 1974 to January 29, 1975 and had worked for 258 and 266 days respectively during that period. As the period from May 4, 1974 to January 29, 1975 was not one year, it was conceded before the Labour Court that there was no violation of the provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Before us, the concession was questioned and it was argued that there was non-compliance with the requirements of s. 25F of the Act. Since the facts were not disputed, we entertained the argument and heard the counsel on the question. The concession was apparently based on the decision of this Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen. That decision was rendered before S. 25B, which defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act was recast by Act 36 of 1954. The learned counsel for the employer submitted that the amendment made no substantial difference. Let us take a look at the statutory provisions. S. 25-F, then and now, provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until certain conditions are fulfilled. S. 25-B's marginal title is 'Definition of continuous Service'. To the extent that it is relevant S. 25-B(2) as it now reads is as follows:
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 415 - O C Reddy - Full Document

Lalaram vs State Of U.P. & Others on 21 September, 2012

"8. The cases of Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala were treated by the Labour Court as distinct from the cases of all the other appellants on the ground that, though they had worked for more than two hundred and forty days in the preceding twelve months, they had not been in employment for one year. It appears that Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala were in the employment of the Bank from May 4, 1974 to January 29, 1975 and had worked for 258 and 266 days respectively during that period. As the period from May 4, 1974 to January 29, 1975 was not one year, it was conceded before the Labour Court that there was no violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Before us, the concession was questioned and it was argued that there was non-compliance with the requirements of Section 25F of the Act. Since the facts were not disputed, we entertained the argument and heard the counsel on the question. The concession was apparently based on the decision of this Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1963)IILLJ367SC. That decision was rendered before Section 25B, which defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act was recast by Act 36 of 1964. The learned Counsel for the employer submitted that the amendment made no substantial difference. Let us take a look at the statutory provisions. Section 25F, then and now, provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until certain conditions are fulfilled. Section 25B 's marginal title is 'Definition of continuous Service'. To the extent that it is relevant Section 25B(2) as it now reads is as follows :
Allahabad High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Itc Limited vs Presiding Officer, Labour Court And ... on 23 December, 2005

Section 25-B as it read prior to Act 36 of 1964, in the light of the then existing Section 2(eee), certainly lent itself to the construction that a workman had to be in the service of the employer for a period of one year and should have worked for not less than 240 days before he could claim to have completed one year's completed service so as to attract the provisions of Section 25-F. That precisely was what was decided by this Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen .
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 37 - Cited by 0 - R Ranganathan - Full Document

Hardev Singh vs State Of U.P. And Others on 20 November, 2015

In our opinion, it would be a misuse of the words to say that this amounted to holding of proper enquiry it has been laid down by this Courtin a series of decisions that if an industrial employee's services are terminated after a proper domestic enquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice and the conclusions reached at the enquiry are not perverse the industrial tribunal is not entitled to consider the propriety or the correctness of the said conclusions. In a number of cases which have come to this Court in recent months, we find that some employers have misunderstood the decisions of this Court to mean that the mere form of an enquiry would satisfy the requirements of industrial law and would protect the disciplinary action taken by them from challenge. This attitude is wholly misconceived. An enquiry cannot be said to have been properly held unless, (i) the employee proceeded against has been informed clearly of the charges levelled against him,(ii) the witnesses are examined--ordinarily in the presence of the employee-in respect of the charges, (iii) the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, (iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any relevant matter, and (v) the enquiry officer records his findings with reasons for the same in his report. In the present case the persons whose statements made behind the backs of the employees were used by the enquiring authority were not made available for cross-examination but it would appear that they were not even present at the enquiry. It does not even appear that these reports were made available to the employee at any time before the enquiry was held. Even if the persons who made the reports had been present and the employee given an opportunity to cross-examine them, it would have been difficult to say in these circumstances that was a fair and sufficient opportunity. But in this case it appears that the persons who made the reports did not attend the enquiry at all. From whatever aspect the matter is examined it is clear that there was no enquiry worth the name and the Tribunal was justifies in entirely ignoring the conclusion reached by the domestic Tribunal."
Allahabad High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 2 - M C Tripathi - Full Document

Gurdial Singh vs Hp State Electricity Board on 26 June, 2015

In fact, we need not further dilate upon this aspect because in Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi, (1980) 4 SCC 443 : (AIR 1981 SC 422) Chinnappa Reddy, J., after noticing the amendment and referring to the decision in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. case (AIR 1963 SC 1914) held as under (at p. 426 of AIR) :
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - T S Chauhan - Full Document

Graphite India Limited vs State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 6 September, 1979

All that has been laid down in the said observation of Aiyar, J., is that the Tribunals should not act on any information unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. In view of the decision in the case of Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. The Workmen (supra) where it has been clearly laid down that giving to the employee a fair opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined against him is one of the principles of natural justice, the decision in Kishanlal's case (supra) in so far as it holds that no natural justice requires that there should be a kind of formal cross-examination and the decision in Hari Pada Maitra v. President, Calcutta Improvement Tribunal , which followed Kishanlal's case, are contrary to the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cases. Accordingly, we hold that the principles of natural justice require that a person against whom certain charges have been levelled should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined against him in support of the charges.
Calcutta High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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