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Documents citing Waman Rao & Ors. Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 9 May, 1980

Janhit Abhiyan vs Union Of India on 7 November, 2022

23.An independent justification for the amendments was of implementing the constitutional purposes as outlined in Article 39(b) and (c), i.e., “that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good”. The historical approach was also apparent, when this court considered the amendments which 30 Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362, (hereinafter, "Waman Rao").
Supreme Court of India Cites 281 - Cited by 5 - D Maheshwari - Full Document

M/S Becton Dickinson India Pvt. Ltd vs Cce, Delhi Iii on 2 June, 2015

In this regard, the plea of the learned Counsel for the Department that Similar veins and blood vessels must be construed in ejusdem generus with preceding expression and that in view of the Apex courts judgment in the cases of Liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Bombay reported in 1995 (75) E.L.T. 13 (S.C.), and Novopan India Ltd. vs. CCE, Hyderabad reported in 1994 (73) E.L.T. 769 (S.C.), while interpreting an exemption notification, in case of doubt, the benefit has to go to the Revenue and that these points were not considered by the Tribunal in the case of CCE, Coimbatore vs. Saberwal Surgical (P) Ltd. (supra) and by the Apex court, is not acceptable, as once the Tribunals judgment has been affirmed by the Apex court by the way of dismissal of the civil appeal, even if without giving any reasons, that becomes a binding precedent and in view of the Apex courts judgment in the case of Waman Rao vs. Union of India (supra) for applying the principle of stare decisis it is unnecessary to enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis. As regards the Tribunals stay order dated 12/5/09 in respect of an appeal filed by the Appellant involving an identical issue wherein the Tribunal expressing a contrary prima facie view, has ordered pre-deposit for compliance with the provision of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, it is well settled law that an order passed by the Tribunal in respect of stay application expressing prima facie view has no precedence value.
Custom, Excise & Service Tax Tribunal Cites 12 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Reserved On: 29.10.2025 vs Of on 21 November, 2025

Union of India [Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362] : (SCC p. 393, para 40) '40. It is also true to say that for the application of the rule of stare decisis, it is not necessary that the earlier decision or decisions of longstanding should have considered and either accepted or rejected the particular argument which is advanced in the case on hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could more easily be treated as binding by applying the law of precedent, and it would be unnecessary to take resort to the principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore, sufficient for invoking the rule of stare decisis that a certain decision was arrived at on a question which arose or was argued, no matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the basis of the decision. In other words, for the purpose of applying the rule of stare decisis, it is ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 22:47:27 :::CIS 24 2025:HHC:39280 unnecessary to enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis.' "
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 36 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Union Of India And Others vs Bennett Coleman And Co. Ltd. And Others on 10 September, 1987

41. The submission on behalf of the State that articles 39(b) and 39(c) are part of the basic structure and, therefore, the legislation passed with the object of securing those principles can never damage or destroy the basic structure was seriously controverted by Shri Venugopal. Learned counsel urged that the observations of the Chief Justice Chandrachud in Waman Rao's case, , that it is impossible to conceive that any law passed for such a purpose can violate article 14 or article 19 are obiter on in any event were made without full argument on the point. Learned counsel gave an illustration in support of this submission that a law passed for achieving the purpose of article 39(c) could very well violate article 19. It was urged that the State may nationalise the newspaper industry by claiming that it is necessary to secure the operation of the economic system to prevent concentration of wealth and would claim that the Nationalisation Act was enacted for achieving the object of article 39(c). It was submitted that such a legislation though enacted with the object of securing the directive principles under article 39(c) would directly result in destroying the freedom of the press and thereby the existence of the democracy. Learned counsel wondered whether the Chief Justice would have made the observations in the case of Minerva Mills, , if such contingency was brought to the notice of the learned Chief Justice. There is considerable merit in the submission of learned counsel. It is not difficult to conceive of a legislation which the State would enact for achieving the directive principles set out in articles 39(b) and 39(c) and still such legislation or any provision thereof would directly have the effect of destroying the fundamental rights guaranteed under articles 14 and 19. In my judgment, it is not possible to accept the submission urged on behalf of the State that once it is established that the legislation was enacted for securing the object set out in article 39(c), then it is not open to the court to enquire as to whether such legislation damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution. In may judgment, the area of enquiry on this aspect is not closed though it is possible that in a large number of legislations, the basic structure would be fortified if the object of the legislation is true and bona fide for giving effect to the directive principles contained in article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. In my judgment, even if the legislation is enacted with the object of achieving the directive principles under article 39(c), it should not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution and then and then only the harmony between the fundamental rights and the directive principles would be maintained. In my judgment, applying this principle, it will be held that the provisions of sections 21 and 22 of the Act in so far as they apply to the newspaper industry affect the basic structure and, therefore, the challenge to these provisions as violative of article 19 is available in spite of the insertion of the enactment in the Ninth Schedule.
Bombay High Court Cites 75 - Cited by 3 - S P Bharucha - Full Document
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