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Machikandi Parkum Maramittath ... vs Varayalankandi Kunhi Pokker And Ors. on 12 August, 1915

671 : 34 M. 387 : 20 M.L.J. 268 : (1910) M.W.N. 195 a suggestion was made that if a tavazhi had not become a distinct tarwad by division or relinquishment of its joint interest in the properties of the main tarwad, the property held by that tavazhi will not have the incidents of tarwad property; and the Full Bench decision in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee 16 N. 201 : 2 M.L.J. 226 was explained as deciding only that the interest of a member of such a tavazhi lapsed to the other members of the tavazhi if that interest has not been alienated during his life-time. With the greatest respect to the learned Judges I am unable to accept this explanation. It ignores the fact that in properties held with the incidents of tarwad property no individual member has an alienable interest. It is to be observed that Sankaran Nair, J., who was one of the Judges who decided that case, at that time seems to have been of opinion that it is only in cases where a tavazhi becomes a distinct tarwad by ceasing to have any interest in the properties of the main tarwad, that it can hold properties with the incidents of tarwad property; but in the order of reference the learned Judge concedes that the rule would apply even in cases where the tavazhi retains its interest in the properties of the main tarwad, provided that the members of the tavazhi live separately from the other members of the tarwad.
Madras High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 32 - Full Document

Machikandi Parkum Maramittath ... vs Varayalankandi Kunhi Pokker And Four ... on 12 August, 1915

387, a suggestion was made that if a tavazbi had not become a distinct tarwad by division or relinquishment of its joint interest in the properties of the main tarwad, the property held by that tavazhi will not have the incidents of tarwad property; and the Full Bench decision in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee (1893) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 201 (P.B.) was explained as deciding only that the interest of a member of such a tavazhi lapsed to the other members of the tavazhi, if that interest has not been alienated during his life-time. With the greatest respect to the learned Judges I am unable to accept this explanation. It ignores the fact that in properties held with the incidents of tarwad property no individual member has an alienable interest. It is to be observed that SANKARAN NAIB, J., who was one of the Judges who decided that case, at that time seems to have been of opinion that it is only in cases where a tavazhi becomes a distinct tarwad by ceasing to have any interest in the properties of the main tarwad, that it can hold properties with the incidents of tarwad property; but in the order of reference the learned Judge concedes that the rale would apply even in cases where the tavazhi retains its interest in the properties of the main tarwad, provided that the members of the tavazhi live separately from the other members of the tarwad.
Madras High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Kuyyattil Kundan Kutty vs Vayalpath Parkum Natukandiyilakath ... on 23 November, 1915

I have studied with great care the judgments of the Full Bench in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee 16 M. 201; 2 M.L.J. 226 and Chakkara Kannan v. Kunhi Pokker 30 Ind. Cas. 755; 29 M.L.J. 481; 18 M.L.T. 255; (1915) M.W.N. 740, and I do not feel that my view of this case is in conflict with either of those decisions by which, of course, I am bound. In my opinion, the appeal should be allowed as to three-fourths of the property; but as my brother is of a different opinion, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Chathoth Parkum Kareth Kombi Kunhammad ... vs Parambath Chathankandi Enna ... on 7 February, 1924

The former was a case of gift by a Marumakkatayam donor to his nieces with no apt words to express an absolute estate and Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Haji (1892) ILR 16 M 201 : 2 MLJ 226 was followed by Kumaraswarmi Sastri, J., whose judgment was upheld in Letters Patent Appeal No. 19 of 1916. The other case was one of a bequest. in which the words ' with absolute rights of alienation ' were used and it was there held that the legatee took an absolute estate.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Thazhath Valappil Prasanth vs Kalliani And Ors. on 23 February, 2007

Many inroads have been made into the joint family system as understood in the early decades of the last century. Any individual member can, by his mere declaration of intention, become divided from the rest of the family. Gains of science are now declared by statute to be the separate property of the acquirer.... Women have gained prominence and are no longer dependent on "the father in youth, on the husband during coverture and on the children in old age". This topic has been considered in Mayne's Hindu Law (Tench Edition) at pages 908 and 909. As pointed out by the learned author in Section 775, Section 95 of the Hindu Wills Act which governs the wills of all Hindus lays down a rule of construction as to a gift simpliciter which is uniformly applicable to all cases whether the gift is to a female or a male. Where property is bequeathed to any person, he or she is entitled to the whole interest of the testator therein unless it appears from the will that only a restricted interest was intended for him or her. Rules of construction which are intended to aid Courts of law in ascertaining the wishes of the testator have to be adapted with changing times. If therefore the rule of construction laid down in Sreemutty Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick and in Mahomed Shumsool v. Shewukram is no longer applicable in cases governed by Hindu law, it is a matter for consideration whether the decision in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee, based as it is expressly on the rule of construction in Sreemutty Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick and Mahomed Shumsool v. Shewukram, should be adhered to. At any rate, it should, we think, be confined to a case of a gift to a wife and all her children where the wife is alive or if she is dead to all the children who form a tavazhi. Even; in Malabar times have changed. Impartibility which is the fundamental characteristic of a Malabar tarwad has been put an end to by the Madaras Marumakkattayam Act. Constant intercourse with the rest of India has brought about considerable changes in the ideas and notions of people on the West Coast. Confirmably to the progressive ideas of that community the Legislature enacted the above Act. Wives are now given substantial rights in the husband's properties. We have no hesitation in saying that the whole question must be reviewed when the question directly arises for decision and is not covered by Section 48 of the Marumakkatayam Act. A reasonable solution is to hold that, except in cases governed by Section 48 of the Act, there is no presumption that the donees do not get absolute rights.
Kerala High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 5 - S Nambiar - Full Document

Paru Amma And Ors. And Narayana Menon vs Itticheri Amma And Ors. on 4 November, 1915

1. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment which my brother is about to deliver, and as I entirely agree with it, no useful purpose would be served by my going over the same ground twice. I have considered very carefully the Full Bench decisions in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee 16 M. 201; 2 M.L.J. 226 and Chakkara Kannan v. Varayalankandi Kunhi Pokker 30 Ind. Cas. 755; 29 M.L.J. 481; (1915) M.W.N. 740; 18 M.L.T. 255 (F.B.) and I have come to the conclusion that the principles of construction they lay down do not compel me to treat Exhibit IV as being other than what it purports to be on the face of it, a devise of an absolute estate to the 1st defendant. Its language is to me quite inconsistent with its being intended as a putravakanam gift. The argument that the donee's position as manager of a tavazhi raises a presumption that the intention was to benefit the tavazhi, loses all its force from the fact that it is not contended that the gift was to the whole tavazhi of which he was the manager, but only to the sub-tavazhi constituted by the present appellants.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Karthiyayani Pillai And Ors. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 13 August, 1974

"There remains the real question for consideration, i.e., whether a separate branch of the tavazhi can be established consisting of a woman and her children by one husband to the exclusion of the children by another husband. When property is given to his family by a father, it is held with all the incidents of tarwad tenure-- Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee ((1893) ILR 16 Mad 201) (FB)-- and this view is based on the presumed intention of the father to benefit his own children. If, therefore, the second husband Rives property to his wife and his own children, it is difficult to presume that he intended also to benefit the children by subsequent husband, in the absence of any expression of such intention ......... If, therefore, the property was intended for that man's children alone, there is no reason for adding to the branch, which is to enjoy that property the children by another husband. The very fact that the tavazhis are very frequently called puthravakasam tavazhis leads to the inference that they are not merely descendants of one female but also branches of the family which are benefited by a gift from their father and are thereby constituted as tavazhis. In this view there is no difficulty in supposing that the tavazhi of a woman could consist of two branches, one branch made up of children by one husband and the other of children by another husband and each branch might own separate properties obtained from their respective fathers......"
Kerala High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - V B Eradi - Full Document

Smt. Seetha And Ors. vs Kayiyath Krishnan And Ors. on 25 November, 1974

22. It now only remains for us to refer to a recent decision of a Division Bench of this court (Gopalan Nambiyar and Viswanatha Iyer, JJ.), in 1973 Ker LT 753 = (AIR 1974 Ker 82). Though the question as to the applicability of the presumption in respect of transactions of gift or purchase in the name of the wife alone or in the joint names of the wife and some alone of the children did not directly arise for decision in that case the learned Judges made a passing reference to the said aspect also and expressed the view that a gift, bequest or acquisition in the name of the wife alone, or in the names of the wife and one or more of the children alone to the exclusion of the others, would not give rise to such a presumption. We fully agree with the said statement of the law,
Kerala High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 6 - V B Eradi - Full Document

Karumathil Puthiaveettil Kalliani ... vs Karumathil Puthiaveettil Govinda ... on 20 September, 1911

It must be noted that the decision in Kunhacha Amma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee (1892) I.L.R. 16 M. 201, was expressly affirmed and adopted by the learned Judges. The proposition that the property gifted was taken by the donees with the incidents of Tarward property, was not departed from, and one of such incidents, viz., that the holders of the property have no right of disposal and that the property goes by survivorship to the remaining holders on the death of any, was affirmed and acted on. No question arose in the case whether the members of the Tarwad born after the date of gift would take an interest in it by birth or not. What then is the meaning of the state ment that the donees could not be taken to be constituted into a Tarwad by themselves, the senior donee having the ordinary rights of a Karnavan of a Malabar Tarwad so far as the other members in his branch are concerned ?" It can only be taken to mean that they do not become a Tarwad so as to give the Karnavan all the ordinary rights of a Karnavan over the members of his Tarwad.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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