Kokil Singh vs Ramasray Prasad Choudhary And Ors. on 24 January, 1924
See also Shavaksha Dinshd Davar v. Tyab Haji Ayub 37 Ind. Cas. 140 : 40 B. 386 : 18 Bom.
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Shavaksha Dinsha Davar vs Tyab Haji Ayub on 17 January, 1916
C.C. Dorayya vs C. Venkanna And Ors. on 21 August, 1923
310, a decision which overruled that learned Judge's earlier decision in Shavaksha Dinsha Davar v. Tyab Haji Ayub (1916) 40 Bom. 386. When the terms of the adjustment have been settled by an arbitration and award out of Court the parties may agree to ask for a consent decree. In such a case, the true position appears to be that the Court will not look at the arbitration proceedings, but only at the consent terms, as it makes no difference whether those terms have been arrived at by agreement between the parties acting by themselves or have been settled by a third party chosen by them." These remarks apply to the facts of the present case. The power given by Section 20 of Schedule II to any person interested to apply to a Court to have an award filed in Court is not to be understood as overriding the general power given to parties under Order 23, Rule 3 to adjust their disputes by a lawful compromise at any time after the institution of a suit.
Chintalapalli Chinna Dorayya vs Chintalapalli Venkanna And Ors. on 21 August, 1923
L.R. 1048, a decision which overruled that learned Judge's earlier decision in Shavaksha Dinsha Dxvar v. Tyab Haji Ayub 37 Ind. Cas. 140 : 40 B. 386 : 18 Bom. L.R. 559, When the terms of the adjustment have been settled by an arbitration and award out of Court the parties may agree to ask for a consent decree. In such a case, the true position appears to be that the Court will not look at the arbitration proceedings, but only at the consent terms, as it makes no difference whether those terms have been arrived at by agreement between the parties acting by themselves or have been settled by a third party chosen by them." These remarks apply to the facts of the present case. The power given by Section 20 of Schedule II to any person interested to apply to a Court to, have an award filed in Court is not to be understood as overriding the general power given to parties under Order XXIII, Rule 3 to adjust their deputes by a lawful compromise at any time after the institution of a suit.
Amar Chand Chamaria vs Banwari Lall Rakshit And Ors. on 24 November, 1921
In that cess I expressed the opinion that the decision of Macleod, J, in Shavaksha Dinsha Davar v. Tyab Haji Ayub 37 Ind. Cas. 140 : 40 B. 386 : 18 Bom L.R. 659 was correct in so far as he construed the Code and in particular Section 89 of the Code, as preventing any attempt to admit any informal arbitrations or awards under the provisions of Order XXIII, Rule 3.
Belagoduhal Virabhadra Gowd vs Kalyan Gangamma And Ors. on 24 November, 1925
92 : (1921) M.W.N. 756 : 14 L.W. 666 Krishnan and Odgers, JJ., followed with some hesitation Shavaksha Dinsha Davar v. Tyab Haji Ayub 37 Ind. Cas. 140 : 40 B. 386 : 18 Bom.
Dekari Tea Co. Ltd. vs The Assam Bengal Railway Co. on 11 June, 1920
4. In my opinion, the terms of Section 89 are such that it is not possible to hold that an informal reference in a pending suit can be given effect to in that way. The words of Section 89, upon which the matter depends, are these; 'Save in so far as is otherwise provided by the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, or by any other law for the time being in force." The question is whether the last words let in Order XXIII, Rule 3. In my opinion they do not. The words "Any other law for the time being in force" refer, to my mind, to amendments of, or substitutions for, the Arbitration Act, or other piece of legislation on that subject-matter. The decision in Shavahsha Dinsha Davar v. Tyab Haji Ayub 37 Ind. Cas. 149 : 40 B. 386 at p. 387 : 18 Bom. L.R. 559 is, in my judgment, right, and I propose to follow it. I cannot find, except in some Bombay cases before Section 89 was passed or in cases where observations have been obiter, that there is any convincing authority contrary to the decision of Mr. Justice Macleod.
Guimoni Dasi vs Tarini Charan Porel on 12 July, 1927
404 and by Macleod., C.J., in Shavaksha Dinsha Davar v. Tyab Haji Ayub [1916] 40 Bom. 386, the code makes elaborate provisions for the control by the Court of proceedings in arbitration held on a reference through the Court, and it is inconceivable that the legislature intended that it should be open to the parties to cast aside these provisions and carry on the proceedings in any way they choose. Of course, if the parties agree about the result of the proceedings there is an end of the matter; but if they do not, the fact that the proceedings are illegal nullifies the award of the arbitrator.
Peddapalayam Bodachari Alias ... vs Peddappalayam Muniyachari on 17 August, 1921
4. We are further inclined to follow the view taken by Macleod, J., (now Chief Justice) in Shavaksha Dinsha Davar v. Tyab Hai Ayub 37 Ind. Cas. 140 : 40 B. 386 : 18 Bom. L.R. 559 that Section 89, Civil Procedure Code, is a bar to the present contention, but it is not necessary to express a final opinion on the point.
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