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Documents citing Nagalingam Pillai vs Ramachandra Tevar on 4 March, 1901

Indoji Jithaji vs Kothapalli Rama Charlu And Ors. on 11 April, 1919

2. The 1st defendant obtained the property under a Will of his father, dated the 12th September 1910, wherein he describes the properties as his self-acquisition. He then bequeaths the properties in equal halves to the 1st defendant and to the minor son of the testator's deceased younger brother, his undivided co parcener, and some small amounts to other persons. The main bequest was to the testator's son, the 1st defendant, and to the younger brother's son in equal moieties. There can be little doubt in my opinion that upon those fasts the property would be ancestral property in the hands of the 1st defendant, according to the ruling of this Court in Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C.R. 50 at p. 55 and Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar 24 M. 429 : 11 M.L. 210. The question was fully discussed in the last-mentioned case, where it is laid down that "a father may leave his self acquired property to descend to his sons as ancestral property or if he makes any disposition of it in favour of a son, he is at liberty to preserve for it the character of ancestral property. Whether in any given case, the property was intended to pass to the son as ancestral or as self acquired property is a question of intention turning on the construction of the instrument of gift. If there are no words indicating a contrary intention, the natural inference should be that the father intended the sons to take the property as their ancestral estate."
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Janakiram Chatty And Ors. vs G.C. Nagamony Mudaliar on 23 April, 1925

In my view, the fact that the defendant took the estate as a gift from his father will not take away the liability which would have devolved on him, if he had succeeded to the property as son and heir. As pointed out in Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar 1901 24 Mad. 429, where property is given by Will to a person who would otherwise be entitled to it as heir, the character of the property is not changed. The same principle should be extended to transfer inter vivos.
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Jankiram Chetti vs Nagamony Mudaliar on 3 April, 1925

If, as I take it in Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar (1901) ILR 24 Mad 429: 11 MLJ 210 the ratio decidendi is that because but for the will the donee would have taken it as ancestral property, it is therefore a reasonable presumption to draw that where a testator gives property to such a person without in terms indicating his intention he intended it to be taken in the same character as he would have taken but for the disposition this would not apply to cases where the donees would succeed, if there was an intestacy, as tenants-in-common, or in eases where they would not be even rever-sioners to the estate but strangers.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Seeyali Achari And Ors. vs K. Doraiswami Achari And Anr. on 6 November, 1946

6. The directions in the will that the first and second respondents shall discharge the debt borrowed by the testator from the Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund on the security, of the house bearing door No. 26, Kapaleeswarar North Ward Street and that they both shall, after the testator's lifetime, divide the said house in equal shares, do not, in our opinion, indicate any intention on the testator's part that the house should be taken by the legatees as their self-acquired property. Even in the absence of an express direction to that effect the legatees will have to discharge the debt secured on the property bequeathed and that obligation would arise whether the legatees take the property as their self-acquired property or as ancestral property in their hands. No importance again can be attached to the provision that the respondents shall divide the house in equal shares, because even if the property is taken by the respondents as ancestral property it is open to them to divide it at any time between themselves and in such division each can take only a half share. There is here no deviation from what would have happened if the sons got the property by inheritance from their father. It would also be noticed that in the leading case of Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar (1901) 11 M.L.J. 210 : I.L.R. .34 Mad.429 the will contained a similar provision that the landed estates of the testator shall be divided in equal shares among his three sons then alive and the sons who may be born to him thereafter. But this was not regarded as indicating an intention that the sons should take the property as self-acquired property, though coupled with the other clauses in the will the provision was read as indicating an intention that they should take the property in severalty.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Thambiran Chetty vs Nataraja Chetty And Ors. on 15 July, 1924

In Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar (1901) 24 Mad. 429, Shephard. J., observes at page 437 : "As the father is at liberty to make any disposition he pleases or to leave his self-acquired property to descend as ancestral property, so when making any disposition in favour of his son he is at liberty to preserve for the property the quality of ancestral property. Whether in any given case the property was intended to pass to the son as ancestral property or as self-acquired property must be a question of intention turning on the construction of the instrument of gift.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Shyama Bhai vs Purushothamadoss on 16 February, 1925

In Madras, upon the whole, the view seems to be that the father can determine, whether the property which ha has so bequeathed, shall be ancestral or self-acquired, on the principle of cujus est dare ejus est disponere; but that unless he expresses his wish that it should be deemed self-acquired, it is ancestral : See Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram 3 M.H.C. 50 and compare it with Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar (1901) 24 Mad. 429 and other capes. In Bombay on the other hand, the principle of intention seems to have been accepted, if it makes the property ancestral; but if there be no ex" pression of intention, it is deemed self-acquired.
Madras High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Salakshi Ammal vs Doraimanikka Nadan And Ors. on 5 March, 1925

I do not think that on this state of the authorities I can go behind the decisions though my attention has been drawn to a recent decision in O.S. No. 56 of 1922 where Mr. Justice Ramesam seems to doubt the correctness of Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar (1901) ILR 24 M 429. It was an obiter dictum so far as Madras is concerned the question can be set at rest except by a decision of the Privy Council. The question is how far the doctrine in these cases which relates to property bequeathed by a father to his sons would apply to cases where the father creates a trust and appoint his sons as trustees with hereditary rights. On principle I can see very little difference between the conferring of the office of trustee as regards a trust founded by the father by dedication of properties and the gift of properties to the sons. No authority has been cited which creates a difference merely by reason of the difference in the powers of the donees. In the case of properties given to them absolutely, of course they will have full powers of alienation; in the case of a trust they would have such powers as the law gives the trustee. The nature of the estate taken either in property or in the trust must in my opinion be the same; And I may also say that in the case of a trust the leaning of English authorities is in favor of joint tenancy. Trustees are treated as joint tenants with rights of survivor-ship. This is the principle enunciated in the Trust Act. So far as the present will is concerned, reading the will as a whole, I find there is nothing to show that that testator intended his sons to take the office of trustee as tenants-in-common. On the contrary, the words in the will that they should not partition, or sell the properties but they should enjoy them hereditarily suggest that he wanted them to take them with all the incidents of joint family property.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Rajagopala Pillai vs P. Veeraperumal Pillai And Ors. on 29 March, 1927

I may point out that in Madras the weight of authority is in favour of the view taken in Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramchandra Tevar [1901] 24 Mad. 429 but it is necessary to remember that the question arises in this case in a different form. It is not a bequest by a father to his sons. It is, on the contrary, a bequest by an uncle to his nephew. In the case of a father's separate proparty when the sons take it by inheritance they take it as ancestral property; that is to say, their male issue acquire in it a right by birth. The law presumes that a Hindu who gifts or bequeaths his property does not intend to alter the incidents of the property devised or gifted. If in the case of inheritance the property is taken as ancestral proerty, why should it be presumed that it is taken as separate property merely because there is either a will or a gift? It is on this principle that the Courts have laid down that when the bequest or the gift is in -favour of the sons they should prima facie be held to hold the property as joint family property.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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