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Shamsher Singh & Anr vs State Of Punjab on 23 August, 1974 cites

Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur And Ors. vs The State Of Punjab on 12 April, 1955

The ruling in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) is that a law can be framed prescribing the procedure by which and the authority by whom the said pleasure can be exercised. The pleasure of the President or the Governor to dismiss can therefore not only be delegated but is also subject to Article 311. The true position as laid down in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) is that Articles 310 and 311 must no doubt be read together but once the true scope and effect of Article 311 is determined the scope of Article 310(1) must be limited in the sense 835 That in regard to cases falling under Article 311(2) the pleasure mentioned in Article 310(2) must be exercised in- accordance with the requirements of Article 311.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 327 - Full Document

U.N. R. Rao vs Smt. Indira Gandhi on 17 March, 1971

A curious facet of the cabinet system arose in that case viz, whether the President could constitutionally continue his Council of Ministers to govern the country instead of holding the reins in his own hands after the Parliament, responsibility to which is the credential of the Cabinet to rule in the name of the people, had been dissolved. The conspectus of clauses bearing on the President's election, oath of office, legal capacity to carry on the administration directly were all considered, and Sikri, C. J., declared the law thus:
Supreme Court of India Cites 20 - Cited by 68 - S M Sikri - Full Document

Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd vs State Of West Bengal And Ors on 18 January, 1967

In Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (1) a' Constitution Bench of this Court expressly ruled that "the Governor's personal satisfaction was not necessary in this case as this is not an item of business with respect to which the Governor is, by or under the Constitution, required to act in his discretion. Although the executive Government of a State is vested in the Governor, actually it is carried on by Ministers and, in this particular case, under rr. 4 and 5 of the Rules of business, referred to above the business of Government is to be transacted in the various departments specified in the First Schedule thereof"
Supreme Court of India Cites 23 - Cited by 29 - C A Vaidyialingam - Full Document

Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan vs F.N. Rana And Anr. on 5 December, 1963

Some observations in the ruling relied upon, namely Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan v. F N. Rama (1) apparently seem to support the conclusion reached in Sardarilal,(Supra) but it must be remembered that the actual case turned on the constitutionality of the President delegating executive powers conferred on him by Art. 258 to a government of a State. In that case a distinction was made between functions with which the Union Government is invested and those vested in the President. The Court took the view that Art.258 (1) did not permit the President to part with powers and functions with which he is, by express provisions of the Constitution qua President, invested. The particular observations relied upon in Sardarilal may well be extracted here:
Gujarat High Court Cites 42 - Cited by 178 - Full Document

The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others vs Babu Ram Upadhya on 25 November, 1960

The majority view in Babu Ram Upadhya's case (supra) is no longer good law after the decision in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra). The theory that only the President or the Governor is personally to exercise pleasure of dismissing or removing a public servant is repelled by express words in Article 311 that no person who is a member of the Civil service or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The words "dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed" indicate that the pleasure of the President or the Governor is exercised by such officers on, whom the President or the Governor confers or delegates power.
Supreme Court of India Cites 41 - Cited by 800 - Full Document

Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs Union Of India on 1 November, 1957

If the proceedings are disciplinary, the rule in Dhingra's Case (1) is attracted. But if the termination is innocuous and does not stigmatize the probationer or temporary servant, the constitutional shield of Art. 311 is unavailable. In a series of cases, the Court has wrestled with the problem of devising a principle or rule to determine this questions' where non-punitive termination of probation for unsuitability ends and punitive action for delinquency begins. In Gopi Kishore (2) this Court ruled that where the State (1) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36.
Supreme Court of India Cites 46 - Cited by 809 - Full Document

State Of Punjab vs Dharam Singh on 2 February, 1968

Any confirmation by implication is negatived in the present case because before the completion of three years the High Court found prima facie that the work as well as the conduct of the appellant was unsatisfactory and a notice was given to the appellant on 4 October, 1968 to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated. Furthermore, Rule 9 shows that the employment of a probationer can be proposed to be terminated whether during or at the end of the period of probation. This indicates that where the notice is given at the end of the probation the period of probation gets extended till the inquiry proceedings commenced by the notice under Rule 9 come to an end. In this background the explanation to rule 7(1) shows that the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended impliedly if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of this period of probation. This implied extension where a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of the period of probation is not found in Dharam Singh's case (supra). This explanation in the present case does not mean that the implied extension of the probationary period is only between two and three years. The explanation on the contrary means that the provision regarding the maximum period of probation for three years is I directly and not mandatory unlike in Dharam Singh's case (supra) and that a probationer is not in fact confirmed till an order of confirmation is made.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 286 - R S Bachawat - Full Document
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