It was against this context that the observations
referred to above were made. This Court clearly
pointed out that where a trespasser was in settled
possession of the land he is not entitled to be evicted
except in due course of law and he is further entitled
to resist or defend his possession even against the
rightful owner who tries to dispossess him. The only
condition laid down by this Court was that the
possession of the trespasser must be settled
possession. The Court explained that the settled
possession must be extended over a sufficiently long
period and acquiesced in by the true owner. This
particular expression has persuaded the High Court to
hold that since the possession of the appellants' party
in this case was only a month old, it cannot be
deemed to be a settled possession. We, however,
think that this is not what this Court meant in defining
the nature of the settled possession. It is indeed
difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when
the possession of a trespasser can mature into a
settled possession. But what this Court really meant
was that the possession of a trespasser must be
effective, undisturbed and to the knowledge of the
owner or without any attempt at concealment. For
instance a stray or a casual act of possession would
not amount to "settled possession". There is no special
charm or magic in the word settled possession nor is it
a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a
28
straitjacket but it has been used to mean such clear
and effective possession of a person, even if he is a
trespasser, who gets the right under the criminal law
to defend his property against attack even by the true
owner. Similarly an occupation of the property by a
person as an agent or a servant at the instance of the
owner will not amount to actual physical possession.
Thus in our opinion the nature of possession in such
cases which may entitle a trespasser to exercise the
right of private defence of property and person should
contain the following attributes:
"7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till
date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions
being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani
[(2003) 7 SCC 350] .
In between, to quote a few out
of several, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish
Singh [AIR 1968 SC 620 : (1968) 2 SCR 203] this
Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass
when he forcibly entered his own land in the
possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired.
The Court turned down the submission that under
the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee
there was no rule or principle which made it
obligatory for the lessor to resort to court and obtain
an order for possession before he could eject the
lessee. The Court quoted with approval the law as
stated by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
Yar Mohd. v. Lakshmi Das [AIR 1959 All 1 : 1958 All
LJ 628 (FB)] (AIR at p. 4):
"Law respects possession even if there is no title to
support it. It will not permit any person to take the
law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in
actual possession without having recourse to a court.
No person can be allowed to become a judge in his
own cause." (AIR p. 5, para 13)
In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v.
K.C. Alexander [AIR 1968 SC 1165 : (1968) 3 SCR
163] this Court held that a person in possession of
land in assumed character of owner and exercising
peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a
perfectly good title against all the world but the
rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in
either party, possession alone decides. The Court
quoted Loft's maxim -- "Possessio contra omnes
valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (he that
hath possession hath right against all but him that
31
hath the very right)" and said: (AIR p. 1175, para
In
Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao [(1989)
4 SCC 131] it was held that where a person is in
settled possession of property, even on the
assumption that he had no right to remain on the
property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of
the property except by recourse to law.