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A.R. Antulay vs R.S. Nayak & Anr on 29 April, 1988

We are also not convinced with the arguments of Mr. Neeraj Kaul that the bar under Section 142 is only to the extent that Court inferior to the Magistrate, First Class will have no jurisdiction. In fact what the Legislature intended was not only Magistrate, First Class will try those cases and not any Magistrate as stipulated in First Schedule Part-II of the Code. By relying on Article 227 of the Constitution the respondent cannot be permitted to expand the jurisdiction or the scope of the special Act nor the jurisdiction as envisaged under Section 142 of the Act. We also find no merit in the contention of Neeraj Kaul that in A.R. Antulay's case case unlike Section 7(2) of the 1952 Act, no specific bar is provided under Section 142(c) of the Act. No doubt under 1952 Act it was provided that the cases shall be friable by Special Judge only. But reading of the N.I. Act does not indicate that under Section 142(c) unlimited jurisdiction vests with various Courts to try cases under Section 138 of the Act. Even though the words "only has not been written in Section 142(c) but the intention of the Legislature can be inferred. When we say that cases under Section 138 would not be tried by any Court inferior to the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate, First Class it does not automatically expand the jurisdiction to superior Courts. In fact the reading of Section 142(c) makes it clear that cases under Section 138 of the Act being summons cases are to be tried by Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate, First Class. First Schedule Part-11 of the Code provides that if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for less than 3 years or with fine only, then such an offence is friable by "Any Magistrate". It is with a view to circumvent "Any Magistrate" that the Legislature in its wisdom incorporated in Section 142(c) of the N.I. Act which is special provision that only Magistrate of First Class will try offences under Section 138 of the Act and not any Magistrate. This does not mean that jurisdiction under Section 142(c) has been expanded and can vest with Courts superior to the Court of Magistrate, First Class.
Supreme Court of India Cites 153 - Cited by 1309 - S Mukharji - Full Document

Ranbir Yadav vs State Of Bihar on 21 March, 1995

Reliance by Mr. Neeraj Kaul on the case of Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, , is misplaced. In that case the Court transferred the case from the Court of one Magistrate to the Court of another Magistrate for the reason that there was shortage of accommodation in the first Court. That is not the case in hand. It was not a case where the jurisdiction was transferred from the Court of Magistrate to the Court of Sessions.
Supreme Court of India Cites 34 - Cited by 178 - M K Mukherjee - Full Document

P. C. Gulati vs Lajya Ram Kapur And Others on 19 August, 1965

By special provision in Section 142(c) of the Act it has been prescribed to be Magistrate of First Class. Therefore, the summons case which are friable by the Court of Magistrate, 1st Class cannot be tried by the Court of Sessions. The specific provision under Section 142(c) of the Act, to our mind, excludes the jurisdiction of the Court of Session and, therefore, the transfer of case from the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate to the Court of Sessions is in violation of the provision of special enactment i.e. N.I. Act. The Apex Court in the case of P.C. Gulati v. Lalya Ram and Ors., , was not dealing with transfer of case under the special legislation.
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 14 - R Dayal - Full Document
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