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Lalchand Radhakisan vs Ramdayal Ramnarayan on 18 August, 1938

2. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that an order for rateable distribution passed under Section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code is not appealable, and that, therefore, this appeal is not competent. But the order appealed against in this case arises between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, and relates to the execution of the decree. It is true that if the question of the rateable distribution had been fought out between the decree-holders, then the order would not fall under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and would not be appealable. But as the question involved in this case affects not only the decree-holders inter se, but it affects also the judgment-debtor, who contends that he had produced the money in Court for a specific purpose and must be harried over to the decree-holder in the Gadag Court, I think that the order for rateable distribution falls under Section 47 read with Section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is therefore appealable Lalchand v. Ramdayal (1938) 41 Bom. L.R. 176, 179.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Sorabji Coovarji vs Kala Raghunath on 11 September, 1911

In Sorabji Coovarji v. Kala Raghwnath (1911) I.L.R. 36 Bom. 156 : S.C. 13 Bom. L.R. 1193, where the immoveable property of the judgment-debtor was attached and the judgment-debtor produced the decretal amount in Court in order that the attachment might be withdrawn under Order XXI, Rule 55, of the Civil Procedure Code, it was held that the amount could not be treated as assets distributable under Section 73 of the Code. The reason given was that the "assets" referred to in the section were assets held in the process of execution.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 37 - Full Document

Dhirendrarao Krishnarao Gunjikar vs Virbhadrappa G. Hosmani on 29 August, 1934

The wording of this section differs materially from the wording of the corresponding Section 295 of the former Code. As observed in Dhirendrarao v. Virbhadrappa (1934) 37 Bom. L.R. 78 the old section (p. 81) dealt, not with the assets held by the Court, but with assets which had been realised by the Court, and instead of referring as the present section does, to ant application to the Court for the execution of a decree, it refers to an applications to the Court which has realised the assets, so that, there could be no doubt that under the old section the Court to which an application had to be made was the Court which had realised the assets. It is not so clear in the present section that the Court to which the application has to be made must be the Court which holds the assets, and may not be the Court which granted the decree.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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