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1 - 10 of 23 (0.65 seconds)Section 2 in THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972 [Entire Act]
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Section 7 in THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972 [Entire Act]
The Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952
State Of Punjab vs Labour Court, Jullundur & Ors on 16 October, 1979
27) Reliance by Ms. Singh on judgment of Apex Court in
State of Punjab Vs. Labour Court, Jullundur (Supra) also
appears to be apposite. The Apex Court has held that PG Act is a
complete Code in itself and therefore the entire enquiry about
entitlement of a worker for gratuity must be conducted within the
framework of PG Act. Worker is therefore not expected to first seek a
declaration of employer-employee relationship by filing a reference
under the ID Act and thereafter file application for payment of
gratuity. Therefore, even preliminary enquiry about establishment of
employer-employee relationship can be conducted by Controlling
Authority within the framework of PG Act.
The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970
Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers' ... vs Administrative Officer And Ors on 13 January, 2004
10 Mr.Naik for Respondent No.1 suggests that though Respondent No.1
was the contractor who had engaged the Applicants as employees, it is the
Petitioner who was the principal employer. He refers in this connection to
the definition of 'principal employer' under the Contract Labour Act. There
is no reason to import the definition of 'principal employer' in Clause (f) of
Section 2 of the Gratuity Act. The Supreme Court in the case of
Ahmedabad Primary Teachers' Association vs. Administrative Officer
considered the definition of "employee" in clause (e) of Section 2 of the
Gratuity Act. Definitions of the word "employee" in diverse labour
enactments including the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 were
cited before the Court and the Court was urged to construe the word
"employee" in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Gratuity Act widely and include
teachers within it. The Supreme Court rejected the wide construction
suggested in that case, holding that the "legislature was alive to various
kinds of definitions of the word "employee" contained in various previous
labour enactments when the Act (i.e. the Gratuity Act) was passed in
1972. If it intended to cover in the definition of 'employee' all kinds of
employees, it could have as well used such wide language as is contained
in section 2(1) of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 which defines
'employee to mean 'any person who is employed for wages in any kind of
work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an
establishment ...........Nonuse of such wide language in definition of
'employee' in section 2(e) of the Act of l972 reinforces our conclusion that
teachers are clearly not covered in the definition." Even here, the
legislature whilst defining the word "employer" in the Gratuity act, had
before it various templates of definitions of "employer" in different labour
law legislations including the concept of "principal employer" under the
Contract Labour Act. It advisedly did not use these templates or introduce
the concept of "principal employer" in the definition of "employer" in clause
The Slum Areas (Improvement And Clearance) Act, 1956
M/S Queen'S Educational Society vs Commr.Of Income Tax on 16 March, 2015
The various administrative authorities and
tribunals established by the Legislature and falling within the first class
of tribunals referred to in Queen v. Special Commissioners of Income-tax
[(1888)21 Q.B.D 313] (vide supra), function in this way. They make a
preliminary determination of the existence of the conditions on
which their jurisdiction depends. They are not barred from doing
so. They do not have to wait for the decision of a civil Court before
undertaking any inquiry. This would defeat the object of the
statutes under which they function and make them a dead letter.
For instance, under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the jurisdiction of
the Controller to pass an order for eviction or to fix the standard rent
depends on the pre-existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties. This does not mean that the Controller has to wait
for a decision of the civil court as to the existence of such a relationship. A
mere denial by the tenant of the existence of such relationship does not
disable the Controller from holding the inquiry under that Act.