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M/S. Kanoria Chemicals And Industries ... vs U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors on 10 March, 1997 cites

Adoni Ginning Factory And Ors. vs Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Electricity ... on 14 February, 1979

Strong reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in Adoni Ginning Factory v. Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board [1979 (4) S.C.C. 560]. The said contention has been rejected by the Division Bench. R.A. Sharma, J., speaking for the Division Bench, first examined the nature and effect of the interim orders passed by courts pending disposal of substantive matters and then opined that in Adoni Ginning, this Court cannot be said to have held that in the case of stay of operation of the Notification, interest does not accrue at all. Sharma, J. pointed out that the said decision was concerned only with the period during which an order of injunction restraining the Board from collecting the revised charges was in operation and this Court opined that an order of injunction does not prevent the accrual of interest provided by the relevant tariffs/rules. Sharma, J. pointed out that the recoverability of the interest amount of the period covered by an order of stay of the Notification was not at all in issue in Adoni Ginning and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is any decision on the said question. Affirming the opt-repeated principle that a decision is an authority only for what it actually decides, the learned Judge opined that the consumers are liable to pay the late payment surcharge under clause 7(b) of the said Notification even for the period covered by the aforementioned order dated July 25, 1990 [as extended from time to time]. The learned Judge also pointed out that the interim orders passed in various writ petitions were not uniform and by way illustration set out in the interim order in Writ Petition No.30097 of 1990 [quoted by us hereinabove]. The correctness of the judgment is called in question in this batch of appeals.
Supreme Court of India Cites 0 - Cited by 20 - O C Reddy - Full Document

Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd vs Church Or South India Trust Assn. Csi ... on 29 April, 1992

As has been pointed out by S.C. Agrawal, J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. vs. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras [ 1992 (3) S.C.C.1], "while considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position was it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped cut from existence."
Supreme Court of India Cites 25 - Cited by 635 - S C Agrawal - Full Document

Hindalco Industries Ltd. And Others vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others on 15 November, 1995

[Emphasis added] The learned counsel for the appellants in the appeals before us rely upon the portions underlined in the above passage as a decision supporting their contention that where the operation of Government Order is stayed, no surcharge can be demanded upon the amount withheld. We find it difficult to agree. In our respectful opinion, the underlined portions do not constitute the decision of the court. They merely refer to the fact that the Board itself did not make a demand for surcharge amount in respect of the period covered by stay under its own understanding of the effect of the stayed order granted by the High Court and that it was justified in its opinion. The demand was , the court pointed out, in respect of the period covered by the order of injunction granted by this Court. This Court held expressly that the grant of and injunction does not relieve the consumers of their obligation to pay the charges at the enhanced rates and, therefore, the demand for surcharge/interest for such period is not illegal. The portions underlined cannot be understood as laying down the proposition that in respect of the period covered by stay, no demand can be made. No such proposition can be deduced from the said passage for the reason that the liability for the said was not at all in issue in the said decision. Unless put in issue and pronounced upon, it cannot be said that there was a decision on the said issue. There was no list between the parties with respect to the period covered by the stay order of the High Court. If so, it cannot be said that any decision was rendered by this court on the said issue or aspect, as it may be called. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that Adoni Ginning cannot be read as laying down the proposition that the grant of stay of a Notification revising the electricity charges has the effect of relieving the consumers/petitioners of their obligation to pay late payment surcharge/interest on the amount withheld by them even when their writ petitions are dismissed ultimately. Holding otherwise would mean that even though the Electricity Board, who was the respondent in the writ petitions succeeded therein, is yet deprived of the late payment surcharge which is due to it under the tariff rules/regulation. It would be a case where the Board suffers prejudice on account of the order of the court and for no fault of it's. It succeeds in the writ petition and yet loses. The consumer files the writ petition, obtains stay of operation of the Notification revising the rates and fails in his attack upon the validity of the Notification and yet he is relieved of the obligation to pay the late payment surcharge for the period of stay, which he is liable to pay according to the statutory terms and conditions indeed form part of the contract of supply entered into by him with the Board. We do not think that any such unfair and inequitable proposition can be sustained in law. No such proposition flows from Adoni Ginning. It is a matter of common knowledge that several petitioners [their counsel] word the stay petition differently. On petitioner may ask for injunction, another may ask for stay of demand notice, the third on may ask for stay of collection of the amount demanded and the fourth one may ask for the stay of the very Notification. Such distinctions are bound to occur where a large number of writ petitions are filed challenging the same Notification. the interim orders made by the Court may also vary in their phraseology in such a situation. Take this very case while the consumers has asked for stay of operation of the Government Order revising the rates, those very consumers asked for an injunction when they came to Supreme Court. Furthermore, as pointed out rightly by the High Court, the order of the stay granted by the High Court in writ petitions questioning the validity of the Notification dated April 21, 1990 were not uniform. In the case of writ petition filed by the Eastern U.P. Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Allahabad, the operation of the Notification was stayed while in the case of the writ petition filed by the Employers Association of Northern India, it was directed that "effect shall not be given to the notification dated 21st April, 1990 as against the petitioner shall deposit with the relevant authority within a period of one month from the date of dismissal of the writ petition the difference between the amount of electricity dues to be paid hereinafter by the petitioner under our orders and the sum which may be calculated on the basis of the impugned notification". The words "sum which may be calculated on the basis of the impugned notification"
Allahabad High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
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