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1 - 9 of 9 (0.28 seconds)The Guardians And Wards Act, 1890
Sarita Sharma vs Sushil Sharma on 16 February, 2000
In similar vein, in Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma (2000) 3 SCC 14, their Lordships held that the High Court should direct the parties to initiate proceedings for a full-fledged inquiry under Section 6 of the Minority Act, although in the interregnum it ought to have restored the status quo ante. Their Lordships reiterated that 'a female child should be allowed to remain with the mother so that she can be properly looked after'.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Smt. Nandita Virmani vs Raman Virmani on 19 February, 1982
2. At the very threshold we had conveyed to learned Counsel for the Petitioner our view that it would not be appropriate to exercise the extraordinary powers reposed on the Writ Court in the circumstances of this case. Mr. Issar, however, relies on Smt. Nandita Virmani v. Raman Virmani 1983 Crl. L. J. 794. We have carefully perused the Judgment but in our view it is of no assistance to the Petitioner. So far as the factual matrix was concerned, an understanding had been reached between the mother and the father in that case pertaining to visitation and custody of their minor son. It appears that the father had reneged on that understanding. The petition for Habeas Corpus was filed in those circumstances. The Division Bench, inter alia, underscored the fact that Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (Minority Act for short) postulated that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother. While drawing a distinction between guardianship and custody of a minor, the Division Bench clarified that Section 6 does not stipulate that custody of a child above the age of five years would invariably lie with the father. The Division Bench further elaborated that in custody matters it is the welfare of the child which is of pre-eminence; it would prevail over perceived individual rights of the parents. At no stage did the Division Bench opine that the jurisdiction of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Guardians Act for short) or of any matrimonial court exercising jurisdiction under respective Sections dealing with custody rights, must give way to Habeas Corpus proceedings. It is trite that wherever alternate or equally efficacious proceedings are available under statute a writ court should direct the parties to avail of such remedies.
Section 25 in The Guardians And Wards Act, 1890 [Entire Act]
Article 32 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Sumedha Nagpal vs State Of Delhi And Ors. on 3 March, 2000
3. The interplay between a Habeas Corpus Petition and a custody action under a statute, essentially seeking a decision on which of the parents has the right to the custody of an infant, has been considered in detail by the Supreme Court in Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi . The mother had filed a writ of Habeas Corpus on the allegation that she had been deprived, through deceit, of the care and custody of her two year old child. The contention on behalf of the mother was that since it was the petitioner who was statutorily entitled to the custody of the child, the writ court should not 'shirk' its task in ordering restoration of the custody of the minor to the mother. Their Lordships clarified that the rights of the parties would always be subservient to the welfare of the minor. The writ was dismissed with leave to file appropriate proceedings under Section 25 of the Guardians Act read with Section 6 of the Minority Act.
Saihba Ali vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 24 July, 2003
In Saihba Ali v. State of Maharashtra 2003 SCC(Cri) 1675 the Supreme Court reiterated the position that a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable.
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