Reference in this regard can also be made to the judgment of another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. Ashok Kumar v. The State of Punjab and Ors., (1997-3)117 P.L.R. 727, wherein it was held as under:-
16. Clause 9 of the allotment letter envisages that the cost indicated is not the final cost but is tentative cost subject to increase. The mode of increase is another aspect of the matter even if an irregularity is assumed in the mode of determination. Increased cost that itself would not render the clause redundant or ineffective. The power to demand increased cost is substantially stipulated in the said clause and, thus, action of the respondent-Board cannot be erred on any ground. As far as the quantum of demand is concerned, I have already discussed that there was no occasion for the Board to apply its mind because enhanced price only contained the element of increase in payment of cost of acquisition of land for the benefit of the petitioners. The learned counsel for the Board has rightly relied upon the case of Indore Development Authority v. Smt. Sadhana Agarwal and Ors., J.T. 1995(3) S.C. 1, where the Hon'ble Apex Court not only directed the allottees in those cases to pay the demanded amount, but even directed them to pay interest at the rate of 6%. Following the same principle, the demand raised by the respondent-Board cannot be termed as unjustified or arbitrary in any manner, whatsoever. The interest has been added only for the interregnums period as afore-indicated and that too in consonance with the judgments of the Court.
17. 1 find the contention of the learned counsel for the Board that the allottees always had the choice to decline the allotment of the flats, bereft of any merit. Thus, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra Kumar Jain, J.T. 1994(6) S.C. 292 relied upon by the learned counsel, has no application to the facts of the present case. The question involved in that case was whether the allottees are liable to pay price of the flats on the date of draw of lots or when there was communication of allotment to the allottees.
15. Clause 9 itself gives power to the Board to demand increased cost on all scores including as a result of increase in awards. There is no demand in the present cases which had been raised by the Board after a period of seven years. To attract the applicability of the doctrine of estoppal, the petitioners were required to show in what way the demand raised is contrary to any concluded contract and was prejudicial to their interest after they had accepted the offer and altered their position prior to the issuance of the said demands. The first demand was raised by the Board on 13.1.1987 and all the petitioners are stated to have paid the said demand without protest and demur. In other words, the petitioners themselves by their conduct or otherwise have accepted the demand raised by the Board in relation to payment of enhanced compensation. In any case, the principle of estoppel is a rule of evidence to which equity and fairness are the precepts. At this stage it may be relevant to make a reference to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of C. Narayan and Anr. v. Chandigarh Housing Board, Chandigarh, (1996-2) 113 P.L.R. 292, wherein it was held as under:-