Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 5 of 5 (0.20 seconds)
Naro vs Harbans Lal And Anr. on 26 February, 1962 cites

Dareppa Alagouda vs Mallappa Shivalingappa on 13 March, 1946

Our attention was also drawn to Dareppa Alagouda v. Mallappa Shivalingappa, AIR 1947 Bom 307, and Yeshwantrao Sabnis v. Bhalchandrarao, AIR 1952 Madh-B 207, where similar observations were made, and it was said, that a legal representative must continue the litigation on the cause of action sued upon and cannot set up a new and individual right. He can take up any plea which may be appropriate to his character as legal representative, but he cannot take up a new and inconsistent plea, or, a plea contrary to the one taken by the deceased. Nor can he take any plea which was not open to the deceased defendant himself. The above observations are true so far as they go, but are no guide to a case like the present. The distinguishing features of this case are, that the legal representative as an intermeddler cannot prosecute the appeal, because the right to sue die not survive to her. In her own right she was neither an heir nor had any power to contest the alienation.
Bombay High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Risaldar Ram Singh vs Labh Singh And Ors. on 16 September, 1953

Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on Risaldar Ram Singh v. Labh Singh, AIR 1954 Punj 119, where a learned Single Judge expressed the view that where persons who would be interested in challenging an alienation agree to it, that would be presumptive proof which if not rebutted by contrary proof would validate the transaction as a proper and right one and this is when necessity is not proved aliunde nor is there proof of enquiry on the part of the alienee nor honest belief for the necessity. These observations in view of the peculiar facts of that case are not of much help of resolving the controversy. No other authority has been cited which is really germane of the contention canvassed before us. In view of the clear language of para 59 I cannot persuade myself to hold that on the facts of this case the consent to the sale given by Ishri Parshad during the minority of the plaintiff would estop him from suing for possession of his share of the ancestral land on the ground that the sale by his father was without consideration and legal necessity.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Lalsa Rai And Ors. vs Udit Rai And Anr. on 7 May, 1923

There is authority for the proposition that when a person intermeddles with the property of the deceased, he is a legal representative of the deceased for the purposes of procedure to the extent of the property with which he has intermeddled, but that does not mean that the intermeddler becomes representative of the deceased for purposes of succession to the property. Such a person is "legal representative" under section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code, but only for purposes of procedure. The definition is for the purposes of adjective law and does not alter the rule of substantive law. Simply because an intermeddler is joined as a party to the suit for recovery of possession, no relief can be given to him and he cannot be treated on the same footing as the real heir of the deceased (vide Lalsa Rai v. Udit Rai, AIR 1925 All 717).
Allahabad High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
1