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1 - 10 of 26 (0.48 seconds)Section 13 in The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 [Entire Act]
Section 12 in The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 [Entire Act]
The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
Section 22 in The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 [Entire Act]
The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882
Article 136 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Crompton Greaves Ltd. vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 20 July, 2001
8. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for the
respondent-landlord, on the other hand, supported the
decree passed by the Small Causes Court, confirmed by a
Bench of that Court as also by the High Court. He
submitted that as far as constitutional validity of Section
3(1)(b) of the Rent Act is concerned, the point is covered
by a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of
Bombay in M/s Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 2002 Bom 65. The Small Causes
Court as well as the High Court were, therefore, wholly
justified in proceeding with the matter and in deciding it
on merits. He submitted that tenancy was terminated in
accordance with law. It was, therefore, obligatory on the
tenant to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of
the property to the landlord, but it failed to do so. The
landlord was, therefore, constrained to approach a Court
of law which passed a decree for possession in favour of
the landlord holding that since the paid-up share capital
of the Company was more than rupees one crore, the
provisions of the Act were not applicable to it. The
counsel urged that there was no illegality in the said
finding and obviously, therefore, the landlord was
entitled to possession of suit-premises and the tenant
could not resist eviction. An appellate Court confirmed
the said decree. Before the High Court it was contended
by the tenant that a unanimous resolution was passed by
the Company to decrease the share capital to less than
rupees one crore (Rs.41 lakhs from Rs.8.20 crores).
Such unilateral action at a subsequent stage, submitted
the counsel, would not deprive the owner of the property
to the 'right accrued' in favour of the landlord. The
'jurisdictional fact' (paid up share capital of more than
rupees one crore) was very much in existence at the time
when the proceedings were initiated against the
Company. But even otherwise, considering the factual
situation, the tenant was not entitled to any relief. It was
stated that though the so-called resolution was said to
have been passed, it had not been approved by the Board
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). In the
eye of law, therefore, there was no decrease of share
capital. The High Court was, hence, wholly right in
observing that even on that ground, the tenant was not
entitled to any relief. The counsel also submitted that
this Court is exercising discretionary and equitable
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The
tenant is not entitled to such equitable relief. It was
submitted that the tenant has not paid rent since several
years i.e. from January 1, 1995. According to the
counsel, the amount due and payable by the tenant as
on August 31, 2007 comes to Rs. 56,22,000/- pursuant
to interim order passed by this Court on April 18, 2005,
an amount of Rs. 24 lakhs was deposited by the
appellant in this Court which was withdrawn by the
landlord, but even excluding that amount, the tenant
is liable to pay to the landlord an amount of
Rs.32,22,000/-. It was further stated that after order
dated April 18, 2005 i.e. for more than two years, the
tenant has not paid even a pie to the landlord. Such
tenant, urged the counsel, does not deserve sympathy
and cannot claim equitable relief. On all these grounds,
the counsel prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001
Goppulal vs Thakurji Shriji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji ... on 12 March, 1969
40. The tenant took on lease the premises on
January 1, 1960. He, however, sublet a part of the
premises in August, 1965. The landlord issued a notice
on April 1, 1967 and terminated the tenancy. The tenant
denied that there was unlawful sub-letting of a part of
the premises. It was further submitted that in any case,
the so-called sub-tenant vacated the premises on April
14, 1967 i.e. before the suit was instituted by the
landlord and hence, cause of action did not survive. It
was contended on behalf of the tenant that Section
13(1)(e) used the expression "has sub-let", i.e. the
present perfect tense which contemplated the event
connected in some way with the present time. Since the
sub-tenant had already vacated and left the premises, at
the most it could be said that the tenant 'had sub-let'
the premises but it was not a ground for eviction under
the Act and hence no decree could have been passed.
Reliance was also placed on an earlier decision of this
Court in Goppulal v. Thakurji Shriji Shriji Dwarkadheshji,
(1969) 3 SCR 989 : (1969) 1 SCC 792.