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1 - 10 of 22 (0.48 seconds)Section 2 in The State Bank Of India Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Section 5 in The State Bank Of India Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Section 8 in The State Bank Of India Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Board Of Revenue Etc vs A. M. Ansari Etc on 17 March, 1976
12. The said order was challenged before the High Court of
Calcutta in a writ petition wherein it was contended that the
Bank was not a "dealer" within the meaning of Section 2(c)
of the Act in respect of the Exim scrips since it does not
and/or did not carry on the business of sale or purchase of
such Exim scrips; that in the case at hand it was only a
solitary case and that too for a brief period from March 23,
1992 to May 31, 1992 but neither before nor after the said
period had any such transaction been entered into which
could justify the finding of the tribunal that the
assessee-Bank had an intention to carry on business in
purchase of Exim scrips and that mere lack of regularity or
frequency would not convert a business into non-business
and would not make a dealer a non-dealer; that there was
16
no material on record to arrive at the conclusion that it was
clearly established that the writ petitioner No. 1, i.e., the
SBI, had the intention to carry on business in purchase of
Exim scrips; that even if the Bank was to be treated as a
dealer, the provisions of Section 4(6)(iii) would have to be
related to the business being carried on by the Bank
inasmuch as the said provisions would otherwise suffer
from vagueness and would expose it to attack on the ground
of constitutional validity; that keeping in view the scheme of
the Act and the intent and purpose of relevant provision,
purchase tax could be levied on a dealer only if he carried
on business of buying or selling the goods in question; that
whatever may be the nature of the transaction, the Bank
had only acted as an agent of the RBI in the transaction
relating to Exim scrips and would not, therefore, come
within the definition of the expression "dealer" as defined in
Section 2(c) of the 1941 Act; that the transaction involving
the acquisition of Exim scrips by the Bank could not be said
to be a case of purchase but a case of surrender; that the
Exim scrip was in substance a licence or a grant from the
Sovereign and there could not be any sale of such Exim
17
scrips to the Sovereign and accordingly, when the holder of
the Exim scrips gives up his right in favour of the granter it
is an act of surrender and nothing else; that SBI had merely
acted as an agent of the Sovereign, namely, the department
of the Central Government which had issued the Exim
scrips, that is, the Joint Chief Controller of Import and
Export and under the instruction of the RBI and once the
said Exim scrips were surrendered by the holders, the same
were required to be cancelled and forwarded to the office of
the Joint Chief Controller of Import and Exports who had
originally issued the same and in effect the grant under the
Exim scrips would, upon cancellation by the Bank, cease to
exist, which state of affairs is consistent with the concept of
surrender and it was not intended that upon acquisition of
the Exim scrips from their holders, the same would be
utilised by the Bank for the purpose of either selling the
same or using the same for the purpose for which they had
been intended. Be it noted learned counsel for the Bank
placed reliance on the decisions in Raipur Manufacturing
18
Co. Ltd. (supra), Board of Revenue v. A.M. Ansari 10 and
Billion Plastics Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Abdul Bakhi And Bros on 8 April, 1964
To arrive at the said conclusion, the tribunal referred to the
definition of “dealer” under Section 2(c) of the Act and
definition of “business” and other provisions and in that
context, referred to State of Andhra Pradesh v. H. Abdul
Bakhi and Bros.8 and Hindustan Steel Ltd v. State of
Orissa9 and came to hold that profit motive is not
imperative, because as per law “business” connects some
activity actually in the nature of trade or commerce or
manufacture which is done not for sport or pleasure or for
charity. Thus, there is little difference between the primary
or main part of the definition of “business” and its inclusive
7
AIR 1967 SC 1066
8
AIR 1965 SC 531
9
AIR 1970 SC 253
13
part which basically means, as in the present context, any
trade or commerce or similar activity and any transaction in
connection with, or ancillary or incidental to, such trade or
commerce. Process of exchange can be completed by the
exchange of goods and services for money. The tribunal has
observed that in the instant case the purchase of exim
scrips was by way of exchange of the scrips, which are
financial instruments, for money. Thereafter, the tribunal
referred to the meaning of the terms trade and commerce
and stated in Black’s Law Dictionary and certain other
dictionaries including Aiyer’s Judicial Dictionary and
eventually came to hold as follows:-
Hindustan Steel Ltd vs State Of Orissa on 4 August, 1969
To arrive at the said conclusion, the tribunal referred to the
definition of “dealer” under Section 2(c) of the Act and
definition of “business” and other provisions and in that
context, referred to State of Andhra Pradesh v. H. Abdul
Bakhi and Bros.8 and Hindustan Steel Ltd v. State of
Orissa9 and came to hold that profit motive is not
imperative, because as per law “business” connects some
activity actually in the nature of trade or commerce or
manufacture which is done not for sport or pleasure or for
charity. Thus, there is little difference between the primary
or main part of the definition of “business” and its inclusive
7
AIR 1967 SC 1066
8
AIR 1965 SC 531
9
AIR 1970 SC 253
13
part which basically means, as in the present context, any
trade or commerce or similar activity and any transaction in
connection with, or ancillary or incidental to, such trade or
commerce. Process of exchange can be completed by the
exchange of goods and services for money. The tribunal has
observed that in the instant case the purchase of exim
scrips was by way of exchange of the scrips, which are
financial instruments, for money. Thereafter, the tribunal
referred to the meaning of the terms trade and commerce
and stated in Black’s Law Dictionary and certain other
dictionaries including Aiyer’s Judicial Dictionary and
eventually came to hold as follows:-
Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore vs Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes on 11 May, 1988
As already said, the
compulsory nature of performance of the duty of
purchase of exim scrips emanates from Act of
1955 which created the bank. Unlike any other
dealer, the applicant bank could not think of
acting beyond the provisions of Act of 1955. That
being so, in the special circumstances of the
case, the element of compulsion involved in the
instruction of the Reserve Bank of India is
15
irrelevant. Apart from that aspect, we may refer
to the case of Coffee Board v. Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes (1988) 70 S.T.C. 162 (S.C.) in
which it was held that there was a sale, where
the growers of coffee delivered coffee to the Board,
though the growers did not actually sell it. It was
a sale by operation of law. The imposition of sales
tax on such sale of coffee was upheld. From the
above points of view we hold that the purchase of
exim scrips by the applicant bank were rightly
brought to purchase tax under 1941 Act.”
Bharat Fritz Werner Ltd. vs Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes on 16 April, 1992
(iii) of the Act and, therefore, the finding recorded by the
tribunal that the transaction involving the purchase of Exim
scrips by the assessee bank amounted to sale could not be
found fault with. It was also canvassed that the intention of
the legislature was clear and in view of the authority
rendered in Vikas Sales Corporation (supra), P.S.
Apparels (supra) and the decision in Bharat Fritz Werner
10
(1976) 3 SCC 512
11
[1994] 94 STC 139
19
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes12 nothing
really remain to be adjudicated.
H. Anraj Etc vs Government Of Tamilnadu Etc on 4 October, 1985
“51. We are therefore of the view that the decision
in H. Anraj (supra) incorrectly held that a sale of a
lottery ticket involved a sale of goods. There was
no sale of goods within the meaning of Sales Tax
Acts of the different States but at the highest a
transfer of an actionable claim. The decision to
the extent that it held otherwise is accordingly
overruled though prospectively with effect from
the date of this judgment.”