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1 - 10 of 18 (0.35 seconds)Section 173 in The Army Act, 1950 [Entire Act]
Jc-116244 Ex-Subedar Joginder Singh vs Union Of India And Ors. on 16 October, 2001
8. Hon'ble Supreme court of India in a very recent case of Joginder Singh v. Union of India 1996 (2) SLR 149 wherein the proprietor who was proceeding on casual leave from his duty station met with an accident while boarding the bus at the railway station, held as under:
Harbans Singh Tuli And Sons Builders ... vs Union Of India on 11 February, 1992
...If a person subject to Army Act is considered to be on duty while on casual leave, it could not make any difference, whether he travels from duty station to leave station on his own expense or public expense as that cannot be sine qua non for determining whether the person is on duty or not. He referred to a judgment of the Delhi High Court reported as Harbans Singh v. Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of defense, New Delhi , wherein the officer in that case was to travel from Walong in N.E.F.A., his duty station, to Patiala, his leave station. He had travelled from Walong to Jorhat and from Jorhat to Calcutta by air at public expense. From Calcutta to Ambala Cantt., he travelled on form D and from there, he travelled on road by his own scooter to his leave station Patiala. It was while traveling on scooter from Ambala to Patiala that he met with an accident which resulted in his disability. The High Court held that though he was traveling at his own expense and by his own conveyance during the part of his journey from Patiala to Rajpura, he was still to be treated on duty and entitled to disability pension.
Regional Director, E.S.I Corpn. And Anr vs Francis De Costa And Anr on 5 May, 1992
16. The expression "attributable to or aggravated by military service" must be read ejusdem generis with Rule 2 in Appendix II and opening line of Regulation 173. It must be read in conjunction with the scheme of these provisions and has to be given purposeful meaning. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase "arising out of and in the course of his employment." This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr. v. Francis De Costa observed as under:
Union Of India & Anr vs Shri Baljit Singh on 11 October, 1996
17. The injury or disability must be incidental to military service. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh 1997 (1) SLR 98 while declining to interfere with the judgment of the High Court held as under:
General Manager, B. E. S. ... vs Mrs. Agnes on 10 May, 1963
10. The above view is in consonance with the settled principles and we would adopt the same reasoning for rejecting the contention raised by the respondents before us even in the present writ petitions. This view can also be buttressed from other judgments of the Supreme Court and even this Court. The concept of attribute ability to and aggravation by service is quite similar to the expression "Accident arising out of and in the course of his employment" which occurs in Section 3 of the Workman Compensation Act." This provision was subject of scrutiny by the Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes and the Court held that the driver of petitioner's undertaking met with an accident while going home from duty, would be covered by this expression entitling the driver's family for receiving the compensation as the accident occurs during the course of employment. Applying the principles of "Notional extension at both entry and exist by time and space", the Court while reading such extensions as part of duty also held that circumstances of the case would have a bearing on such subject.
Madan Singh Shekhawat vs Union Of India & Ors on 17 August, 1999
In the case of Madan Singh Shekhawat (supra), the Supreme Court in unambiguous terms has held that rule of liberal construction should apply to these two provisions rather than strict construction. Strict construction of these provisions is bound to defeat the intent of Regulation 173 and giving unreasonable restricted meaning to the clauses of this Appendix II, would hurt the very object of these provisions. Clauses 5, 6, 9 and more particularly 10 and 19 to 22 reasonably exhibit and demonstrate the legislative intent to enlarge the scope of these rules tilted towards grant of relief, rather than rejection of claim. Clause 10 of Appendix II in unambiguous term shows the intent of rule framers that up to to 10 years of discharge of his service, if it can be established medically that disability is a delayed manifestation of a pathological process set in motion by service conditions obtaining prior to discharge and that if the disability had been manifest at the time of discharge, the individual would have been invalided out of service on this account, then it would be recognised as attributable to service. Under Clause 19, if it is established that disability was not caused by service, attributability shall not be conceded. However, aggravation by service is to be accepted unless any worsening in his condition was not due to his service or worsening did not persist on the date of discharge/claim. Clause 21 provides that if there is delay in diagnosis including its adverse effects or complications, the attributability is to be conceded. These regulations have been enacted so as to amply demonstrate a liberal approach. Giving them a limited meaning or introducing uncalled for restrictions would not be in consonance with the known precepts of judicial interpretation of the Statute. They must be given their true and liberal meaning so as to satisfy the very purpose of these enactments. Deprivation of the benefit is exceptional while its grant subject to satisfaction of the conditions under Regulation 173, appears to be the purpose of rules.
M. Pentiah And Others vs Muddala Veeramallappa And Others on 7 November, 1960
15. This rule of construction is quoted with approval by this Court in M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa and also referred to by Beg, C.J. In Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and in Hameedia Hardware Stores, represented by its Partner S. Peer Mohammed v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar .
Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage ... vs R. Rajappa & Others on 21 February, 1978
15. This rule of construction is quoted with approval by this Court in M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa and also referred to by Beg, C.J. In Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and in Hameedia Hardware Stores, represented by its Partner S. Peer Mohammed v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar .