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1 - 10 of 25 (1.71 seconds)Section 151 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Article 21 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 129 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd vs Proprietors Of Indian Express ... on 23 September, 1988
42. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Sahara India (supra) proceeded to
quote the judgment of the Reliance Petrochemicals (supra) and proceeded
to observe that the prior restraint against publication is vested in the form of
inherent powers of the superior Courts including High Court under the
provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein the Court
can proceed to pass such restraint orders if the administration of justice so
warrants approving the judgment of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1. It has also been held by the Supreme Court
that the right to open justice which is free and unprejudiced is a basic right
that has to be balanced vis-a-vis the right to press and expression of ideas
which is the facet of the right to speech and expression.
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005
"The very object behind empowering the Courts to devise such
methods is to see that the administration of justice is not
perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. At the same
time, there is a presumption of Open Justice under the common
law. Therefore, Courts have evolved mechanisms such as
postponement of publicity to balance presumption of
innocence, which is now recognized as a human right in
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra
(supra) vis-a-vis presumption of Open Justice. Such an order
of postponement has to be passed only when other alternative
measures such as change of venue or postponement of trial are
not available. In passing such orders of postponement,
Courts have to keep in mind the principle of proportionality
and the test of necessity. The applicant who seeks order of
postponement of publicity must displace the presumption of
Open Justice and only in such cases the higher Courts shall
pass the orders of postponement under Article 129/Article
215 of the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied)
Binod Rao vs Minocher Rustom Masani on 10 February, 1976
"At this stage, we wish to clarify that the reliance on the above
judgments is only to show that "prior restraint" per se has not
been rejected as constitutionally impermissible. At this
stage, we may point out that in the present IAs we are
dealing with the concept of "prior restraint" per se and not
with cases of misuse of powers of pre- censorship which
were corrected by the Courts [see Binod Rao v. Minocher
Rustom Masani reported in 78 Bom LR 125 and C. Vaidya v.
D'Penha decided by Gujarat High Court in Sp. CA 141 of 1976
on 22.03.1976 (unreported)]" (Emphasis Supplied)
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 3 March, 1966
In Mirajkar's case
(supra), the High Court ordered that the deposition of the defence witness
should not be reported in the newspapers. This order of the High Court was
challenged in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India. The Supreme Court held that apart from Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the High Court had the inherent power to restrain the press
from reporting where the administration of justice so demanded. The Court
held vide para 30 that evidence of the witness need not receive excessive
publicity as fear of such publicity may prevent the witness from speaking
the truth. That, such orders prohibiting publication for a temporary period
during the course of trial are permissible under the inherent powers of the
Court whenever the Court is satisfied that interest of justice so requires. As
to whether such a temporary prohibition of publication of Court proceedings
in the media under the inherent powers of the Court can be said to offend the
rights under Article 19(1)(a) [which includes freedom of the press to make
such publication], this Court held that an order of a Court passed to protect
the interest of justice and the administration of justice could not be treated as
violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
Shri Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. vs Smt. Madhu Trehan And Others on 28 May, 2001
In the case of Surya Prakash Khatri vs. Madhu Trehan, 2001 (92)
DLT 665, the Full Bench of this Court in para 23 of the judgment has held
as under:
Delhi Judicial Service Association Tis ... vs State Of Gujarat And Ors. Etc-Etc on 11 September, 1991
It may be noted that each of the Articles is in two parts. The first
part declares that the Supreme Court or the High Court "shall be a
Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court". The
I.A. No.723/2014 in CS(OS) No.102/2014 Page 28 of 42
second part says "includes the powers to punish for contempt". These
Articles save the pre-existing powers of the Courts as Courts of record
and that the power includes the power to punish for contempt [see Delhi
Judicial Service Association vs. State of Gujarat [(1991) 4 SCC 406] and
Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India [(1998) 4 SCC 409].
As such, a declaration has been made in the Constitution that the said
powers cannot be taken away by any law made by the Parliament except to
the limited extent mentioned in Article 142(2) in the matter of investigation
or punishment of any contempt of itself. If one reads Article 19(2) which
refers to law in relation to Contempt of Court with the first part of
Article 129 and Article 215, it becomes clear that the power is conferred
on the High Court and the Supreme Court to see that "the
administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or
interfered with". (Emphasis Supplied)