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1 - 10 of 16 (0.76 seconds)Section 47 in Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 8 in Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 102 in Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961
Section 16 in Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Satubha K. Vaghela vs Sayla Taluka Panchayat And Ors. on 6 October, 1964
5. As regards the second ground raised by Mr. Vyas, there is no dispute that respondent No. 2 the District Panchayat is the competent authority constituted under Section 2(5) of the Act. There is no dispute that by a resolution of the District Panchayat powers under Section 290 and under Section 49 have been delegated to respondent No. 1 by the District Panchayat. The contention of Mr. Vyas is that the powers which vest in the competent authority to exercise such judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be exercised by the competent authority itself and such powers or functions could not be a proper subject of delegation under Section 321(4)(iii). Section 321 Clause (4) provides that subject to the general or special orders which the State Government may issue from time to time (i) a District Panchayat may delegate to a District Development Officer and (iii) a competent authority may delegate to any officer subordinate to it, any powers exercisable by it under this Act. This question raised by Mr. Vyas is also concluded by a decision of the Division Bench consisting of Miabhoy J. (as he then was) and myself, in Satubha v. Sayala Panchayat VI G.L.R. 409. We have in terms held that the term 'its functions' in Section 111(1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act would not only include the functions of the Taluka Panchayat which were specified in the Act but also functions which were entrusted to it by or under the Act, or under any other provision of law as provided by Section 8(4) of the Act. The term 'its functions' was of a wide amplitude and was not restricted to only day-to-day or administrative functions referred to in Sections 117 or 118 of the Act but would cover even quasi-judicial functions. It is further held that the functions of the competent authority under Section 50(2) of the Act which are entrusted to the Taluka Panchayat of the District Panchayat by the State Government under Section 2(5) of the Act became part and parcel of the functions of the Taluka Panchayat or the District Panchayat, as soon as notification under Section 2(5) is issued. In the said decision a distinction is made between "assignment of power of the Panchayat to a smaller body like committee" and "delegation as contemplated by Section 221(4)". When assignment is made to a smaller committee of the powers of the parent Panchayat there would be no necessity of any delegation under Section 321(4). It is further held in terms that all the functions including the functions as a competent authority, which may be quasi-judicial function could form proper subject of delegation under Section 321(4) and if, therefore, such functions are delegated by the Panchayat who is appointed as a competent authority to the District Development Officer or the Taluka Development Officer of the Panchayat concerned, the delegation would be legal and valid. This decision, therefore, furnishes a complete answer to the contention raised by Mr. Vyas. Mr. Vyas, however, sought to distinguish this decision on the ground that even though delegation may be possible there was nothing in the Act which would show that the delegate would become the competent authority Itself. Once the Legislature provides for delegation of any of the powers the delegate would be exercising the same powers as the competent authority itself. Mr. Vyas also argued that Section 321(4) in terms provides that such delegation was subject to the general or special orders which the State Government may issue from time to time and in the absence of any such orders no delegation could be effectively made. The respondent No. 4 has categorically stated that no order has been issued by the State Government. The power to issue such general or special order would be only limiting the exercise of jurisdiction by the delegate but in the absence of any such general or special orders, there would be no restriction or limitation whatever. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of Mr. Vyas that if no orders limiting such power would be issued, the delegation itself would not become effective. Therefore, the second contention raised by Mr. Vyas must fail.
State Of Orissa vs Bidyabhujshan Mohapatra on 19 October, 1962
Their Lordships relied upon the earlier decision of His Lordship Shah J. in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Nahapatra where it was held that if the High Court was satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were 'unassailable' the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment were placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty because the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, was not justiciable. His Lordship in terms pointed out that if the order might be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment could lawfully be imposed, it was not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court had no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie made out a case of misdemeanour to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appeared that there bad been violation of the rules of natural justice. In the case before their Lordships, the principle was finally stated in the following words:
The State Of Maharashtra & Anr vs B. K. Takkamore & Ors on 2 February, 1967
The competent authority has rightly considered that the whole thing was done with undue haste and even the committee meeting was called without any such agenda and that all these surrounding circumstances and especially his subsequent conduct not to reinstate these employees in spite of various directions leave no doubt of his intention that he had wilfully disregarded the provisions of the Act and had passed this order terminating services of these employees. The competent authority was, therefore, right in holding that both these grounds amounted to misconduct. Even if there was any substance in the contention of Mr. Vyas that the first head of misconduct did not amount to misconduct, the competent authority's order could be equally supported on the ground that in its, view the later misconduct of insubordination was of the grossest type. The learned Government Pleader rightly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. B.K. Takkamore .