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1 - 10 of 23 (0.36 seconds)The Limitation Act, 1963
The General Clauses Act, 1897
Article 137 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 6 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 [Entire Act]
The Amending Act, 1897
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Dhannalal vs D.P. Vijayvargiya & Ors on 7 May, 1996
The benefit of this deletion should be given to the non-applicant No. 1 as the ban on filing an application beyond 12 months was lifted leaving the field open. It was specifically pointed out that prescription of period of limitation simply bars the remedy and does not extinguish the right. The right of the non-applicant No. 1 would have been extinguished only when his rights were irretrievably defeated by the order of the final court leaving him with no remedy. The learned counsel drew the attention of this court to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya 1996 ACJ 1013 (SC). It was further argued that there was no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that Article 137 of the Limitation Act would govern the proceedings before Claims Tribunal. The article would not apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal and, therefore, there was no merit in the contention that an application under Section 166(1) of the Act was barred.
The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2000
The Kerala State Electricity Board, ... vs T.P. Kunhaliumma on 29 October, 1976
This appears to be the ratio in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282. As already stated, the Act would be a special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and would not cease to be the special law by omission of Section 166(3) of the Act. It would still retain the character of special law. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal would not become a court constituted under the Code of Civil Procedure by deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act. It was the special law that constituted the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal as an alternative to the civil court. It has already been seen that Parliament wanted no limitation clause after it omitted Section 166(3) of the Act on 14.11.1994. This court cannot smuggle in by back door Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. If the intention was to extend the limitation by three years, Parliament would have prescribed that limitation in Section 166 (3) of the Act rather than omitting it altogether. This action would have been more in consonance with the history of Section 166(3) ibid.