Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 13 (0.28 seconds)The Finance Act, 1996
Section 4 in The Finance Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
Suraj Mall Mohta And Co vs A. V. Visvanatha Sastri And Another on 28 May, 1954
On the arguments addressed before us, the first questions that arises for consideration is of the nature of sub-section (1A). As is plain from the language of that provision, it enabled the Income-tax Officer to bring to tax escaped income for only for such provision years as fell wholly or partly within the period beginning on 1st september, 1939, and ending on 31st March, 1946, if the escaped income of such year or years amounted to or was likely to amount to Rs. 1 lakh or more. When sub-section (1A) was introduced with effect from 17th July, 1954, the period of limitation for reopening assessments under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 34(1) for any year falling within the aforesaid period had already expired. Sub-section (1A) made no distinction as to whether the escaped assessment was due to an omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, or whether even if there was no such omission or failure, the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that income had escaped assessment or full assessment. It enabled the Income-tax Officer to serve a notice, no matter whether the assessees case fell under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 34, and notwithstanding that the period of eight years or, as the case may be, four years specified in sub-section (1) had expired. A notice under sub-section (1A) could be issued only with the previous sanction of the Central Board of Revenue on or before 31st March 1956. Sub-section (1A) thus expressly referred to the assessments which could be duly opened by specific reference to particular previous years. There can, therefore, be no doubt that it embodied a special provision with regard to the reopening of assessment of particular previous years which could not be reopened either under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 34(1) because of the bar of limitation. That sub-section was no doubt introduced soon after the decision of the Supreme Court in Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. v. Visvanatha Sastri. But its applicability was not confined to only èthose cases which were being dealt with under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, or were before the Investigation Commission. It was a provision inserted for the "assessment or reassessment" of all persons "who have to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxes" during the period specified in the sub-section. Learned Advocate-General did not dispute that sub-section (1A) was special provision. What he urged was that it was a special provision till 1st April, 1956, only and thereafter it ceased to be operative, and that, though it was retained on the statute book after 1st April, 1956, it must be taken to have been impliedly repealed when the time limit of eight years for a notice under section 34(1)(a) was removed by section 18 of the finance Act, 1956.
Section 18 in The Finance Act, 2018 [Entire Act]
Shahzada Nand And Sons And Ors. vs Central Board Of Revenue And Ors. on 8 September, 1961
Turning now to the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the decision of the Punjab High Court in Shahzada Nand and Sons v. Central Board of Revenue supports the views we have taken. In that case, the learned judges of the Punjab High Court on the principle of harmonious construction and the rule of construction that a statute must be construed according to the plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words in which it is expressed, reached the conclusion that sub-section (IA) of section 34 is an exception to the cases covered by sub-section (I)(a) of the said section and, consequently, if a notice falling under section 34(I)(a) falls also within sub-section (IA), that is to say, the notice is in respect of income, profits or gains which have escaped assessment for any previous year falling within 1st September, 1939, and 31st March, 1946 such a notice could not under the last proviso to sub-section (IA) be issued after 31st March, 1956.
Taxation On Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
S. C. Prashar, Income-Tax ... vs Vasantsen Dwarkadas And Others on 12 December, 1962
If the reasoning on which the Calcutta High Court held that action under the amended section could not be taken if prior to the amendment coming into force the period of serving the notice had already expired is accepted as sound, then it must be held that action under the amended section could not be taken even in regard to the reopening of assessment for the year ending on 31st March, 1941, and subsequent years falling under sub-section (IA) after 31st March, 1956, that is to say, after the end of the period for the issue of a notice under sub-section (IA). It must be noted that section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, came into force on 1st April, 1956, that is, from the midnight of 31st March, 1956, and it was at this midnight hour that the 31st day of March, 1956, after which no notice under sub-section (IA) could be issued, ended. The decision of the Calcutta High Court led to the insertion of a new sub-section (4) in section 34 by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959. After the coming into force of sub-section (4) in 1959, a notice under clause (a) of sub-section (I) of section 34 could be issued at any time notwithstanding that at the time of the issue of the notice the period of eight years specified in the sub-section before its amendment by section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, had expired. Section 4 of the amending Act of 1959 saved and validated notices issued and action taken between 1956, when section 34 was amended by the Finance Acts, 1956 and 1959 when the amending Act was passed and said that those notices and action could not be called in question on the ground that at the time the notices were issued or action was taken the time within which the notice should have been issued or assessment or reassessment should have been made under section 34 as in force before its amendment by section 18 of the Finance Act 1956 had expired. According to the majority decision of the Supreme Court in S. C. Prasher v. Vasantsen the new sub-section (4) of section 34 of the Act, as amended in 1959, is prospective and operates only from 12th March, 1959, and does not affect the notices issued previous to that date, and the effect of section 4 of the amending Act of 1959 is to validate an action under section 34 as amended in cases where action under section 34 has already become time-barred prior to its amendment in 1956. It is significant that even in 1959 when section 34 was again amended in the manner indicated above sub-section (IA) was èleft untouched. The continuance of that sub-section even after the amending Act of 1959 only shows that Parliament did not intend that action under section 34(I)(a), after it was amended in 1956, should be taken in cases where action under sub-section (IA) had become time-barred for want of issue of notice on or before 31st March, 1956. If that had been the intention then Parliament while providing by the insertion of the new sub-section (4) for the issue of a notice under clause (a) of section 34(I) notwithstanding the expiry of the eight years limitation specified in the second proviso to sub-section (IA) for serving a notice (sic). Parliament did not do so. On the other hand, the express reference in sub-section (4) of section 34 of the Act and section 4 of the amending Act of 1959 to the expiry of eight years limitation specified in section 34(I)(a) before its amendment by section 18 of the Finance Act of 1956 makes it pointedly clear that Parliament did not intend that action under the amended section 34(I)(a) should be taken in regard to the year ending on 31st March, 1941, and subsequent years falling under sub-section (IA) if prior to the coming into force of the amendment on 1st April, 1956, no action had been initiated under sub-section (IA) by the issue of a notice on or before the 31st March, 1956. In our judgment, there is nothing to show in the amendment made in 1956 in section 34(I) that the special provision embodied in sub-section (IA) was repealed or abrogated when the amendments came into force on 1st April, 1956.
Debi Dutta Moody vs T. Bellan And Ors. on 11 September, 1958
It is pertinent to note here that in Debi Dutta v. T. Bellan, it was held that the provision of section 34(I) of the Act, before it was amended in 1956, laid down a certain period of time within which notices must be served in order to enable a reassessment to be made and that on the expiry of that period the assessee was entitled to tell himself that no proceedings having been taken, he was safe from having his assessment reopened", and that action under the amended section could not be taken if prior to the amendment coming into force, that is 1st April, 1956, the period of serving the notice had already expired.