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1 - 10 of 12 (0.57 seconds)Section 2 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 25F in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Santosh Gupta vs State Bank Of Patiala on 29 April, 1980
If by September,
1967, the appellant company had resolved to close the office
at Delhi to which the respondent was attached, it is
unthinkable that aspect would not be recited in the notice.
The necessity for termination of service of the respondent
recited in the notice was recession in the work handled by
the company. Not even one word is stated in the notice that
the office to which the respondent was attached was in the
process of being closed down, so his services would no more
be required. On a true construction of the notice, it would
appear that the respondent had become surplus on account of
reduction in volume of work and that constitutes
retrenchment even in the traditional sense of the term as
interpreted in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar
Mills
964
Mazdoor Union(1) though that view does not hold the field in
view of the recent decisions of this Court in State Bank of
India v. N. Sundara Money(2) Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa and Others;(3)
Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala;(4) Delhi Cloth and
General Mills Ltd. v. Shambu Nath Mukerjee;(5) Mohan Lal v.
Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd(6) and L. Robert
D'souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway &
Anr.(7) The recitals and averments in the notice leave no
room for doubt that the service of the respondent was
terminated for the reason that on account of recession and
reduction in the volume of work of the company, respondent
has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of
service for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not
covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sec. 2(oo)
which defines retrenchment and it is by now well-settled
that where the termination of service does not fall within
any of the excluded categories, the termination would be
ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even attempted to be
urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of
the excluded categories. It is there indisputably a case of
retrenchment.
Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd vs Shambhu Nath Mukherjee & Ors on 3 October, 1977
If by September,
1967, the appellant company had resolved to close the office
at Delhi to which the respondent was attached, it is
unthinkable that aspect would not be recited in the notice.
The necessity for termination of service of the respondent
recited in the notice was recession in the work handled by
the company. Not even one word is stated in the notice that
the office to which the respondent was attached was in the
process of being closed down, so his services would no more
be required. On a true construction of the notice, it would
appear that the respondent had become surplus on account of
reduction in volume of work and that constitutes
retrenchment even in the traditional sense of the term as
interpreted in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar
Mills
964
Mazdoor Union(1) though that view does not hold the field in
view of the recent decisions of this Court in State Bank of
India v. N. Sundara Money(2) Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa and Others;(3)
Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala;(4) Delhi Cloth and
General Mills Ltd. v. Shambu Nath Mukerjee;(5) Mohan Lal v.
Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd(6) and L. Robert
D'souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway &
Anr.(7) The recitals and averments in the notice leave no
room for doubt that the service of the respondent was
terminated for the reason that on account of recession and
reduction in the volume of work of the company, respondent
has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of
service for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not
covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sec. 2(oo)
which defines retrenchment and it is by now well-settled
that where the termination of service does not fall within
any of the excluded categories, the termination would be
ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even attempted to be
urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of
the excluded categories. It is there indisputably a case of
retrenchment.
Mohan Lal vs Management Of M/S Bharat Electronics ... on 21 April, 1981
It is not disputed that the pre-requisite for a valid
retrenchment as laid down in Sec. 25f has not been complied
with and therefore the retrenchment bringing about
termination of service is ab initio void. Viewed from this
angle, the award of the Industrial Tribunal was correct and
unassailable and the learned Single Judge was in error in
interfering with the same. Undoubtedly, the Division Bench
of the High Court has set aside the order of the learned
Single Judge and restored the award for reasons of its own.
However, for the reasons herein indicated, the decision of
the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 25 of 1970
is upheld and confirmed and this appeal must therefore fail
and accordingly it is dismissed.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 25 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd vs Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union on 23 October, 1956
If by September,
1967, the appellant company had resolved to close the office
at Delhi to which the respondent was attached, it is
unthinkable that aspect would not be recited in the notice.
The necessity for termination of service of the respondent
recited in the notice was recession in the work handled by
the company. Not even one word is stated in the notice that
the office to which the respondent was attached was in the
process of being closed down, so his services would no more
be required. On a true construction of the notice, it would
appear that the respondent had become surplus on account of
reduction in volume of work and that constitutes
retrenchment even in the traditional sense of the term as
interpreted in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar
Mills
964
Mazdoor Union(1) though that view does not hold the field in
view of the recent decisions of this Court in State Bank of
India v. N. Sundara Money(2) Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa and Others;(3)
Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala;(4) Delhi Cloth and
General Mills Ltd. v. Shambu Nath Mukerjee;(5) Mohan Lal v.
Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd(6) and L. Robert
D'souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway &
Anr.(7) The recitals and averments in the notice leave no
room for doubt that the service of the respondent was
terminated for the reason that on account of recession and
reduction in the volume of work of the company, respondent
has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of
service for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not
covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sec. 2(oo)
which defines retrenchment and it is by now well-settled
that where the termination of service does not fall within
any of the excluded categories, the termination would be
ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even attempted to be
urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of
the excluded categories. It is there indisputably a case of
retrenchment.