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1 - 10 of 37 (0.31 seconds)The Limitation Act, 1963
Section 15 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Article 179 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Bhawanipore Banking Corpora-Tion, Ltd vs Gouri Shankar Sharma on 14 March, 1950
The respondent, as already mentioned, has referred to
Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Gouri Shankar Sharma
(supra) and submits that the subsequent suit has no direct
or immediate connection with the decree under execution and
we will deal with this aspect at the appropriate place.
The respondent relies upon a decision of the Bombay High
Court in Somshikharswami Shidlingswami'v. Shivappa Mallappa
Hosmaani and Others(1), which, according to the learned
counsel, runs on all fours with the present case. This was,
however, a case where the High Court was considering the
pleas of sections 14 and 15 of the Limitation Act raised by
the decreeholder to save running of time. The High Court
held section 15 out of the way as there was no order of stay
or injunction in any of the suits filed- by the judgment-
debtor preventing the decreeholder from executing his
decree. With regard to the plea of section 14(2) of the
Limitation Act, the High Court held that the decree-holder
was not prosecuting any case but was only defending the same
and it was "difficult to say...... that the Court was unable
to entertain the proceeding form defect of jurisdiction or
other cause of alike nature". Adverting to the unholy type
of tenacious litigation of the judgment debtor in that case
the High Court, being unable to apply the provisions of
sections 14 and 15 of the Act, pithily and rather ruefully,
observed as follows:
The Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920
Laxmiram Lallubhai Joshi vs Bhalashankar Veniram Mehta on 7 July, 1914
because his written statement in the suit was not an
"application" made to the proper court. So the appellant
cannot get the benefit of cl. 5 of Art. 182.
The Allahabad and Bombay High Courts have taken the view
that time would run from the date of the appellate order.
(Baldeo Singh v. Ram Swarup(1) and Joshi Laxmiram Lallubhai
v. Mehta Balashankar Veniram(2).
Vadlamannati Bala Tripura Sundaramma ... vs Abdul Khadar on 14 September, 1932
Regarding argument No. 3: An application may be said to be
one seeking to continue or to revive the previous execution
application if (1) it is in the eye of law still pending or
has been dismissed for no fault of the decreeholder and (2)
if the two applications are in substance similar in scope
and character. Where the previous application for execution
has been properly and finally disposed of by the execution
court, the subsequent application cannot be said to be in
continuation of it or to be a revival application. (See
Vadlamannati Bala Tripura Sundaramma v. Abdul Khader) (1).
In the present case the previous application (the fourth
application for execution was dismissed on June 23, 1956.
The execution court made this order: "Decreeholder in
person; judgment-debtor absent. Process fee not paid.
Dismissed as wholly infructuous." It appears from the
judgment of the appeal court, dated November 28, 1956, that
the execution court had dismissed the execution application
on June 23, 1956 as the appellant had failed to pay process
fee for the warrant of possession. It is plain from these
orders that the previous execution application was not kept
pending. On the contrary, it was dismissed on account of
the appellant's failure to pay process fee for the warrant
of possession. Accordingly the last application for
execution made on July 28, 1964 was not an application for
continuing or reviving the previous application made on
November 28, 1956.