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Reliance Airport Developers Pvt. Ltd vs Airports Authority Of India And Ors on 7 November, 2006 cites

Needle Industries Ltd. By Secretary And ... vs The Additional Commissioner For ... on 28 October, 1980

The authors have discussed the pure theory of jurisdiction, the innovative decision in Anisminic case, the development of the law in post-Anisminic period, the scope of the finality clauses (exclusion of jurisdiction of courts) in the statutes, and have laid down a few propositions at pp. 250-256 which could be advanced on the subject. The authors have concluded the discussion thus at p. 256:
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 82 - S Mohan - Full Document

Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd vs Girja Shankar Pant & Ors on 18 October, 2000

The discretion of a Judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown. It is different in different men. It is casual and depends upon constitution., temper, passion. In the best it is often times caprice : in the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable, said Lord CAMDEN. L. C.J., in Hindson and Kersey, (1680) 8 How St Tr 57; as cited in National Insurance Corporation Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur, AIR 2004 SC 1581, 1584, para 11 and Kumaron Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shanker Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182).
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 410 - U C Banerjee - Full Document

M/S. Aero Traders Pvt. Ltd vs Ravinder Kumar Suri on 27 October, 2004

Discretion. Power of the Court or arbitrators to decide as they think fit. The word discretion connotes necessarily an act of a judicial character, and, as used with reference to discretion exercised judicially, it implies the absence of a hard-and-fast rule, and it requires an actual exercise of judgment and a consideration of the facts and circumstances which are necessary to make a sound, fair and just determination, and a knowledge of the facts upon which the discretion may properly operate. [Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 27, page 289 as referred in Aero Traders Pvt. Ltd. v. Ravinder Kumar Suri, VI (2004) SLT 428, 430, para 6] A discretion, said Lord WRENBURY, does not empower a man to do what he likes merely because he is minded to do so, he must in the exercise of his discretion do not what he likes but what he ought.
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 60 - G P Mathur - Full Document

National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Keshav Bahadur And Ors on 20 January, 2004

The word discretion standing single and unsupported by circumstances signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot he arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. The word in itself implies vigilant circumspection and care; therefore, where the Legislature concedes discretion it also imposes a heavy responsibility. (See National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur, AIR 2004 SC 1581, 1584, para 10).
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 251 - A Pasayat - Full Document

State Of U.P. And Ors vs Renusagar Power Co. And Others on 28 July, 1988

One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of Governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary (See State of U.P. and Ors. v. Renusagar Power Co. and Ors. (AIR 1988 SC 1737). At one time, the traditional view in England was that the executive was not answerable where its action was attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor De Smith in his classical work Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4th Edition at pages 285-287 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the Courts may be broadly summarized as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires.
Supreme Court of India Cites 56 - Cited by 351 - S Mukharji - Full Document

Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd vs Invest Import on 9 October, 1980

Discretion said Lord Mansfield in R. V Wilkes (1770 (4) Burr 2527, when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular. (See Craies Statute Law, 6th Edn. P.273 and Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import (1981 (1) SCC 80).
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 242 - D A Desai - Full Document

G. Chandra Sekhara Pillai, Suresh Babu. ... vs Chief General Manager, Telecom, ... on 21 February, 2003

And I think that the day will come when it will be more widely recognized that the Wednesbury case was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative law, in so far as it suggested that there are degrees of unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree can bring an administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation. The depth of judicial review and the deference due to administrative discretion vary with the subject matter. It may well be, however, that the law can never be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision under review is not capricious or absurd. It is further observed that this does not mean that there has been a shift to merits review. On the contrary, the respective roles of judges and administrators are fundamentally distinct and will remain so. To this extent the general tenor of the observations in R (Mahmood) v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. (2000)1 WLR 840 are correct. And Laws L.J. (at 847 (para 18) rightly emphasized in Mahmoods case that the intensity of review in a public law case will depend on the subject matter in hand.
Kerala High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 664 - M R Nair - Full Document
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