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Heera Lal vs Board Of Revenue & Ors. on 5 February, 2001 cites

Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs Pandurang Miragu Agalawe & Ors on 22 February, 1988

(14). Before us Mr. M.C. Bhoot, counsel for the appellant urged ttiat on the death of a member of joint family the property must be considered to have vested in the remaining members by survivorship. Similar argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant in Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe & ors. (supra), also. The Supreme Court rejected the said conlention. 11 was held that property no doubt passes by survivorship but there is no question of any vesting or divesting in the sense contemplated by Sec. 12 of the Act. To interpret Sec. 12 to include cases of devolution by survivorship on the death of a member of the joint family would be to deny any practical effect to the adoption made by the widow of a member of the joint family. The Supreme Court was of the view that such result was not in the contemplation of the Parliament at all.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 49 - E S Venkataramiah - Full Document

Vasant And Anr. vs Dattu And Ors. on 8 December, 1986

The Supreme Court had agreed with the reasons given by the High Court of Bombay in that decision in taking the view that clause (c) of proviso to Section 12 of the Act would not be attracted to a case of this nature since as observed by the Supreme Court in Vasant's case (supra) no vesting of joint family property in Dharma the appellant took place on the death of Miragu and no divesting of property took place when Pandurang was adopted.
Supreme Court of India Cites 2 - Cited by 21 - O C Reddy - Full Document

Gowli Buddanna vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Mysore, ... on 10 January, 1966

In the said case the facts were that the properties consisting of agricultural lands and a house was jointly held by one Bhagirath and his brother Dulichand. Bhagiralh died sometime in the year 1930 leaving his widow Sita Bai and after the dealh of Bhagirath Dulichand became me sole surviving coparcener of the joint family. Sita Bai adopted Suresh Chandra on 4.3.1958 after coming into force of the Act. The Supreme Court noled the fact that at the time Suresh Chandra was adopted the joint family still continued to exist and the disputed properties retained their character of coparcenary property. Relying upon Gowli Buddanna vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra), the Supreme Court observed that under the Hindu system of law a joint family may consist of a single male member and widows of deceased male members and that the property of a join! family did not cease to belong to the joint family merely because the family is represented by a single coparcener who possesses rights which an absolute owner of the property may possess. A judgment of the Supreme Court in Dina Ji & ors. vs. Daddi & ors. (supra), was also cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. In that case one Dinaji filed a suit for injunclon and possession on the basis of registered sale-deed executed by one Yashoda Bai in his favour with respect of immovable property including agricultural land and houses. The property originally belonged to Yashoda Bai's husband and after his death she got it as limited owner and by influx of time and by coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, she acquired the rights of an absolute owner. On 24.3.1963, she adopted respondent Nain Singh as her son and executed a adoption document which was not registered. The trial court admitted the same in evidence in proof of adoption. In the adoption deed it is stated that the adopted son will be entitled to the whole property including movable and immovable and adoptive mother will have no right to alienate any part of the property after the deed of adoption, the trial court decreed the suit. The appellate court dismissed the suit setting aside the decree passed by the trial court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court considering the impact of Section 12 of the Act held that the adopted son in view of the proviso (c) to Section 12 of the Act will only be entitled to properly after the death of the adoptive mother, but the learned Judge felt that the further covenant in the adoption deed deprived her of that right and conferred that right on the adopted son. On this basis the High Court came to the conclusion that the widow after executing this deed of adoption had no right left in the properly and therefore a transfer executed by her will not confer any title on the plaintiff. It is on this basis that the High Court maintained the judgment of the lower appellate court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff appellant. By special leave the appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court construed Section 12(c) of the Act and held that this proviso departs from the Hindu General Law and makes it clear that the adopted child shall not divest any person of the estate which has vesled in him or her before the adoption. Construing the facts and circumstances of the said case, the Supreme Court held that in the said case Yashoda Bai who was the limited owner of the property after the death of her husband and after the Hindu Succession Act came into force, has become an absolute owner and therefore, the properly of her husband vested in her and therefore merely by adopting a child she could not be deprived of any of her rights in the properly and the adoption would come into play and the adopted child could get the rights for which he is entitled after her death as is clear from the scheme of Section 12 Proviso (C). The Supreme Court in this case after construing Section 12 of the Act and Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act set aside the judgments of the High Court and of the lower appellate court and restored the judgment of the trial court. This judgment, in our opinion, is distinguishable on facts and law with' the case on hand.
Supreme Court of India Cites 16 - Cited by 119 - Full Document
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